Carratelli v. State

• Decision Date: 20 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4D00-2714.,4D00-2714.
• Citation: 832 So.2d 850
• Parties: Robert CARRATELLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

832 So.2d 850

Robert CARRATELLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D00-2714.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

November 20, 2002.

Rehearing Denied January 15, 2003.

Roy Black and Christine M. Ng of Black, Srebnick & Kornspan, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David M. Schultz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Robert Carratelli was tried by jury, convicted of six counts of vehicular homicide, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The charges arose from an accident that occurred on June 4, 1999, when Carratelli drove his Mercedes Benz at a high rate of speed through a red light and into a 1994 Mercury Grand Marquis LS. All six passengers in the Grand Marquis died at the crash scene.

On appeal, we address two of Carratelli's claims and hold that: (1) Carratelli failed to preserve error arising from the denial of his juror challenges for causes and (2) there was no error in admitting in evidence of expert accident reconstruction testimony and a diagram which formed a part of the basis for that testimony.

Jury selection

The jury selection process was lengthy and difficult due to extensive pretrial publicity. During the voir dire, defense counsel moved to exclude a number of potential jurors for cause.

We find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense's attempted strikes for cause as to jurors Nesbitt, Johnson, and Lott.

Nesbitt had worked for fifteen years in law enforcement and for five years as a fireman. When initially asked by the trial judge whether he could be a fair and impartial juror, Nesbitt responded that he was not sure. He vacillated between indicating that he could be fair and that he might not. Nesbitt admitted that he had seen television and news reports concerning the accident and that at the time of the accident, he had read many stories about it every day in the newspaper.

When asked if he could set aside what he had heard or read, Nesbitt responded, "I believe, I could." He stated that he had talked about this case with his law enforcement friends; they specifically discussed the speed of appellant's vehicle and appellant's diabetic condition. In addition, the following colloquy took place regarding any preconceived opinions Nesbitt may have had:

Defense: In terms of your police officer relationships and the discussion and the publicity, is it a fair statement to say that the defense is not starting on an equal playing field?

Nesbitt: As far as me?

Defense: Yeah.

Nesbitt: I would hope to say that you would be. But it's a little hard for me to answer that question, because I don't know if I really formed an opinion or not. I try not to. But if I had—

Defense: If you have, what is it?

State: I object to him giving his opinion.

Court: Overruled.

Nesbitt: There could be a matter of guilt there, but that's my opinion, but I can't say for sure that I can't be convinced with evidence.

Defense: In other words, you are saying I might be able to talk you out of that?

Nesbitt: With evidence, I've got to see the evidence. I have to see the evidence and if the evidence is there, beyond a reasonable doubt, I believe I can make the right decision but—reject my opinion, whatever it may be, but I have to go strictly by the evidence.

Defense: You are saying the evidence could convince you to reject the opinion that you have?

Nesbitt: Yeah, yeah. If there is a— guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, okay, I would have to go one way.

Defense: What way?

Nesbitt: Guilty, but if it is not there, I can't, in all honesty, vote guilty for somebody that it wasn't proven against. Defense: It happens. The last question for you: Is it a concern in your mind, though, that it might take more of a defense or more evidence to help convince you to find Mr. Carratelli not guilty than it might otherwise take if you weren't who you are, having discussed this case and having read what you read?

Nesbitt: I don't think it would take more. Whatever evidence is presented in the case, I am going to have to go with that evidence and I don't think I would be coming back and say, I need more.

Defense: Now, would you suggest might it be more difficult for Mr. Carratelli to be acquitted with you as a juror than with a juror that didn't have the preconceived opinion as it were, as you described it?

Nesbitt: The way you put that, in all fairness to him probably it would, but that's—I don't want to sit here and say, you know, no, but—.

Subsequently, the State asked Nesbitt if he could set aside the conversations he had had with his friends, view the evidence on the facts, apply the law to the facts, and not prejudge the defendant. Nesbitt responded that he could.

Juror Lott initially expressed doubts as to whether she could keep her feelings out of her decision. She mentioned that a friend had recently lost a child in an ATV accident.

Lott: I know my emotions would come into play because I would think, you know, if I am to think about that child, this doesn't even involve kids. I know my emotions will come into it.

Defense: And will it—will that then serve to the detriment of Bob Carratelli?

Lott: It could possibly, and I wouldn't want it to be, so I would honestly say that in fairness to him, I don't think you—I would be good for him, you know, emotional wise. I don't think I'm there yet.

Defense: Because of the recency of that tragedy, do I hear you saying that you feel that you do not believe that you could be as fair and impartial as the law would want you to be on this particular case?

Lott: Yes, and as he deserves.

Defense: So you would rather not sit because of that?

Lott: I would, because I would want someone sitting here in a reverse role to be totally, you know, I would want them to be totally, out of a hundred percent of themselves, and I am not. And just don't think I would be fair to him.

The state asked Lott if she would follow the law and listen to the facts, and she responded, "uh-hum." The trial judge also asked Lott if she could do the job and be emotional and logical at the same time, and she stated, "I'll try, yeah, yes, I would think I would."

Juror Johnson initially told the trial judge that she would not have any problems being fair and impartial, but when questioned by the defense indicated otherwise.

Defense: Are you concerned that because of the magnitude of this accident that you can't really concentrate and be fair?

Johnson: I don't think I could be fair. I just—

Defense: It's okay too, I just need to know.

Johnson: I don't have the words.

Defense: Are you overwhelmed by the tragedy?

Johnson: Yeah, I feel sorry for the six people that lost their lives. Defense: Do you feel because of that, that you are just not going to be able to be fair to Mr. Carratelli in case [sic]?

Johnson: Yeah.

Defense: Even though you['d] like to be?

Johnson: Yes.

Defense: You just know, no matter what the judge tells you, you are not going to be able to be fair?

Johnson: No.

Defense: Do you agree with that statement?

Johnson: Yes.

Defense: And you would rather not be seated because you can't be fair—

Johnson: Right.

Defense:—to Mr. Carratelli?

Johnson: Yes.

When questioned by the State, Johnson indicated that after listening to all of the evidence, she "probably could" be fair to both sides.

An appellate court reviews a trial judge's decision on a for-cause challenge for an abuse of discretion. See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, 973 (Fla.2001). "`The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.'" Street v. State, 592 So.2d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA) (on clarification) (quoting Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984)). "A juror should be excused for cause if there is any reasonable doubt about the juror's ability to render an impartial verdict." Singleton, 783 So.2d at 973. "Because impartiality of the finders of fact is an absolute prerequisite to our system of justice, we have adhered to the proposition that close cases involving challenges to the impartiality of potential jurors should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving doubt as to impartiality." Williams v. State, 638 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Consistent with the foregoing principles, the courts have held that the mere fact that a juror eventually acquiesces and asserts that he or she can be fair does not necessarily resolve doubts initially raised as to that juror's ability to sit as a fair and impartial fact-finder:

The rehabilitation of prospective jurors is a tricky business that often leads to reversal. Although Florida law allows for the rehabilitation of prospective jurors whose responses during voir dire examination raise questions concerning their impartiality, "[a] juror is not impartial when one side must overcome a preconceived opinion in order to prevail." Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). As the Florida Supreme Court has observed:

It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the reasoning which leads to the conclusion that a person stands free of bias or prejudice who having voluntarily and emphatically asserted its existence in his mind, in the next moment under skillful questioning declares his freedom from its influence. By what sort of principle is it to be determined that the last statement of the man is better and more worthy of belief than the former?

Johnson v. Reynolds, 97 Fla. 591, 599, 121 So. 793, 796 (1929).

Martinez v. State, 795 So.2d 279, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Here, the record demonstrates reasonable doubts concerning Nesbitt's, Johnson's, and Lott's abilities to be fair and impartial. Those doubts were not dispelled during subsequent questioning. Each of these jurors expressed significant reservations about their suitability to sit...