Carpenter v. Dawson, 96-CA-00464-SCT
| Decision Date | 13 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-CA-00464-SCT,96-CA-00464-SCT |
| Citation | 701 So.2d 806 |
| Parties | Coy C. CARPENTER v. David W. DAWSON and The City of Southhaven. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
William P. Myers, Hernando, for Appellant.
Wilton V. Byars, III, Daniel Coker Horton & Bell, Oxford, for Appellees.
En Banc.
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
¶1 On July 17, 1994, Coy Carpenter was injured in a collision with an auto driven by David Dawson, an officer on duty with the City of Southaven police. Counsel for Carpenter contacted the liability carrier for Southaven in an unsuccessful attempt to reach a settlement, but Carpenter did not submit a notice of claim to the City. Carpenter filed suit against Southaven and Dawson on October 5, 1995, one year and eighty days after the accident in question. Southaven was granted summary judgment by the Circuit Court of Desoto County based upon the running of the one-year statute of limitations in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11. Feeling aggrieved, Carpenter timely appealed said ruling to this Court.
II. ISSUES
¶2 The instant appeal involves substantially the same issue confronted by this Court in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss. 1997), that is, whether this Court will strictly enforce the statutory requirement for notice in the Tort Claims Act, specifically Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11. This Court held in Lumpkin that notification which, as here, was not provided to the "chief executive officer" of the governmental entity in question did not comply with the statutory requirements for notice. Carpenter argues that the one year statute of limitations provided in the Tort Claims Act statutes was tolled for an additional ninety-five (95) days based upon the fact that he provided notice of his claim to the insurance carrier for the City of Southaven.
¶3 Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 provides that:
(1) After all procedures within a governmental entity have been exhausted, any person having a claim for injury arising under the provisions of this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity; provided, however, that ninety (90) days prior to maintaining an action thereon, such person shall file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity;
(2) The notice of claim required by subsection (1) of this section shall be in writing, delivered in person or by registered or certified United States mail. Every notice of claim shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts upon which the claim is based, including the circumstances which brought about the injury, the extent of the injury, the time and place the injury occurred, the names of all persons known to be involved, the amount of money damages sought and the residence of the person making the claim at the time of the injury and at the time of filing the notice.
(3) All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five (95) days. The limitations period provided herein shall control and shall be exclusive in all actions subject to and brought under the provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the nature of the claim, the label or other characterization the claimant may use to describe it, or the provisions of any other statute of limitations which would otherwise govern the type of claim or legal theory if it were not subject to or brought under the provisions of this chapter.
¶4 The accident from which the present case arose occurred on July 17, 1994, and Carpenter did not file suit until October 5, 1995. Absent the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations by the providing of statutorily valid notice, Carpenter's suit is thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations. It is clear that the notice provided by Carpenter in the present case did not comply with the requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11, and the trial court thus correctly ruled that Carpenter's claim was not timely filed.
¶5 The notice provided by Carpenter, in the form of a two sentence letter to the city's liability carrier, merely sets forth the names of the plaintiff and the defendant and the date of the accident. In addition to failing to provide the "chief executive officer" (i.e. the mayor) with the required notice, it is apparent that the notice lacked much of the statutorily required information regarding the claim. Specifically, the notice failed to contain a "short and plain statement of facts," the "extent of the injury," the "time and place the injury occurred," the "names of all persons known to be involved," "the amount of damages sought," and the "residence of the person making the claims." Under these facts, the notice granted by Carpenter could not even be said to "substantially" comply with the requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11, and the notice is certainly not sufficient under a strict construction of the statute.
¶6 It is clear that the notice provisions contained in the Torts Claims Act statutes constitute a litigation "pitfall" for plaintiffs' attorneys in cases filed against the state and its political subdivisions. The notice provisions in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 are detailed and set forth requirements for notice which differ from those in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, to which attorneys in this State are accustomed. In this context, mistakes in complying with the required notification procedures are not...
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Brown v. City of Greenwood, Civil Action No. 4:97cv87-D-B (N.D. Miss. 4/__/2001)
...waiver was qualified by specifying certain procedural requirements which must be met before an action was filed."); Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So. 2d 806, 807 (Miss. 1997) ("This Court must enforce the statute as written . . ."); Lumpkin v. City of Jackson, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss. 1997) ("The L......
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Williams v. Clay County, 2002-CA-00224-SCT.
...requirements. See Holmes v. Defer, 722 So.2d 624 (Miss.1998); City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1997); Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1997). However, in December 1998, this Court handed down Reaves ex rel. Rouse v. Randall, 729 So.2d 1237 (Miss.1998). In Reaves, th......
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Owen v. Williamson, Civil Action No. 1:96cv259 (N.D. Miss. 4/__/1998)
...The Mississippi Supreme Court provides that the notice requirements of § 11-46-11 "should be strictly enforced." Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So. 2d 806, 807 (Miss. 1997). In Carpenter, the plaintiff sued the City of Southhaven and one of the city's police officers. Carpenter, 701 So. 2d at 806......
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Fairley v. George County
...notice provision, rejected strict compliance as set forth in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1997), and Carpenter v. Dawson, 701 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1997). The Court The Mississippi Tort Claims Act stands in contrast to the old common law principle of sovereign immunity where ......