Carrasquillo-gonzalez v. Sagardia-de-jesus .

• Decision Date: 14 July 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09-1776 (SEC).
• Citation: 723 F.Supp.2d 428
• Parties: Ezequiel CARRASQUILLO-GONZALEZ, et al, Plaintiffs v. Antonio SAGARDIA-DE-JESUS, et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

723 F.Supp.2d 428

Ezequiel CARRASQUILLO-GONZALEZ, et al, Plaintiffs

v.Antonio SAGARDIA-DE-JESUS, et al, Defendants.

Civil No. 09-1776 (SEC).

United States District Court,D. Puerto Rico.

July 14, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Eileen Landron-Guardiola, Luis A. Rodriguez-Munoz, Eduardo A. Vera-Ramirez, Centro Internacional De Mercadeo, Arlene R. Perez-Borrero, Landron & Vera, LLP, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Eliezer Alberto Aldarondo-Lopez, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, Guaynabo, PR, Osvaldo Feliu-Villegas, Luis Martinez-Llorens Law Offices P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Reconsideration (Docket # 27), and Plaintiffs' opposition thereto. See Docket # 30. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the Motion to Dismiss.

Factual Background

Ezequiel Carrasquillo-Gonzalez (“Carrasquillo”) (“Plaintiff”) ¹ is an employee of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Department of Justice, Bureau of Special Investigations (“NIE” in Spanish) where he currently holds the position of Inspector of Special Investigations in the INTERPOL branch of the NIE. He occupies said position in a probationary capacity. Plaintiff avers that he is a member of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) and that he participated in partisan political activities during his tenure as a public servant, over a span of approximately twenty years, beginning with the Rafael Hernández Colón PDP administration in 1985. Carrasquillo alleges that after a change in administration in early 2009, when the New Progressive Party (“NPP”) won the elections, he was illegally transferred and stripped of his duties and responsibilities as an NIE Inspector. According to the complaint these actions are part of an overall conspiracy to remove him by creating a hostile work environment, forcing him to resign or to otherwise deny him permanence as Inspector after the conclusion of his probationary period.

Defendants, on the other hand, claim that Plaintiff's former position is a trust position under Puerto Rico law, which allows dismissal on the basis of political affiliation. ² They additionally claim that Plaintiffs have failed to plead specific acts regarding Co-defendants Antonio M. Sagardia-De-Jesus (“Sagardia”), Victor Carbonell-Ramirez (“Carbonell”), Edwin Carrion-Soto (“Carrion”), William Machado-Aldarondo (“Machado”), and Ismael Cintron-Cintron (“Cintron”) but rather make generalized assertions, which are not admissible, as they have failed to meet the minimum pleading standard set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

This Court initially ruled that Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to plead a plausible cause of action under Iqbal against Sagardia, Carbonell, Machado, and Cintron for allegations regarding discriminatory treatment in violation of the First Amendment after Carrasquillo's transfer to INTERPOL, but that Plaintiff did not plead a plausible claim for relief regarding his allegations surrounding his removal from the post of Auxiliary Director for the Witness and Victim Protection Program.

Shortly after the ruling, at a Case Management & Settlement Conference, Defendants requested leave to file a motion for reconsideration regarding Sagardia, Carbonell, Machado, and Cintron, and Plaintiff responded by requesting leave to file an Amended Complaint. This Court granted both party's requests, but stated:

The Amended Complaint cannot refer to Carrasquillo's removal from the Witness Protection Program as a cause of action, and the Court will not revisit its initial ruling on this issue, Due Process or Equal Protection. What remains in controversy is whether his transfer to INTERPOL, and subsequent treatment in said office constitute a violation of the First Amendment.

Docket # 25. Neither party objected to this ruling. Accordingly, Plaintiff proceeded to file an Amended Complaint, and Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss or for Reconsideration.

Standard of Review

It has been established that “the general rules of pleading require ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, 572 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Complaints do not necessarily need to include detailed factual allegation, but must provide “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. As a result, for a plaintiff's claims to survive a motion to dismiss there must be “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Furthermore, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true.” Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir.2008). Conclusory statements and repetition of the elements of the case do not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court cannot dismiss a claim unless it is apparent that no relief can be granted under any of the facts that can be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Under the same rule, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable interests in favor of the plaintiff. However, it is well-pleaded facts that must be taken as true and therefore admitted.

Medina-Claudio v. Rodríguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.2002). The court will proceed to evaluate Carrasquillo's claims in order to determine whether they meet this standard and if there is a plausible entitlement to relief.

Applicable Law & Analysis Political Discrimination (First Amendment)

The freedom to belong to and support a political party, or engage in other forms of expression regarding public policy, is “integral to the freedom of association and freedom of political expression that are protected by the First Amendment.” Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 939 (1st Cir.2008). The First Amendment applies to Puerto Rico through the dispositions of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, public employees enjoy protection from adverse employment actions based on their political affiliation or beliefs. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). These actions include changes in employment which result in “a work situation ‘unreasonably inferior’ to the norm for that position.” Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1218 (1st Cir.1989); see also Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756 (1st Cir.2010)(stating “[a]ctions short of dismissal or demotion, including denials of promotions, transfers, and failures to recall after layoff, can constitute adverse employment actions.”)(citing Rutan v. Repub. Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990)).

Beyond this, to prevail on a claim of political discrimination, a public employee must at a minimum show that he engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct and that this conduct was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). However, even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion when making the adverse employment action brought by the plaintiff, it can defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration. Id.; see also Rodriguez-Garcia, 610 F.3d at 767-68.

This Court's prior Opinion and Order (Docket # 23) in the present action cites Ruiz-Casillas v. Camacho-Morales, 415 F.3d 127, 131 (1st Cir.2005), which held that “plaintiffs must first establish that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse employment action.” Establishing this in a prima facie case requires that “(1) the plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff's ... affiliation; (3) ... a challenged employment action [occurred]; and (4) ... ‘political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor’ behind it.” Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago, 464 F.3d 29, 48 (1st Cir.2006). Furthermore, as mentioned above, the challenged employment action must result in “unreasonably inferior” working conditions in order to prosper. Rosario-Urdaz v. Velazco, 433 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.2006). The Court will discuss if Plaintiff's transfer to INTERPOL or his subsequent treatment thereafter constitute a challenged employment action providing grounds for a political discrimination case.

1) Transfer to INTERPOL

Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.1993), establishes that mere temporal proximity between a change of administration and a public employee's dismissal is not enough to demonstrate the existence of a discriminatory animus. However, the atmosphere occasioned by a major political shift throughout Puerto Rico during a change of government, combined with the fact that discharged employees and discharging officials are of competing political persuasions, may produce probative circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, especially where discharged employees played very active or prominent roles in political activities. Plaintiffs bear the original burden of proof and must produce sufficient evidence from which it may be inferred that their constitutionally protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” for their dismissal. Once this takes place, the burden shifts toward the defendants, who must elaborate nondiscriminatory grounds for dismissal. Id.

In his Amended Complaint (Docket # 26)...