Castlewood Intern. Corp. v. Wynne

• Decision Date: 17 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 43858,43858
• Citation: 294 So.2d 321
• Parties: CASTLEWOOD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Winston WYNNE, as Director of the Division of Beverage, et al., Appellees. Beer Industry of Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation, Intervenor.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 321

294 So.2d 321

CASTLEWOOD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Winston WYNNE, as Director of the Division of Beverage, et al., Appellees Beer Industry of Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation, Intervenor.

No. 43858.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 17, 1974.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1974.

Elizabeth J. du Fresne, of Tobias Simon and Elizabeth J. du Fresne, Miami, for appellant.

Herbert M. Klein, Miami, for appellees.

William B. Killian and Joseph P. Klock, of McCarthy, Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, and Lee L. Willis, of Ausley, Ausley, McMullen, McGehee & Carothers, Tallahassee, for intervenor.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order entered in the Circuit Court in Leon County, which directly passed upon the validity of Florida Statutes § 562.21, F.S.A. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Constitution, Art. V, Section 3(b)(1), F.S.A.

During oral argument, counsel agreed that a determination as to the validity of the statute should be made from the record before us without the taking of further pleadings and hearings on remand.

The plaintiff corporation does business as 'Big Daddy's Liquors and Lounges', and is a retail vendor of liquor, Wine, and beer for consumption both on and off the premises.

The primary defendant is the Director of the Division of Beverage of the Department of Business Regulation with the remaining defendants being the Division of Beverage and the Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida.

The Beer Industry of Florida, Inc., was allowed to intervene as a defendant.

Appellant filed a suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking to obtain a declaration that Florida Statutes § 562.21, F.S.A. is unconstitutional. Said statute provides in part:

'F.S. § 562.21--Sale of beer and wine to vendors for cash only. All sales of malt brewed or vinous beverages as defined in beverage law, made by manufacturers, when distributing under the manufacturer's license, wholesalers and distributors to Retail licensees must be for cash only, and cash in this instance means that delivery and payment therefor is to be a simultaneous transaction, and any maneuver, device or shift of any kind whereby credit is extended shall constitute a violation of the beverage law. Nothing herein shall be construed to permit such manufacturers to distribute to vendors under a manufacturer's license where a warehouse has been established in any county or counties from which such beverages are distributed other than the county wherein they are licensed to so manufacture.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Plaintiff concedes that liquor retailers are subject to a special regulation, but asserts that the Regulation under review must be rational and non-discriminatory.

Plaintiff next argues the statute's application is not rational and is discriminatory, thus causing injury to the plaintiff. Therefore this class of Retail vendors of 'beer and wine' are invidiously discriminated against, as alleged in its complaint:

'(a) Beer and wine vendors are subjected to a 'cash only' purchase policy while vendors of 'hard liquors and spirits' are statutorily granted credit up 'to the tenth day after the calendar week within which such sale was made' (F.S. § 561.42, F.S.A.);

'(b) Beer and wine vendors are discriminated against in that they are treated differently, and with no rational or constitutionally permissible basis for that difference, from all other retail merchants in the denial of credit purchases of merchandise;

'(c) Beer and wine vendors are discriminated against through the intra-liquor industry classification, which subjects only the Retail vendor of beer and wine to the cash purchase requirement, while arbitrarily and capriciously allowing unlimited credit from the Brewery-manufacturer to the distributor and from the Retailer to the individual purchaser of drinks or packaged liquor.'

Plaintiff also alleges damages involved in its business (financially and through risk of personnel).

Finally, and attributing irreparable harm being imposed by the statute under review, plaintiff's prayer for its invalidity states among other things:

'(a) There is no rational basis for the difference in treatment regarding the proscription of credit sales to the class of retail vendors of beer and wine, as contrasted to (1) retail vendors of hard liquor; (2) retail vendors in other industries; or (3) other commercial entities in the liquor industry (E.g., brewery/manufacturers dealing with distributors). This baseless discrimination between classes deprives Plaintiff as a member of the class of retail vendors of beer and wine, of its right to equal protection of the laws.

'(b) There is no rational basis in terms of the evils designed to be prevented by the statute--temperance and anti-monopoly--for the prescription of cash only purchases imposed by F.S. § 562.21, F.S.A. This lack of reasonable relationship between the 'evils' and the legislative regulation establishes a denial of substantive due process of the laws.'

The trial court promptly dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, thereby upholding the validity of the statute under review. This appeal followed.

The constitutional issue of the statute, sub judice, has been properly raised and we accept the challenge and invitation to answer it, with the additional pertinent observation that our State Legislature will have the opportunity to correct any destructive deficiencies found therein.

For example, the 1973 Legislative Committee on Business Regulation, Florida House of Representatives, filed a provocative report in support of the plaintiff's position. ¹

In our review we cannot ignore the commanding constitutional standards asserted by the plaintiff, in support of its position, as the proper criteria surrounding the validity or invalidity of the statute in question.

Neither are we unmindful of the decisions rendered: Pickerill v. Schott, Fla.1951, 55 So.2d 716; Overstreet v. Lee, Fla.App.1963, 152 So.2d 201, Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v, Meiklejohn, 5th Cir. 1970, 426 F.2d 142; and Musleh v. Fulton Distributing Company of Florida, Fla.App.1971, 254 So.2d 815.

Quite obviously the State's authority to license for sale and dispensation of Intoxicating beverages (irrespective of the designation, nature and kind) cannot condone such authority to be used in any fashion directly in confrontation with the guarantees of equal protection and/or due process afforded to all people.

In Sherbert v. Verner, 1963, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d...