Carter v. Bowler
Citation | 211 Conn.App. 119,271 A.3d 1080 |
Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
Docket Number | AC 43670 |
Parties | Anthony C. CARTER v. Michael P. BOWLER |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Anthony C. Carter, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Philip Miller, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (defendant).
The self-represented plaintiff, Anthony C. Carter, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Michael P. Bowler. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his complaint on the ground of absolute immunity.1 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
At all relevant times, the defendant was the statewide bar counsel for the Statewide Grievance Committee (committee). During the summer of 2017, the plaintiff filed two grievance complaints with the committee against Attorney Richard J. Rubino. In response to each complaint, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff that stated in relevant part: "The [plaintiff's] complaint has been reviewed by the [O]ffice of the Statewide Bar Counsel, together with an attorney and a non-attorney member of the [committee]. After this review it was decided to dismiss the complaint ... without referring it to a grievance panel for the following reason(s):
The complaint does not allege facts, which, if true, would constitute a violation of any provision of the applicable rules governing attorney conduct. ..."2
The plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant on November 29, 2017. In his one count complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions by dismissing his grievance complaints against Rubino. In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30, in which he alleged, inter alia, that the doctrine of absolute immunity barred the plaintiff's action. After the parties submitted memoranda of law on that issue, the court granted the motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his action on the ground of absolute immunity. We do not agree.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH , 340 Conn. 266, 269, 264 A.3d 1 (2021). The doctrine of absolute immunity implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
See Kenneson v. Eggert , 196 Conn. App. 773, 780, 230 A.3d 795 (2020) ( ); Bruno v. Travelers Cos. , 172 Conn. App. 717, 723, 161 A.3d 630 (2017) (). In addition, we note that, "[i]n reviewing a challenge to a ruling on a motion to dismiss ... [w]hen the facts relevant to an issue are not in dispute, this court's task is limited to a determination of whether ... the trial court's conclusions of law are legally and logically correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hospital, Inc. , 182 Conn. App. 445, 452, 185 A.3d 680 (2018).
We begin our analysis by reviewing certain well established precepts. The doctrine of absolute immunity, known also as the litigation privilege; see, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti , 310 Conn. 616, 627, 79 A.3d 60 (2013) ; Idlibi v. Ollennu , 205 Conn. App. 660, 664, 258 A.3d 121 (2021) ; "protects against suit as well as liability—in effect, against having to litigate at all." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 272 Conn. 776, 786, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) ; see also Simms v. Seaman , 308 Conn. 523, 540–45, 69 A.3d 880 (2013) ( ). Our Supreme Court consistently has "applied the doctrine of absolute immunity to ... actions arising from judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings." Rioux v. Barry , 283 Conn. 338, 345, 927 A.2d 304 (2007). As the court explained, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Petyan v. Ellis , 200 Conn. 243, 246, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).
The question, then, is whether the proceeding at issue in the present case properly may be considered quasijudicial in nature. Our Supreme Court has outlined a number of factors that assist in determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature. (Citation omitted.) Kelley v. Bonney , 221 Conn. 549, 567, 606 A.2d 693 (1992). Those factors "are not exclusive nor must all factors militate in favor of a determination that a proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature for a court to conclude that the proceeding is, in fact, quasijudicial." Priore v. Haig , 196 Conn. App. 675, 697, 230 A.3d 714, cert. granted, 335 Conn. 955, 239 A.3d 317 (2020).
The Office of the Statewide Bar Counsel exists pursuant to statute. General Statutes § 51-90c provides in relevant part: In carrying out that statutory mandate, in accordance with the applicable rules of practice promulgated by the Superior Court; see footnote 2 of this opinion; the statewide bar counsel (1) exercises judgment and discretion, (2) is vested with investigative authority, (3) ascertains and determines facts, (4) makes decisions that affect the personal or property rights of private persons, as a possible consequence of the statewide bar counsel's decision to refer a complaint to the committee is suspension or revocation of a license to practice law in this state; see General Statutes § 51-90g ; and (5) makes binding orders and judgments to either dismiss a complaint or refer it to a grievance panel or an arbitration panel. See Practice Book § 2-32 (a). Those responsibilities persuade us that the activities of the statewide bar counsel are quasi-judicial in nature. Moreover, as a creature of statute entrusted with responsibility for reviewing complaints of attorney misconduct, a sound public policy reason exists to recognize the statewide bar counsel's "complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provides." Kelley v. Bonney , supra, 221 Conn. at 567, 606 A.2d 693.
Furthermore, it bears emphasis that, although established by statute, the Office of the Statewide Bar Counsel acts as an arm of the court to effectuate its "inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar." Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo , 190 Conn. 510, 523, 461 A.2d 938 (1983) ; see also Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki , 211 Conn. 232, 239, 558 A.2d 986 (1989) ( ); cf. In re Application of Pagano , 207 Conn. 336, 339, 541 A.2d 104 (1988) ( ). This court previously has held that "a grievance proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature"; Cohen v. King , 189 Conn. App. 85, 90, 206 A.3d 188 (2019), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 925, 246 A.3d 986 (2021) ; and that "statements made in a grievance proceeding [are] shielded by absolute immunity ...." Id., at 92, 206 A.3d 188 ; see also Field v. Kearns , 43 Conn. App. 265, 273, 682 A.2d 148 (), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 684 A.2d 711 (1996) ; Grant v. Quinn , Docket No. CV-10-5035130, 2011 WL 925441, *4 (Conn. Super. February 8, 2011) (). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the statewide bar counsel's review of...
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Priore v. Haig
...nature for a court to conclude that the proceeding is, in fact, quasi-judicial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carter v. Bowler , 211 Conn. App. 119, 123, 271 A.3d 1080 (2022). We have made clear that these factors are "[i]n addition" to, not in lieu of, the application of the law to ......
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...... proceeding is, in fact, quasi-judicial." (Internal. quotation marks omitted.) Carter v. Bowler, 211. Conn.App. 119, 123, 271 A.3d 1080 (2022). We have made clear. that these factors are "[i]n addition" to, not in. ......
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