Casey v. Casey

• Decision Date: 06 April 2004
• Docket Number: (AC 23934)
• Citation: 844 A.2d 250,82 Conn. App. 378
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: THOMAS CASEY v. GLORIA A. CASEY

82 Conn. App. 378

844 A.2d 250

THOMAS CASEY v. GLORIA A. CASEY

(AC 23934)

Court of Appeals of Connecticut.

Argued January 20, 2004.

Officially released April 6, 2004.

Lavery, C. J., and Schaller and McLachlan, Js.

William C. Franklin, for the appellant (defendant).

James Ryan Mulvey, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

McLACHLAN, J.

This case represents one of the very rare matrimonial cases in which a disappointed party successfully argues that the financial orders entered incident to a dissolution action exceed the broad discretion of the trial court. The defendant, Gloria A. Casey, claims that the financial orders are inequitably favorable to the plaintiff, Thomas Casey, because they assigned him an exceedingly high portion of the marital assets while assigning her an exceedingly high portion of the marital debt and liabilities. The defendant argues specifically that (1) the orders are logically inconsistent with the facts found by the court, (2) the court improperly refused to make an equitable division of the portion of the respective parties' vested pension plans that accrued during the term of the marriage and (3) the court failed to enter orders with respect to certain personal property that was contested at trial and exceeded its authority in the orders that it did enter. We reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the first and third claims and remand the matter for a new trial as to the financial orders.

The court's findings may be summarized as follows. The parties began a romantic relationship in the early 1990s and, in January, 1995, the plaintiff moved into the defendant's Wilton home that she shared with her two children from a previous marriage. Both parties were and are currently employed with American Airlines, the plaintiff as a senior pilot and the defendant as a flight attendant. In addition to her salary, the defendant also received rental income from an apartment on her Wilton property and received unallocated alimony and support from her former husband. Shortly after the plaintiff moved into the defendant's home, it was appraised at $535,000 and had equity of approximately $400,000. The home was encumbered by a first mortgage of approximately $75,000, requiring a monthly payment of principal and interest of $600, and a second mortgage to her former husband in the amount of $60,160, on which no monthly payments were required.

Although the plaintiff had a pension with American Airlines, he owned no real estate and had no savings or investments. The only significant assets the plaintiff brought to the relationship were two airplanes, a Beech aircraft and a Grumman Albatross aircraft, both financed and encumbered by loans.

In June, 1995, the defendant refinanced her Wilton home with a new first mortgage loan in the amount of $265,000 and paid off the existing two mortgage loans with the proceeds of the refinance. The balance of $131,000 "inured directly to the benefit" of the plaintiff, who used the money to make improvements to and to pay off loans that encumbered his airplanes.¹

The parties were married in June, 1996. Approximately two years into the marriage, the defendant quitclaimed a one-half interest in the Wilton home to the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, the parties decided to sell the Wilton home and to acquire a new home in Sherman. In 1999, the Wilton home was sold for $466,020. The parties then purchased the Sherman home for $465,000, subject to a mortgage loan in the amount of $372,000. As a result of the foregoing sale and purchase transactions, approximately $114,000 in cash was generated, which was deposited into the plaintiff's solely owned bank account. With those funds, the plaintiff purchased a 1978 Rolls Royce automobile, a pontoon boat and a Jaguar automobile. The balance of $27,000 was invested in the Sherman home and in the plaintiffs airplanes.

Shortly after the parties moved into the Sherman home, the defendant discovered that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual infidelities with other women during the course of the marriage without the defendant's knowledge or consent. In February, 2001, the plaintiff left the marital residence, believing that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. At or about that time, the plaintiff took the Rolls Royce, Jaguar and pontoon boat from the Sherman home. In May, 2001, a dissolution action was filed by the plaintiff.

In its memorandum of decision, the court made several specific factual findings that purportedly formed the predicate for its financial orders. The court found that at the time of the dissolution, the plaintiff was fiftytwo years of age and still employed as a senior pilot with American Airlines, earning approximately $200,000 a year, and that the defendant was fifty-four years of age and earning approximately $50,000 a year as a flight attendant. The court further found that the Sherman home had a fair market value of $725,000, subject to a mortgage loan with a balance of approximately $360,000, resulting in a net equity of $365,000.² The court further found that the Beech aircraft had a value of $84,000 and that the Albatross aircraft had a value of $245,000, although the plaintiff had spent significantly larger sums on maintenance and improvements to the Albatross between 1995 and the date of dissolution. In that respect, the court specifically found that the "exorbitant amount of money spent on the airplanes... was the primary reason for the various increases in the mortgages" prior to and during the parties' marriage.³ As to the breakdown of the marriage, the court concluded that although both parties' conduct ultimately caused the breakdown, the plaintiffs sexual infidelities initiated the breakdown and were the primary cause of the failure of the marriage.

In its financial orders, the court did not award alimony or attorney's fees but did distribute the parties' principal assets. The court awarded the defendant all right, title and interest to the Sherman home, subject to existing encumbrances including the mortgage, taxes and insurance. The court also awarded the defendant a 1995 Jeep Cherokee, valued at $5000. The court awarded the plaintiff all right, title and interest to both airplanes, subject to any encumbrances. The plaintiff was also awarded the 1978 Rolls Royce and the pontoon boat, with respective values of $14,000 and $4450.⁴ With regard to the parties' retirement accounts, the court ordered that the parties retain their own accounts. Last, the court ordered the parties to resolve any issues pertaining to the distribution of personal property through mediation with the family relations division of the Superior Court, but expressly limited its order to eleven items included in a list of property supplied by the plaintiff in his brief. Those eleven items represented only a small portion of the total personal property identified by both the plaintiff and the defendant in their respective financial affidavits and briefs, and no order was entered with respect to the balance of the personal property at issue.

The defendant then filed a motion to reargue, pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11, contending that the financial orders issued by the court were inequitable.⁵ The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Our standard of review for financial orders in a dissolution action is clear. The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning its financial orders, and "[j]udicial review of a trial court's exercise of [this] broad discretion... is limited to the questions of whether the... court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did.... In making those determinations, we allow every reasonable presumption... in favor of the correctness of [the trial court's] action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gilbert v. Gilbert, 73 Conn. App. 473, 484, 808 A.2d 688 (2002). That standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties. See Parley v. Parley, 72 Conn. App. 742, 745, 807 A.2d 982 (2002). As pithily stated by Justice Parskey, "in matters of this sort our role of necessity is not to work the vineyard but rather to prune the occasional excrescence." Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980).

I

The defendant first claims that the court's financial orders were logically inconsistent with its factual findings and that the court, therefore, could not reasonably have concluded as it did. In particular, the defendant claims that the court inequitably awarded her the marital residence, subject to a large mortgage loan, despite the express finding that substantial proceeds from the various mortgages had been utilized to make expenditures toward the plaintiffs two airplanes, which were awarded to him. We agree that the financial orders are logically inconsistent with the facts found by the court.

Our jurisprudence requires the trial court to consider all the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81 in determining how to distribute parties' assets in a dissolution action.⁶ Burns v. Burns, 41 Conn. App. 716, 720, 677 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 906, 682 A.2d 997 (1996). We do not, however, require that courts ritualistically recite the criteria they considered, nor are they bound to any specific formula respecting the weight to be accorded each factor. See id., 720-21.

The court properly made specific factual findings as to the assets and liabilities each party brought to the marriage and certain other relevant factors existing at the time of the dissolution, all of which are supported by the evidence. The court found that prior to the marriage, the defendant's Wilton home had approximately $400,000 in equity, subject to $135,160 in mortgage...