Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez

• Decision Date: 18 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 08-0367.,1 CA-CV 08-0367.
• Citation: 213 P.3d 197,222 Ariz. 48
• Parties: Cruz Antonia Suarez CASTRO, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dora Ema Castro Solis, Deceased, Defendant/Appellee, v. Luz BALLESTEROS-SUAREZ, a single woman, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

213 P.3d 197

222 Ariz. 48

Cruz Antonia Suarez CASTRO, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dora Ema Castro Solis, Deceased, Defendant/Appellee, v. Luz BALLESTEROS-SUAREZ, a single woman, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 08-0367.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department C.

June 18, 2009.

Dominguez Law Firm PC by Antonio Dominguez, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.

Cantor & Simon, PLC by Stanley David Murray, Eve Parks, Tempe, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.

OPINION

PORTLEY, Judge.

¶ 1 We are asked to determine whether the slayer statute, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 14-2803 (2005), can preclude the decedent's widow from collecting all or part of the proceeds from two life insurance policies. Because the slayer statute prohibits a person who is found to have feloniously and intentionally killed another from profiting by that act, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Adolfo F. Suarez ("Decedent") was shot to death in his home on November 29, 2004. His death was ruled a homicide.

¶ 3 His widow, Luz Ballesteros-Suarez ("Mrs. Suarez"), was a suspect in the murder and the beneficiary under his two life insurance policies. After she requested the life insurance proceeds, American Family Insurance Company and Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company filed separate interpleader actions. Both noted that Decedent's mother, Dora Castro, had been the previously named beneficiary, and requested the superior court to determine who should receive the insurance proceeds.

¶ 4 Mrs. Suarez answered both actions and denied any involvement in her husband's death. She also filed unsuccessful motions for summary judgment to recover the proceeds. The insurance companies were subsequently dismissed after they deposited the insurance proceeds with the clerk of the court, the cases were consolidated, and Cruz Antonia Suarez Castro ("Ms. Castro"), the Decedent's sister and the personal representative of her mother's estate, was substituted for her mother.

¶ 5 During the ensuing discovery, Mrs. Suarez unsuccessfully attempted to prevent her deposition from being taken and to preclude any questions about her knowledge of or involvement in her husband's death based on her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Mrs. Suarez also filed a motion for partial summary judgment and argued that she was entitled to one-half of the life insurance proceeds because the premiums had been paid from a community account. Ms. Castro responded and affirmatively argued that Decedent did not sign the American Family change of beneficiary form. She also petitioned the court to find that Mrs. Suarez was criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of Decedent.

¶ 6 The trial court conducted a bench trial in January 2008. Mrs. Suarez and her adult son, Miguel Carrasco, were called to testify and, other than identifying themselves, invoked their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.

¶ 7 The court subsequently found that the American Family change of beneficiary form was a forgery and, as a result, it had no legal effect. Consequently, Decedent's mother's estate was still the beneficiary of the American Family policy.

¶ 8 The court also found that Fidelity's change of beneficiary form had been properly executed and Mrs. Suarez was the beneficiary. The court then examined the facts against the slayer statute and found that:

[Mrs. Suarez's] invocation of her privilege against self-incrimination gives rise to an inference that she was involved in and is responsible in whole or in part for the murder of Adolfo Suarez as a matter of fact.

[Ms.] Castro's un-rebutted testimony that [Mrs. Suarez] offered her money if she would help [her sister-in-law] go against [Ms.] Castro's family and not oppose her attempt to obtain the insurance proceeds on [the Decedent's] life buttresses the allowable inference that [Mrs. Suarez] was involved in the murder of her husband.... The Court finds that, because of the allowable inferences the Court can make from [Mrs. Suarez's] taking the Fifth Amendment when questioned about the murder of Adolfo Francisco Suarez, and the forgery of the American Family Life change of beneficiary form, the preponderance of the evidence in this civil case is that Defendant, Luz Ballesteros-Suarez would be found guilty of the intentional and felonious killing of Adolfo Francisco Suarez.

Therefore, the Court finds in favor of Defendant, [Ms.] Castro as the personal representative of the estate of her mother, Dora [Ema] Castro, which is entitled to receive the proceeds from the two life insurance policies.

¶ 9 Mrs. Suarez filed a motion for new trial. She challenged the findings and verdict, and argued that she was entitled to her community property share of the life insurance proceeds. Ms. Castro, in response, argued that the issue was waived because Mrs. Suarez had failed to raise it in the joint pretrial statement. Mrs. Suarez replied, and subsequently filed an amended motion for new trial addressing the forgery issue and the applicability of the slayer statute.

¶ 10 The motion for new trial was denied. The court found that the statute allowed it to presume that Mrs. Suarez predeceased her husband and, as a result, she did not have any community property interest in the life insurance proceeds. The court also denied the amended motion, and signed an amended order and judgment. Mrs. Suarez filed an appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B), (F)(1) (2003).

DISCUSSION

I

¶ 11 When reviewing a verdict, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. A.R. Teeters & Assocs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 172 Ariz. 324, 328, 836 P.2d 1034, 1038 (App. 1992). "We will not set aside the [trial] court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses." In re Estate of Zaritsky, 198 Ariz. 599, 601, ¶ 5, 12 P.3d 1203, 1205 (App.2000). "A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence supports it, even if substantial conflicting evidence exists." Kocher v. Dep't of Revenue of Ariz., 206 Ariz. 480, 482, ¶ 9, 80 P.3d 287, 289 (App.2003). Evidence is substantial if it allows "a reasonable person to reach the trial court's result." Davis v. Zlatos, 211 Ariz. 519, 524, ¶ 18, 123 P.3d 1156, 1161 (App.2005) (quoting In re U.S. Currency in the Amount of $26,980.00, 199 Ariz. 291, 295, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 85, 89 (App. 2000)). We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our evaluation of the facts. Cauble v. Osselaer, 150 Ariz. 256, 258, 722 P.2d 983, 985 (App.1986).

¶ 12 We will, however, review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. In re Estate of Travers, 192 Ariz. 333, 334, ¶ 11, 965 P.2d 67, 68 (App.1998). We also review the court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Fremont Indem. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 182 Ariz. 405, 408, 897 P.2d 707, 710 (App.1995). Finally, we review a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Mullin v. Brown, 210 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 2, 115 P.3d 139, 141 (App.2005).

II

A

¶ 13 Mrs. Suarez argues that the slayer statute¹ is inapplicable. We disagree.

¶ 14 To determine whether the statute applies, we review its plain language to find and give effect to the legislative intent. See Mathews ex rel. Mathews v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 217 Ariz. 606, 608, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 867, 869 (App.2008). "When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to it and do not use other methods of statutory interpretation." Id. If a statute is unclear, we will "attempt to determine legislative intent by interpreting the statutory scheme as a whole and consider the statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Id. (quoting State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 22, 151 P.3d 1261, 1264 (App.2007)).

¶ 15 The slayer statute, in relevant part, provides that:

A. A person who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all benefits under this chapter with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt property and a family allowance....

B. The felonious and intentional killing of the decedent:

1. Revokes any revocable:

(a) Disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument.

2. Severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or as community property with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in common.

...

D. Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent.

E. A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section shall be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from that person's wrong.

F.... In the absence of a conviction, the court, on the petition of an interested person, shall determine whether, under the preponderance of evidence standard, the person would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent. If the court determines under that standard that the person would be found criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent, the determination conclusively establishes that person as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section.

A.R.S. § 14-2803.

¶ 16 The plain language of A.R.S. § 14-2803 demonstrates that the Arizona Legislature intended to prevent a person who feloniously and intentionally kills another from receiving any property belonging to his victim. See ...