Carte v. Cline, 22530
| Decision Date | 16 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 22530,22530 |
| Citation | 460 S.E.2d 48,194 W.Va. 233 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Lawrence A. CARTE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Jane L. CLINE, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Defendant Below, Appellee. |
Gregory W. Sproles, Breckinridge, Davis, Sproles & Stollings, Summersville, for appellant
Paul E. Jordan, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.
1
The appellant, Lawrence A. Carte, appeals from the 3 May 1994 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, which upheld the decision by the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to revoke the appellant's driver's license for six months. 2 The appellant challenges his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and his license revocation on grounds the State Police failed to comply with standard operating procedures when conducting a sobriety checkpoint. The appellant also argues that the use of sobriety checkpoints by law enforcement officers in West Virginia is a violation of Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 3
Sobriety checkpoints in West Virginia are operated pursuant to departmental policy known as "The Standard Operating Procedures of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety for Sobriety Checkpoints." These guidelines, effective 1 September 1989, provide, in part:
2.01 Members of the Department of Public Safety, in combination with other department alcohol enforcement efforts, may initiate and establish sobriety checkpoints to deter and detect alcohol and/or drug impaired drivers; and to reduce the number of alcohol related motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries.
2.02 All sobriety checkpoints will be conducted in such a manner as to minimize any intrusion or inconvenience upon the motoring public and to maximize program effectiveness, enforcement uniformity, and officer/civilian safety.
2.03 Sobriety checkpoints will not be used as a subterfuge to search for other crimes; however, members may initiate appropriate enforcement action for any violation detected while conducting a sobriety checkpoint.
PROCEDURE:
2.04 Initiation, establishment, and operational supervision of sobriety checkpoints shall be the responsibility of Department District Commanders or other Company level command officers.
2.05 Prior to initiation of a checkpoint request, the supervisor to be in charge will contact the local prosecuting authority for inclusion in checkpoint planning.
2.06 The supervisor in charge shall select the location of the sobriety checkpoint based upon alcohol/drug related accident statistics, D.U.I. arrest numbers, and/or nighttime single vehicle traffic accidents occurring within a localized area.
2.07 The selected site will be inspected to assure maximum safety and visibility for officers and the motoring public, and must include at a minimum:
(a) Presence of adequate lighting (supplemental illumination may be provided by BATmobiles, portable light generators, or other equipment);
(b) Availability of sufficient space to ensure the safety of motorists and officers, and to provide parking for police vehicles and vehicles of any persons taken into custody;
(c) An alternate route for any driver that wishes to avoid the checkpoint operation.
* * * * * *
2.10 The supervisor in charge shall request permission to conduct a sobriety checkpoint operation from the Company Commander. Such request shall be made in writing and must include the date, time, and location of the checkpoint, and personnel and equipment requirements for operation. The supervisor in charge shall, upon receiving in writing Company approval for a checkpoint, advise the local media of the checkpoint location, date and times, to provide the public with advance notice of the checkpoint operation and to serve as a deterrent to potentially intoxicated drivers.
2.11 Sufficient uniformed personnel and marked vehicles shall be assigned to sobriety checkpoints to display the legitimate police purpose of the stop and to minimize any fear, surprise or apprehension of the motoring public.
(a) Uniformed personnel shall consist at a minimum of the supervisor in charge, BATmobile officer, and six (6) additional officers.
(b) Marked police patrol vehicles will be assigned to the checkpoint and all emergency lighting (blue lights, hazard warning lights, spotlights, and headlights) will be activated during checkpoint operations.
(c) BATmobile(s) will be used to process DUI arrestees unless the services of additional facilities are required.
* * * * * *
2.15 Prior to conducting a checkpoint, the supervisor in charge shall brief all involved personnel as to site location, checkpoint operation procedures, individual officer assignments, and the placement and utilization of safety equipment.
On 6 June 1992, the West Virginia Division of Public Safety established a sobriety checkpoint on Route 60, near Belle, West Virginia. State Police officers stopped all vehicles travelling in either direction. The appellant was stopped in the westbound lane by Corporal S.W. Reedy, who asked to see his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Corporal Reedy said he initially detected an odor of alcohol and saw beer containers in the vehicle. After a brief conversation, he asked the appellant to pull over to the side of the road and exit his vehicle. Corporal Reedy noted the appellant's slurred speech and bloodshot eyes.
Corporal Reedy directed the appellant to perform several field sobriety tests. According to Corporal Reedy, the appellant did not touch heel to toe, stepped off line and lost his balance in the walk-and-turn test, and swayed on the one-leg-stand test. A horizontal gaze nystagmus test of the appellant's eyes indicated he was intoxicated. Corporal Reedy also performed a preliminary breath test, which the appellant failed. The appellant was then arrested for DUI at 10:30 p.m. on 6 June 1992, at which time he was taken to an on-site BATmobile, where a secondary chemical test was administered. 4
A statement of the arresting officer was transmitted to the DMV, as required by W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(b). 5 The DMV initiated license revocation proceedings against the appellant. An administrative hearing was held on 30 March 1993, and the commissioner's final order was issued on 4 June 1993.
On appeal from that final order, the appellant now challenges the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints and argues that failure to prove compliance with standard operating procedures invalidates his arrest and license revocation.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, a "seizure" takes place when a vehicle is stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. Such a seizure is subject to constitutional scrutiny to determine its reasonableness.
Increased awareness and heightened concern about the danger of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol have thrust the drunk driving menace to the forefront of America's social consciousness. As a result of the increased awareness of traffic fatalities attributable to alcohol consumption, some states have employed roadblocks as devices to detect and to deter drunk driving. Sobriety checkpoints generally entail the slowing and eventual stopping of traffic to check for valid driver's licenses, proper vehicle registration forms, and outward signs of intoxication of the drivers. Stopping an automobile and detaining the occupants at a roadblock constitutes a seizure under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Under the fourth amendment, a search and seizure is presumptively unreasonable, and the government has the burden of proving the legitimacy of the seizure. 6
The type of nondiscriminatory checkpoint at issue in this case was approved by this Court under different factual circumstances in State v. Frisby, 161 W.Va. 734, 245 S.E.2d 622 (1978). In Frisby, where a significant issue was the "tenuous legality of the police's initial detention of the appellant," we explained:
The weight of authority is that without violating the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or W.Va. Constitution, art. 3, § 6, motorists may be stopped for no other reason than examination of licenses and registrations when such examinations are done on a random basis pursuant to a preconceived plan, such as the stopping of every car at a check point, the examination of every car on a given day with a particular letter or number group in the license, or any other nondiscriminatory procedure.
Id. 245 S.E.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
Three leading cases illustrate the evolution of the United States Supreme Court's decisions on the issue of checkpoint seizures.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), officials operated a fixed immigration roadblock at which all passing vehicles were initially stopped. Officials observed or questioned the occupants briefly. Automobiles were detained only upon a finding of probable cause or the consent of the driver. The Court concluded that the seizure incident to a fixed roadblock satisfied the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment as long as the stop remained minimally intrusive and was operated pursuant to narrow...
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