Carpenter v. Elway
| Decision Date | 19 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 24746-1-II, No. 22964-1-II, No. 23408-4-II., No. 23258-8-II |
| Citation | 988 P.2d 1009,97 Wash.App. 977 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jon E. CARPENTER, a Single Man, Appellant, v. Barbara and Sam ELWAY, husband and wife, Respondents. Donald Morrow, Appellant, v. Jose Ruiz-Beyo and "Jane Doe" Ruiz-Beyo, husband and wife and their marital community composed thereof; Keam Thou and "Jane Doe" Thou, husband and wife and their marital community composed thereof, d/b/a Golden Given Sewing, Respondents. Donald Morrow, Respondent, v. Jose Ruiz-Beyo and "Jane Doe" Ruiz-Beyo, husband and wife and their marital community composed thereof; Keam Thou and "Jane Doe" Thou, husband and wife and their marital community composed thereof, Appellants. Lowell Ing, Patricia Ing, and Betty C. Foon, Respondents, v. Jimmie D. Haskins and Leatta Haskins, husband and wife, Appellants. |
James Marston Brown, Phillips, Krause & Brown, Aberdeen, for Appellant Carpenter.
William Robert Hickman, Marilee C. Erickson, Reed McClure, Seattle, for Appellants Keam Thou, Ruiz-Beyo; and Respondents Elway.
Walter Marland Hackett, Bremerton, for Appellants Haskins.
Mark J. Dynan, Tacoma, for Respondents Elway.
Richard L. Levandowski, Finch & Levandowski, Tacoma, for Respondents Franklin and Morrow.
Jonathan B. Noll, Foster, Pepper & Shefelman, Seattle, for Respondents Ing and Foon.
These four consolidated cases involve application of Mandatory Arbitration Rules (MAR) 6.2, 6.3 and 7.1(a), which set forth procedures for filing an arbitration award, seeking a trial de novo, and entering or vacating judgment on an award. Specifically, we consider the consequences of filing a request for a trial de novo before the arbitrator has filed proof of service of the arbitration award, what constitutes sufficient proof of service, and the minimum requirements for appealing a judgment on an arbitration award.
We hold that a request for a trial de novo is premature if filed before the arbitrator files proof of service and that a judgment on an arbitration award is not appealable until after the challenger has brought a CR 60 motion, or its substantial equivalent, before the trial court. Thus, we affirm the trial court in Carpenter v. Elway and in Ing v. Haskins. We vacate and remand the judgment in Morrow v. Ruiz-Beyo & Thou.
On November 19, 1997, Barbara and Sam Elway received a copy of the arbitrator's award in their lawsuit against Jon Carpenter. On that same day, they mailed to the trial court clerk their request for a trial de novo and a copy of the request, upon which there was a certification of service stamp attesting that they had sent a copy to Carpenter. In an accompanying letter, Elway asked the clerk to file the original and send back the conformed copy, which the clerk did.
The next day, November 20, the arbitrator filed the award with the superior court. The bottom of the award carried the following notation: "Original to the Clerk for filing with copies to each party." But the arbitrator did not file proof of service.
Carpenter received his copy of Elway's request on November 24, 1997. In January 1998, after discovering that the court file did not contain proof of service of Elway's trial de novo request, Carpenter moved for entry of judgment. Citing Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wash.2d 804, 947 P.2d 721 (1997), the trial court granted the motion and entered judgment accordingly.
About two weeks later, Elway moved for reconsideration pursuant to CR 59(b). Elway argued that because the arbitrator had not filed proof of service of the award pursuant to MAR 6.2, the 20-day period required in MAR 7.1(a) had not yet begun to run.
In opposition, Carpenter argued that (1) under MAR 6.3, Elway could attack the judgment only by filing a CR 60 motion to vacate; (2) the arbitrator's failure to file proof of service did not toll the 20-day MAR 7.1(a) period; and (3), in any event, the notation at the bottom of the award constituted proof of service under MAR 6.2.
The trial court rejected Carpenter's argument that the notation on the award constituted proof of service, noting that "the arbitrator has to file proof of service just like [MAR] 7.1(a), because, ... sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and that's the way it is." Consequently, the trial court granted Elway's motion and vacated the judgment, reasoning that the award had not been properly filed pursuant to MAR 6.2 and, thus, the MAR 7.1(a) 20-day time period had not yet started.
Carpenter appeals.
On April 3, 1997, an arbitrator filed an award in favor of Donald Morrow against defendants, Jose and Jane Doe Ruiz-Beyo, and Keam and Jane Doe Thou (collectively Thou). The arbitrator did not file proof of service.
On April 16, Thou filed a request for a trial de novo along with a legal messenger slip. But the legal messenger document did not indicate the name and address of the party served or the date of delivery. On April 30, Thou filed a certificate of service and another messenger slip showing service of the request for trial de novo on Morrow's attorney on April 16.
On March 13, 1998, Morrow moved to strike the request for trial de novo and for entry of judgment. Thou objected, contending that (1) they had served a copy of their request within the statutory 20-day period, and (2) the 20-day period for filing had not yet expired because the arbitrator had not yet filed proof of service.
The trial court granted Morrow's motion and struck the trial de novo. Several days later, the arbitrator filed a signed confirmation of service averring that "[a]ll parties were served with the Arbitrator's Award on April 4th, 1997." Nonetheless, the trial court entered judgment for Morrow.
Thou then filed a notice of appeal, cause No. 23258-8-II. While the appeal was pending, Thou filed with the trial court a CR 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment. Citing Roberts v. Johnson, 137 Wash.2d 84, 969 P.2d 446 (1999), Thou argued that their proof of service for a trial de novo was not untimely filed because the arbitrator had not yet filed proof of service of the arbitration award. The trial court, noting that the matter was on appeal, denied the motion on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction under RAP 7.2 until the appellate court remanded the matter.
Thou then filed a second appeal from this ruling, cause No. 24746-1-II. This court then consolidated the two Thou appeals, and later consolidated them with the Carpenter and Haskins appeals.
On February 19, 1998, the arbitrator filed an award in favor of Lowell and Patricia C. Ing, and Betty Foon (collectively Ing) against Jimmie D. and Leatta Haskins. Haskins timely filed and served a request for trial de novo but neglected to file proof of service. Sometime after the 20-day period for perfecting a request for a trial de novo had expired, Ing moved for entry of judgment. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that Haskins had failed to meet the 20-day deadline set forth by MAR 7.1(a). Haskins appeals.
The Legislature's purpose in adopting mandatory arbitration legislation was to "`reduce congestion in the courts and delays in hearing civil cases.'" Nevers, 133 Wash.2d at 815, 947 P.2d 721 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Perkins Coie v. Williams, 84 Wash.App. 733, 737, 929 P.2d 1215, review denied, 132 Wash.2d 1013, 940 P.2d 654 (1997)). RCW 7.06.030 authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate mandatory arbitration rules. Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 88, 969 P.2d 446. These rules (MAR) implement basic procedural requirements set forth in RCW 7.06.050.1 Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 88, 969 P.2d 446.
MAR 6.2 requires the arbitrator to file his award "with the clerk of the superior court, with proof of service of a copy on each party." An aggrieved party then has 20 days to "serve and file with the clerk a written request for a trial de novo in the superior court along with proof that a copy has been served upon all other parties appearing in the case." MAR 7.1(a).
If the aggrieved party fails to seek a trial de novo by the 20-day deadline set forth in MAR 7.1(a), the prevailing party is entitled to an entry of judgment on the award. MAR 6.3. Such judgment "is subject to all provisions of law relating to judgments in civil actions, but it is not subject to appellate review and it may not be attacked or set aside except by a motion to vacate under CR 60." MAR 6.3.
Further, because MAR 7.1(a) requires that the aggrieved party file proof of service "along with" its request for trial de novo, a trial court cannot grant a trial de novo unless the aggrieved party has served the request and filed proof of that service within the 20-day limit imposed by MAR 7.1(a). Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 89, 969 P.2d 446; Nevers, 133 Wash.2d at 811-13, 947 P.2d 721. The two acts, filing the request, and filing proof of service, are linked: "[o]ne act, in short, is not complete without the other." Nevers, 133 Wash.2d at 813, 947 P.2d 721.
The strict compliance requirement also applies to the filing of arbitration awards under MAR 6.2. Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 90, 969 P.2d 446. MAR 6.2 requires an arbitrator to file the award "with proof of service." Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 91, 969 P.2d 446. Thus, "the filing of one document (the award) is not complete without filing of the other (proof of service)." Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 91, 93, 969 P.2d 446; Inman v. Netteland, 95 Wash.App. 83, 87, 974 P.2d 365 (1999). Because filing of the arbitration award under MAR 6.2 triggers the MAR 7.1(a) 20-day time limit for filing a request for trial de novo, it follows that the 20-day period to request a trial de novo does not commence until the arbitrator has filed both the award and proof of service. Roberts, 137 Wash.2d at 93, 969 P.2d 446; Inman, 95 Wash.App. at 87, 974 P.2d 365.
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