Caruso v. Aluminum Co. of America

• Citation: 473 N.E.2d 818,15 Ohio St.3d 306,15 OBR 436
• Decision Date: 31 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-13,84-13
• Parties: , 15 O.B.R. 436 CARUSO, Appellee, v. ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellant, et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 306

15 Ohio St.3d 306

473 N.E.2d 818, 15 O.B.R. 436

CARUSO, Appellee, v. ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellant, et al.

No. 84-13.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 31, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

That portion of R.C. 4123.68(Y) which precludes compensation in any form for occupational diseases resulting in an employee's disability or death, prior to January 1, 1976 but more than eight years after the employee's injurious exposure to the substances causing his disease, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. (State, ex rel. Lourin, v. Indus. Comm., 138 Ohio St. 618, 37 N.E.2d 595 , overruled.)

The plaintiff-appellee, Mrs. Pina Caruso, filed a claim for workers' compensation death benefits in 1976. ¹ This claim alleged that the plaintiff's husband, Anthony Caruso, had died as a direct result of the occupational disease silicosis, which he had contracted within the course and scope of his fifteen-year employment with the defendant-appellant, Aluminum Company of America ("ACA"). Mr. Caruso had retired from ACA on March 1, 1966, but he apparently did not exhibit symptoms of silicosis until September 1975. At that time, Mr. Caruso was admitted to a hospital with complaints of shortness of breath and pain in his legs. He remained hospitalized until his death on November 2, 1975.

On September 13, 1978, a district hearing officer for the defendant Industrial Commission issued an order denying plaintiff's claim for death benefits. The hearing officer's order was based upon R.C. 4123.68(Y), which, at the time that plaintiff filed her claim, stated in relevant part: "Compensation * * * on account of silicosis * * * [is] payable only in the event of [disability] * * * or death, in accordance with sections 4123.56, 4123.58, and 4123.59 of the Revised Code, and only in the event of such disability or death resulting within eight years after the last injurious exposure; provided that such eight-year limitation shall not apply to disability or death occurring after January 1, 1976 * * *." ² (Emphasis added.) Because Mr. Caruso's "last injurious exposure" to substances known to cause silicosis had occurred no later than his last day of employment on March 1, 1966, nine years and eight months had elapsed before his death on November 2, 1975. For this reason, the hearing officer found that he did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim.

Plaintiff appealed first to the Cleveland Regional Board of Review which affirmed the hearing officer's order. The Industrial Commission affirmed the board of review. Plaintiff then appealed the decision of the Industrial Commission to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. ACA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, on September 2, 1982, the court granted this motion.

On appeal, the judgment of the court of common pleas was reversed. The appellate court held that the portion of R.C. 4123.68(Y) which denies compensation for silicosis-related deaths occurring prior to January 1, 1976 but more than eight years after "injurious exposure" is a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Charles S. Tricarichi Co., L.P.A., Charles S. Tricarichi, and Carla M. Tricarichi, Cleveland, for appellee.

Baughman & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Richard Davies, Cleveland, for appellant.

SWEENEY, Justice.

The only issue properly before this court is whether R.C. 4123.68(Y) is unconstitutional as it applies to claimant a seeking compensation for a silicosis-related death that occurred prior to January 1, 1976 but more than eight years after the decedent's work-related exposure to substances known to cause silicosis. We decide this issue with reference to R.C. 4123.68(Y) as it read at the time that plaintiff filed her claim in 1976. ³

It is clear that the effect of R.C. 4123.68(Y), as applied to the plaintiff herein, is to preclude compensation for any silicosis-related death occurring more than eight years after "injurious exposure," which in this case is decedent's work-related exposure to silica dust. ⁴ The plaintiff's husband worked for ACA as a grinder and welder of aluminum castings. While performing these jobs, Mr. Caruso allegedly was exposed to silica dust on a regular basis, but he apparently did not exhibit any symptoms of silicosis until nine years and six months after his retirement from ACA. Because Mr. Caruso's disability and death did not occur "within eight years after * * * [his] last injurious exposure," his widow's claim for death benefits was denied.

In the past, we have had occasion to scrutinize other statutes that tie a claimant's eligibility for certain types of compensation to the date that the claimant's decedent died. In State ex rel. Nyitray v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 443 N.E.2d 962, we struck down a statutory prerequisite that effectively deprived a decedent's dependents of accrued workers' compensation benefits simply because the decedent had died "too soon," i.e., before he had a chance to cash the check that had been issued as compensation for his work-related disability. In Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 322 N.E.2d 880 , a case that is strikingly similar to the case sub judice, we struck down a statutory limitation that denied death benefits to the dependents of a worker who had died "too late," i.e., more than the statutory limit of three years after suffering a work-related injury that ultimately caused his death.

In Kinney and in Nyitray, we applied a test wherein the legislation in question "could be upheld if it was shown that the statutory prerequisites [to compensation] were rationally related to the accomplishment of some state objective at least as important as the purpose contained in the Constitution [Section 35, Article II] and reflected in the statute." Nyitray, supra, at 176, 443 N.E.2d 962. We will apply this same test to the instant case.

The appellant ACA posits that, when the eight-year limitation on silicosis claims was first enacted in 1945 as part of G.C. 1465-68a, the forerunner of R.C. 4123.68(Y), two rational bases existed for this limitation. The first of these bases was that "the state of medical knowledge was such that the legislature felt that symptoms of silicosis could manifest themselves within an eight year period." In other words, the legislature felt that it was likely that any silicosis claim filed more than eight years after exposure to silica dust was either fraudulent or the result of exposure subsequent to employment. Under the present state of medical knowledge, it is clear that there is no longer any rational relationship between the eight-year limitation period and the prevention of fraudulent or non-work-related claims. Silicosis can, and does, manifest itself more than eight years after exposure to silica dust. Also, silicosis can now be diagnosed with far greater accuracy than was possible in 1945, which makes the risk of a fraudulent silicosis claim no greater than that for any other type of injury or disease claim.

The second basis for the eight-year limitation, as posited by the appellant, was that "the legislature wanted to avoid...