Carolina Coach Co. v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 01 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 322,322 |
| Citation | 17 Md.App. 51,299 A.2d 474 |
| Parties | CAROLINA COACH COMPANY v. Juanita P. BRADLEY. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Patrick L. Rogan, Jr., Salisbury, with whom were Richardson, Rogan & Anderson, Salisbury, on the brief, for appellant.
No appearance at argument and no brief filed for appellee.
Argued before MENCHINE, POWERS and SCANLAN, JJ.
Appellant, Carolina Coach Company, has appealed from a judgment, awarding damages against it and in favor of the appellee, Juanita P. Bradley, in the amount of $13,532.52, in an action for personal injuries following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, Judge C. Burnam Mace presiding. The question presented is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict which timely raised the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to show any negligence on the part of the appellant.
On September 13, 1968, at approximately 7:30 p. m., Juanita P. Bradley boarded one of the appellant's buses at Glen Burnie to return to her home in Vienna, Maryland. The bus was fully loaded with passengers when the appellee went aboard. The bus stopped at Queenstown, Maryland, a rest stop where all the passengers alighted. Queenstown was the final destination for a number of passengers. The appellee was among the last of the passengers to reboard the bus as it prepared to depart from Queenstown. She first went to the rear of the bus and rec-occupied the seat in which she had ridden from Glen Burnie.
The bus driver was the last person to re-board the vehicle at Queenstown. He sat down, closed the door and extinguished the overhead lights. Shortly after the driver had resumed his seat, but before he had actually started the bus in motion, Mrs. Bradley moved toward the middle of the bus in order to take a vacant seat. The appellee did not advise the driver that she was changing seats. She had started her movement toward her new seat before the driver turned off the overhead lights, but reached the seat after they had been extinguished. Just as she was ready to sit down, the bus started forward and appellee sat down hard on a coke bottle which was on the vacant seat.
After Mrs. Bradley sat down on the coke bottle, she noticed other coke bottles rolling on the floor under the seats. She placed the bottle on which she had sat under her seat. The appellee first told the driver about sitting on the coke bottle as she neared her final destination. The driver then picked up the coke bottles which were on the floor.
Medical testimony indicated tht the appellee had suffered a fractured coccyx bone as a result of the accident. The bone was removed by surgery.
At the conclusion of the appellee's case, the appellant filed a motion for a directed verdict, claiming (1) that there was no evidence showing either actual or constructive notice on the part of the carrier of the presence of the coke bottle, and (2) that there was no evidence sufficient to prove negligence. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion. It was renewed at the conclusion of the evidence and denied.
In deciding whether the appellant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted, we must 'consider the evidence together with all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be deduced therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.' Stoskin v. Prensky, 256 Md. 707, 709, 262 A.2d 48, 49 (1970). Accordingly, for the purpose of this opinion, we have adopted appellee's version of the accident. Id. Moreover, in our review of this appeal, we also recognize that the appellant is a common carrier of whom 'the law requires the highest degree of care which is consistent with the nature of (its) undertaking.' Brooks v. Sun Cab Co., Inc., 208 Md. 236, 242, 117 A.2d 554, 557 (1955). Nevertheless, we conclude, for the reasons we now state, that the trial court erred in submitting this case to the jury. There was insufficient evidence to serve as a proper basis for the jury to conclude that the appellant negligently breached any duty of care which it owed Mrs. Bradley.
The only evidence in the record which even arguably might be considered as tending to show negligence on the part of the appellant-carrier consists solely of the appellee's testimony that as she was ready to sit down in the vacant seat in the middle of the bus, towards which she had moved as the bus was departing Queenstown, 'the bus started suddenly, throwing me back and I hit a hard object,' i. e., the coke bottle on the vacant seat. This evidence was insufficient to carry the case to the jury.
With respect to sudden starting of the bus, the trial judge recognized that this particular fact, by itself, would not establish the breach of any duty of due care which the carrier owed the appellee when he instructed the jury that:
'You are advised that once a passenger is fairly on board, a bus operator may resume his ordinary duties as to the vehicle without further concern with the movements of the passengers within the bus. After a passenger is on board the bus, it is not incumbent upon the operator to wait until the passenger is seated before starting.
This does not mean, however, that the bus driver would be excused if there was an unusually sudden quick start, which, of course, would be brought to your attention as a result of the testimony that there was an unusual jerk or start which affected the passengers on this bus.' (emphasis added).
However, in this case there was no evidence of 'an unusually sudden quick start' of the bus and the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider that issue at all.
In Maryland, a bus driver is not required to wait until his passengers are seated before starting the bus in operation, unless the passenger labors under some apparent infirmity or disability. Przyborowski v. Baltimore Transit Co., 191 Md. 63, 66, 59 A.2d 687 (1948); Brocato v. United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore, 129 Md. 572, 99 A. 792 (1917). The evidence showed only that the appellee was 57 years of age at the time of the accident; there is no suggestion that she manifested any physical infirmity or disability of which the driver should have been aware.
Next, there was no evidence offered by the appellee to show that the start of the bus as it departed Queenstown was unusual, abnormal or extraordinary. In this State, a passenger cannot make out a valid case of negligence, based on the alleged...
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Moore v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
...930, 934 (2003) (emphasis added). But, "a common carrier is not the insurer of absolute safety . . . ." Carolina Coach Co. v. Bradley, 17 Md. App. 51, 57, 299 A.2d 474, 478 (1973). Thus, "in the case of a foreign substance in the aisle or on the floor of a conveyance the plaintiff must show......
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...passengers the duty to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the nature of his undertaking. Carolina Coach Company v. Bradley, 17 Md.App. 51, 54, 299 A.2d 474, 477 (1973); see Jacobson v. Julian, supra, 246 Md. at 559, 229 A.2d at 115. This obligation includes the duty to stop......
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Moore v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
...(2003) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, "a common carrier is not the insurer of absolute safety . . . ." Carolina Coach Co. v. Bradley, 17 Md. App. 51, 57, 299 A.2d 474, 478 (1973); see Moulden v. Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc., 239 Md. 229, 232, 210 A.2d 724, 725 (1965); Lexington Market......
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Wmata v. Deschamps
...prove that WMATA had notice of the alleged defect even under common carrier liability. We disagree. WMATA cites Carolina Coach Co. v. Bradley, 17 Md. App. 51, 299 A.2d 474 (1973), and Lusby v. Baltimore Transit Co., 195 Md. 118, 72 A.2d 754 (1950), in support of its argument that notice was......