Carter v. State

• Decision Date: 08 April 1983
• Docket Number: 538,Nos. 537,s. 537
• Citation: 458 A.2d 480,54 Md.App. 220
• Parties: Stephen Donnell CARTER v. STATE of Maryland. Charles Franklin TURNER aka Huss Turner v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 220

54 Md.App. 220

458 A.2d 480

Stephen Donnell CARTER v. STATE of Maryland.

Charles Franklin TURNER aka Huss Turner v. STATE of Maryland.

Nos. 537, 538.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 8, 1983.

Louis P. Willemin, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on the brief for appellant, Carter.

Michael R. Malloy, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on the brief for appellant, Turner.

Carmina Szunyog, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Peter C. Cobb, State's Atty., for Harford County, Arthur F. Carven and Joseph Casilly, Asst. State's Attys. for Harford County on brief, for appellee.

Argued before GILBERT, C.J., and LISS and BISHOP, JJ.

BISHOP, Judge.

The question presented in these two appeals is whether the unavailability of judicial resources on the scheduled date of trial constitutes good cause for postponement under Article 27, section 591 of the Maryland Code and the corresponding Maryland Rule 746.

The two appellants contend that the charges against them should have been dismissed because their trials were not held in accordance with the time limitation and the good cause requirement of Section 591 and Maryland Rule 746.

Section 591(a) provides:

"Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of counsel or the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal matter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the Circuit Court or the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in which the matter is pending, shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date shall be not later than 180 days from the date of the arraignment of the person accused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for good cause shown by the moving party and only with the permission of the administrative judge of the court where the matter is pending."

Maryland Rule 746 directs that:

"Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723.

and

"Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him may grant a change of trial date.

No. 537

Stephen Donnell Carter appeals from a judgment of guilty of possession of heroin after conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County. Appellant received a sentence of four years incarceration.

Appellant's first appearance in court was on December 2, 1980, when he was arraigned. To accord with the foregoing statute and rule, appellant's trial should have started no later than June 1, 1981. The chronology is as follows:

December 2, 1980--Appellant first appears in court.

December 22, 1980--Appearance of counsel.

February 25, 1981--Judge Higinbothom grants a postponement to the State due to the absence of a State's witness, noting also that there was no judge available to try the case. The prosecutor was directed "to reset the case within the proper time." Trial was re-set for April 2, 1981.

April 2, 1981--Postponement requested by the State granted by Judge Close because of the unavailability of a judge or a courtroom. Of the three judges in the county, one was trying a criminal case and the other two were involved in civil trials. Defense counsel objected to the postponement, stated he was ready for trial and urged that the trial of an incarcerated defendant should take precedence over civil trials. Trial was set for June 11, 10 days beyond the 180 day requirement.

At the time of the April 2nd postponement, in response to appellant's trial counsel's objection, Judge Close stated:

"Well, I have to postpone the case for cause and not charge it to either side, because of the absence of any court, Judge, jury, so forth."

The crucial postponement was the one granted on April 2, 1981. At that time the appellant had been confined in the Harford County Detention Center since November 21, 1980, a total of 133 days. At the time of trial on June 11, the appellant had spent 202 days incarcerated, waiting to be tried.

No. 538

Charles Franklin Turner, a/k/a Huss Turner, was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute and possession of paraphernalia. He received concurrent sentences of fifteen and four years, respectively. Appellant bases his claim for dismissal under Section 591 and Maryland Rule 746 on the following chronology:

October 14, 1980--Appellant's first appearance in court; defense counsel enters his appearance. Motion for speedy trial filed.

January 8, 1981--The docket entry for this date reads "Deft. not before the Court (Judge Cameron) for trial and the Court postponed the case for trial at the State's delay." The same judge during the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss stated:

"... The first time it went out was in the midst of the Stebbing trial...". (The "Stebbing trial" was an extended, highly publicized murder trial).

March 23, 1981--According to the State's Attorney, Judge Close, who was scheduled to try this case that day, had to be in Annapolis and no other judge was available. The docket entry indicated that the postponement was based on the unavailability of a judge or a jury and was not charged to either side. This was the 160th day.

April 12, 1981--The 180th day.

May 21, 1981--This docket entry stated: "... Court postponed case, not charged to either side, due to unavailability of Judge or Jury to hear case." At the motion hearing the State's Attorney stated that on May 21st, "the State was ready to go and all the Judges were assigned to go to a sentencing conference and, again, no Judges were available." This was the 219th day.

August 3, 1981--Hearing on Motion to Dismiss and trial. The 292nd day. Judge Cameron denied the motion "... because I feel there is good cause, and we can only try so many cases in a given time and some are going to be first, some are going to be last, some tried within 180 days and, evidently some tried outside of the 180 days because there's simply no way to get them all tried within that time."

There are two questions raised by the postponement of March 23, 1981:

1. Was there good cause not to try the case on that day? and if so,

2. Was it appropriate not to set the case in for trial on or before April 12, 1981, the 180th day, and 20 days after March 23rd?

The Law

Article 27, section 591, Annotated Code of Maryland (1982 Repl.Vol.) parallels Maryland Rule 746. The original version of the statute, passed in 1971 (Ch. 212), permitted postponement for extraordinary cause. In July 1980 the statute and rule were amended to change the standard from "extraordinary" cause to "good" cause. ¹

Although no precise definition of "good cause" has yet been developed to guide the courts, we may ascertain the meaning of this broad normative term by inference from the purposes it was designed to achieve. Goins v. State, 48 Md.App. 115, 425 A.2d 1374 (1981), aff'd. 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982). The primary end of section 591 and Rule 746 is to promote the public interest in prompt trial of criminal cases.

In the leading case in Maryland on this issue, State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), the Court noted that:

"Section 591 is plainly a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges; its enactment manifested the legislature's recognition of the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing trials for inadequate reasons." Id. at 316, 403 A.2d 356.

Accord Meyer v. State, 49 Md.App. 300, 304, 431 A.2d 738 (1981). The purpose of section 591 and Rule 746 is not solely to implement the defendant's right to a speedy trial, which is already constitutionally protected, but to protect society from the harms of unnecessarily delayed criminal trials. In State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md.App. 20, 425 A.2d 1051 (1981) Judge Wilner pointed out for this Court:

"Although the dissent in Hicks viewed the requirements of Rule 746a primarily from the perspective of the defendant--as an extension of his Constitutional right to a speedy trial--the majority looked upon it more from a societal point of view, as a device to alleviate the problems caused to the criminal justice system by delays in initially scheduling cases for trial and by the inappropriate postponing of scheduled trial dates. See the discussion at pp. 316-318 of 285 Md. . Both aspects are, of course, important; the point we make is that the Rule was not intended solely to confer new rights upon defendants, but also to hold their feet to the fire." Id. 48 Md.App. at 27, 425 A.2d 1051.

This public purpose distinguishes our legislative prompt trial requirement from other states' statutes or rules that are designed singularly to implement defendants' constitutional right to speedy trial. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (Pa.1972); Commonwealth v. Ardolino, --- Pa.Super. ---, 450 A.2d 674 (Pa.1982); State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 370 Mass. 31, 345 N.E.2d 386 (Mass.1976).

Thus, the primary purpose of section 591 and Rule 746 is to protect the societal interest in the prompt trial of criminal cases; the benefits it confers upon defendants are incidental to this public purpose. See State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d 356. 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 473, 488 (1980).

Determination of whether there is good cause for a continuance must take this...