State v. Casiano

• Decision Date: 02 November 1999
• Docket Number: (AC 18645)
• Citation: 55 Conn. App. 582,740 A.2d 435
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASON CASIANO
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

55 Conn. App. 582

740 A.2d 435

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASON CASIANO

(AC 18645)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 28, 1999.

Officially Released November 2, 1999.

Lavery, Sullivan and Daly, Js. James B. Streeto, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James G. Clark, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

DALY, J.

The defendant, Jason Casiano, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered following his conditional plea of nolo contendere to charges of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-134, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134. The defendant contends that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to the police. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded that he was not in custody when he made incriminating oral statements, (2) concluded that he was not entitled to Miranda¹ warnings once he was interviewed as a suspect in the police station, (3) concluded that he validly waived his Miranda rights prior to providing his oral statements, (4) admitted two written statements that he contends were tainted and should have been suppressed as the product of his previous oral statements, which he claims were improperly obtained, and (5) determined that the oral statements were made voluntarily. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to the determination of this appeal. On August 13, 1995, the Waterbury police department received information from an informant describing several individuals who might have been involved in an August 11, 1995 homicide at a sandwich shop in North Haven, and that one of those individuals, the defendant's cousin, Nicholas Aponte, lived on Rose Street in Waterbury. After that information was transmitted to the North Haven police department, Detectives Stephen Smith and Edward Murphy went to Waterbury, where Waterbury police informed them that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Aponte on an unrelated matter.

Thereafter, in plainclothes and unmarked cars, Smith and Murphy, and Detective Patrick Deely and Sergeant Michael Ricci of the Waterbury police department drove to Rose Street to arrest Aponte and to question him regarding the August 11, 1995 homicide. When Aponte was arrested and handcuffed, the defendant, who was present, told the police that he wanted to go with Aponte to the police station. The police told the defendant that the decision to accompany Aponte was his to make. The defendant, who was never handcuffed, then exited the residence voluntarily and sat next to Aponte in the backseat of one of the unmarked police cars. Both individuals were then driven to the Waterbury police station.

When the defendant and Aponte arrived at the police station at approximately 12:30 p.m., Aponte was put in an unlocked interrogation room, which had one transparent glass wall, and was handcuffed to a chair. In the adjoining room, which was separated by a glass partition, the defendant was seated where he could see Aponte through the glass. The defendant was given food, soda and cigarettes at his request.

Later that day, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Smith read the defendant his Miranda rights, but told him that he was not under arrest at that time and that he was free to leave. The defendant voluntarily chose to remain at the station with Aponte. At approximately 6 p.m. that evening, and again at approximately 10:15 p.m., Smith and Ricci questioned the defendant, who agreed to give written statements, which ultimately incriminated him and others in the August 11, 1995 homicide. Prior to the time that the defendant gave these written statements, however, Smith and Ricci again read the defendant his Miranda rights from a police card. The defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights and signed written waivers of them.

Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged with felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. At a hearing on February 3, 1997, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating written statements. On February 4, 1997, the court accepted the defendant's conditional plea of nolo contendere.² The defendant subsequently was sentenced to a total effective term of fifty years incarceration. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the incriminating statements, whether written or oral, that he made to the police. In advancing this claim, the defendant asserts that the trial court improperly determined that he was not in custody during his questioning at the Waterbury police station prior to the time that he was read his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver of those rights. We disagree.

As a preliminary matter, "[o]ur standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blackman, 246 Conn. 547, 553, 716 A.2d 101 (1998).

Our Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n determining whether the defendant was in custody, we need to examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. [T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lapointe, 237 Conn. 694, 725, 678 A.2d 942 (en banc), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994, 117 S. Ct. 484, 136 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1996); see also State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 757, 670 A.2d 276 (1996) (Miranda warnings not constitutionally required until defendant in custody and subjected to police interrogation); State v. Hoeplinger, 206 Conn. 278, 287, 537 A.2d 1010 (1988).

Additionally, "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving custodial interrogation ... before the state must prove that adequate warnings of the rights that inhere in the privilege against self-incrimination were given to the defendant and that the defendant's waiver of his rights was constitutionally valid .... Custodial interrogation [occurs when] questioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.... Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda protection ... [a] person is in custody only if a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 76, 621 A.2d 728 (1993).

Finally, "[w]e must look at the totality of the circumstances of the questioning in order to determine whether a reasonable person would have construed those circumstances as placing him in a custody situation.... We will not overturn the trial court's factual finding that the defendant was not in custody unless it was clearly erroneous ... but will, however, carefully review the record to ascertain whether the trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 76-77.

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the court's determination that the defendant was not in custody prior to waiving his Miranda rights at the Waterbury police station on August 13, 1995. The defendant voluntarily chose to accompany Aponte to the police station. The police officers did not draw any weapons at any time and the defendant voluntarily got into the backseat of the police car. The defendant was neither arrested nor handcuffed at any time. Furthermore, at the police station, the defendant was allowed to sit in an unlocked room and to observe Aponte in an adjacent room through a glass partition. The defendant also was given food, soda and cigarettes at his request. In addition, while Smith verbally apprised the defendant of his Miranda rights at approximately 2:30 p.m. on August 13, 1995, he also told the defendant that he was not then under arrest and could leave if he chose to do so. The defendant, however, voluntarily chose to remain at the police station. At approximately 6 p.m. and again at approximately 10:15 p.m., Smith and Ricci questioned the defendant, who agreed to provide written statements. Prior to giving these statements, the defendant was apprised of his Miranda rights and executed a written waiver of them.

Because our review of the record reveals that a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would not have believed that his movement was restricted to a degree that is associated with a formal arrest, we conclude that the court properly determined that the defendant was not in custody prior to executing the written waiver of his Miranda rights.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly concluded that he was not entitled to Miranda warnings once he was interviewed as a suspect in the police station. We disagree.

"A suspect in a crime is not in custody every time he is asked questions at a police station." Id. "Two threshold conditions must...