Carson v. Lake Cnty.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-117-PRC |
| Parties | AARON CARSON, CHARLES COLLINS, JOHN CURTIS, MARY DOBRIJEVICH, DONNIE JONES, CATHERINE KOBY, GWEN LANE, MATTHEW LUBARSKI, JOHN J. MCBRIDE, SR., JANET NICKOVICH, RONALD PAULSIN, CHARLES J. PODGORNY, PATTIE G. PODGORNY, JOHN D. PRUZIN, DANNY SEBBEN, HELEN G. SUTTON, DENNIS TOBIN, CAMILA A. TREVINO, MARIAN VUKAS, and SUSAN WYATT, Plaintiffs, v. LAKE COUNTY, INDIANA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on (1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 40], filed by Defendant Lake County, Indiana, ("Lake County") on June 13, 2016; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE 42], filed by all Plaintiffs on June 13, 2016; (3) Defendant's Motion to Submit Omitted Exhibit [DE 45], filed by Lake County on July 14, 2016; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike [DE 49]; and Defendant's Request for Oral Argument [DE 53], filed by Lake County on August 8, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lake County, Indiana on all of Plaintiffs' claims.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2014, a Complaint was filed by Plaintiffs Aaron Carson, Charles Collins, John Curtis, Mary Dobrijevich, Donnie Jones, Catherine Koby, Gwen Lane, Matthew Lubarski, John J. McBride, Sr., Janet Nickovich, Charles J. Podgorny, Pattie G. Podgorny, John D. Pruzin, Danny Sebben, Helen G. Sutton, Dennis Tobin, Camila A. Trevino, Marian Vukas, and Susan Wyatt. Plaintiffs allege that they were terminated from their employment by Defendant Lake County in violation of their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (ADEA), and in violation of their rights pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lake County filed an Answer on May 28, 2014.
On October 1, 2014, Ronald Paulsin filed a Motion to Intervene, which was granted on October 2, 2014. Paulsin's Intervenor Complaint was filed on October 2, 2014, bringing the same claims as those brought by the original Plaintiffs.
On June 13, 2016, Lake County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims, and Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on all claims.
On July 14, 2016, Lake County filed a Motion for Leave to File Omitted Exhibit, asking the Court to allow it to file the Declaration of Larry Blanchard, which Lake County had relied on in its Motion for Summary Judgment but had not attached to the motion. Lake County also filed its response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The same day, Plaintiffs filed their response to Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Strike, asking the Court to strike Lake County's reference to the Declaration of Larry Blanchard in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment because Lake County did not attach the declaration as an exhibit to its motion.
On July 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a response to the Motion for Leave to File Omitted Exhibit. On July 27, 2016, Lake County filed a reply in support of its Motion for Leave to File Omitted Exhibit and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike.
On August 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendants have not filed a reply in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, and the time to do so has passed.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Lake County's Motion to Submit Omitted Exhibit both concern Lake County's failure to attach Exhibit 1, which is the Declaration of Larry Blanchard, to its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Declaration of Larry Blanchard is extensively cited for background information on the financial health of Lake County. However, little of the information is material to the Court's decision on the central legal issues, and the substance of the Declaration is repeated in other evidence offered by both Lake County and Plaintiffs. In addition, as recognized by Plaintiffs, the Declaration of Larry Blanchard is properly considered in response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as it was timely submitted. Extensions of time for the filing of dispositive motions were granted, and the trial date is quickly approaching. Thus, because most of the information in Larry Blanchard's Declaration is immaterial, because Plaintiffs would be prejudiced by not having had the benefit of the Declaration in responding to Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment, and because there is insufficient time for supplemental briefing prior to trial, the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and denies Lake County's Motion to Submit Omitted Exhibit.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a motion for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Summary judgment is appropriate when no material fact is disputed and the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, meaning that no reasonable jury could find for the other party based on the evidence in the record." Carman v. Tinkes, 762 F.3d 565, 566 (7th Cir. 2014).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), (c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Spierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2015). When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Spierer, 798 F.3d at 507-08; Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 2013).
"Once the moving party puts forth evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute." Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e); Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1986)). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-50.
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2014); Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
On cross motions for summary judgment, a court construes, "all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Speciale v. Blue Cross & Blue ShieldAss'n, 538 F3.d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court looks to the burden of proof each party would bear on an issue at trial. Diaz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997)).
MATERIAL FACTS1
Defendant Lake County, Indiana's health care self-insurance fund liquidated its cash reserve by 2013 from a fund that had a balance of $11 million as of 2007.
From 2007 through 2013, Lake County offered all of its employees over the age of sixty-five an opportunity for voluntary retirement with the ability to immediately begin receiving Public Employees' Retirement Fund benefits and also maintain health insurance as secondary coverage to Medicare for a period of time. Under the 2010 Early Retirement Options, employees were presented with three options. "Option Two," relevant to this litigation, provided that...
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