Carolina Discount Corporation v. Landis Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1925
• Docket Number: 110.
• Parties: CAROLINA DISCOUNT CORPORATION v. LANDIS MOTOR CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

129 S.E. 414

190 N.C. 157

CAROLINA DISCOUNT CORPORATION v. LANDIS MOTOR CO.

No. 110.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

September 30, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Vance County; Devin, Judge.

Action by the Carolina Discount Corporation against the Landis Motor Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Caption or title cannot be used to extend terms of act beyond clear meaning.

Action by plaintiff to recover a Ford automobile from defendant. Upon agreed facts judgment was rendered for defendant. Affirmed. The facts agreed are as follows:

"Plaintiff sues to recover of defendant a Ford coupé. It was sold December 20, 1924, by Louisburg Motor to J. B. Champion, of Franklin county; seller taking a title retained note that was never registered. The Louisburg Motor Company had Champion sign application for title certificate on January 16, 1925, and the certificate was issued in the name of Champion, saying there is a mortgage to Carolina Discount Corporation for $551.

The title, retained note, and certificate of title were then transferred to Carolina Discount Corporation, Louisburg Motor Company, in December, 1924, took a second mortgage from Champion for $85, balance of the price, which was not recorded or mentioned in the certificate of title.

J. B Champion, on February 21, 1925, sold the Ford coupé to Landis Motor Company in Henderson for full value, representing that it was his, free of incumbrance, and that he had the certificate of title at his home in Franklin county in his trunk, and he took with him an addressed envelope in which to return the transferred certificate to Landis Motor Company."

The following judgment was rendered:

"This action being heard at this term on appeal from the judgment of the recorder of Vance county, and being heard by his honor on facts agreed on by the parties, the court doth adjudge that plaintiff is not entitled to recover the car sued for, and on motion of defendant the plaintiff is nonsuited. Defendant recovers costs of plaintiff's surety."

The plaintiff appealed, and assigned error as follows:

"First exception: To the failure of the court to hold that the certificate of title issued by the secretary of state entitled the holder thereof to the automobile in question.

Second exception: To the failure of his honor to hold that the transfer of the certificate of title, issued by the secretary of state, was necessary in order to give the transferee of the automobile title to the same.

Third exception: To the holding by the court in effect that possession of the car by the holder of the automobile without title from the secretary of state was valid as against the plaintiff, who had a proper title as provided for by law.

Fourth exception: To the failure of the court to hold that the registration of the title with the secretary of state of North Carolina with incumbrances thereon, was sufficient notice to prospective purchasers of any liens or incumbrances thereon.

Fifth exception: To the judgment of nonsuit."

Willis Smith, of Raleigh, and J. P. & J. H. Zollicoffer, of Henderson, for appellant.

T. T Hicks & Son, of Henderson, for appellee.

VARSER J.

Plaintiff contends that now and since the adoption of chapter 236, Public Laws 1923, it is not necessary to register a mortgage covering motor vehicles, for that the provisions of section 2, chapter 236, Public Laws 1923, transfer to the department of revenue all the duties in regard to the registration of such chattel mortgages, and that the declaration of the owner, set out in the application for registration with the commissioner of revenue, showing the liens or incumbrances, is all that is necessary. This, if true, would make a radical change in the registration of chattel mortgages, and take from all the counties and transfer to the department of revenue the many transactions represented in chattel mortgages covering motor vehicles.

The caption of chapter 236, Public Laws 1923, is broad and inclusive; it evinces the purpose to protect the title of motor vehicles, to provide for the issuance of certificates of title and evidence of registration thereof, to regulate purchase and sale or other transfer of ownership, to facilitate the recovery of motor vehicles stolen or unlawfully taken, to provide for the regulation and licensing of certain dealers in used and secondhand vehicles, and to prescribe the powers and duties of the secretary of state (now commissioner of revenue) under this act, and to provide penalties for violation of its provision.

When the act itself is examined, it does not go as far as its caption would indicate a purpose to go. Section 2 provides that no certificate of registration or number plates for such vehicles shall be issued unless the applicant shall at the time make application for an official certificate of title, or shall present such satisfactory evidence that such certificate has been previously issued, and allowing the registration officer to prescribe and furnish a form, and the applicant shall set out a full description of the motor vehicle on this official application form, containing the manufacturer's number, the motor number, and any distinguishing marks, together with the statement of the applicant's title, and "of any liens or incumbrances upon said motor vehicle," and such other information as may be required. If the registration officer is satisfied that the applicant is the owner of such motor vehicle, or otherwise entitled to have the same registered in his name, he shall thereupon issue to the applicant an appropriate certificate of title over his signature, authenticated by his seal bearing a consecutive number, and the certificate shall contain such description and evidence of identification of the motor vehicle that such officer may deem proper, together with the statement of any liens or incumbrances which the application may show to be thereon. Another provision is:

"Said certificate shall be good for the life of the car so long as the same is owned or held by the original holder of such certificate, and need not be renewed annually, or at any other time except as herein provided."

The caption or title may be resorted to when the terms of the act are not clear, but it cannot be used to extend the terms of the act beyond their clear meaning. Freight Discrimination Cases, 95 N.C. 434, 447, 59 Am. Rep. 250. The language of the caption does not control the act. State v. Woolard, 119 N.C. 779, 25 S.E. 719; State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190; Weesner v. Davidson, 182 N.C. 604, 109 S.E. 863; In re Chisholm's Will, 176 N.C. 211, 96 S.E. 1031.

Section 3 requires that:

"In the event of the sale or other transfer * * * of the ownership of a motor vehicle for which a certificate of title has been issued as aforesaid, the holder of such certificate shall indorse on the back of same an assignment thereof, with warranty of title, in form printed thereon, with a statement of all liens or incumbrances on said motor vehicle, and deliver the same to the purchaser or transferee at the time of delivery to him of such motor vehicle."

The purchaser or transferee is then required within a named time, to forward the transferred certificate to the secretary of state, to the end that a new certificate shall be issued.

Section 4 prohibits the operation of motor vehicles unless application has been made for certificate of title, and makes its violation a misdemeanor, and...