Castro v. State

• Decision Date: 27 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. PD-1635-06.,PD-1635-06.
• Parties: Hector CASTRO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

227 S.W.3d 737

Hector CASTRO, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-1635-06.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 27, 2007.

Tim Copeland, Abilene, for Appellant.

Lisa McMinn, Assistant State's Atty., Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

MEYERS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Appellant was charged with manufacture of methamphetamine. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied. Appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment and a $1000 fine. Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the court of appeals reversed the conviction. Castro v. State, 202 S.W.3d 348 (Tex.App.-Ft. Worth 2006). We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals failed to defer to the trial court's implied fact findings, and whether a statement that a suspect failed to signal a lane change is a subjective conclusion or an objective fact. We hold that failure to signal a lane change is an objective determination, and the court of appeals erred in failing to defer to the trial court's ruling. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

FACTS

Deputy Bailey, a Young County Narcotics Task Force Officer, was called to a house to investigate a suspected drug lab. Because Appellant was the primary suspect, Deputy Bailey asked Olney police officers to be on the lookout for Appellant. An Olney police officer called Deputy Bailey and told him that Appellant was a passenger in a car that had been pulled over. Deputy Bailey went to the scene of the traffic stop and was informed that the driver had been pulled over for failure to signal a lane change.¹ Appellant was in the backseat of the car, crouched down with a jacket over his head. Officers observed, on the front floorboard of the car, a black bag that had been seen earlier at the suspected drug lab. Deputy Bailey searched the bag and found narcotics. Appellant was then arrested.

He filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the car, alleging that the initial traffic stop was unlawful. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Bailey was the only witness. The following is the testimony related to the stop:

[DEFENSE] And it's your testimony that the stop was made because of information that you had given to the Olney Police Department?

[WITNESS] No, sir, not the reason for the stop.

[DEFENSE] What was the reason for the stop?

[WITNESS] I was told the reason for the stop was failure to signal a lane change.

[DEFENSE] And is it your testimony today before this court that any failure to signal a lane change is a violation of the law?

[WITNESS] Within a hundred feet before turning.

[DEFENSE] But you were not there to see if they were turning or not. Correct?

[WITNESS] No, sir.

[DEFENSE] So you don't know what the circumstances were as far as the driver's signaling and what the drive[r] was doing. Correct?

[WITNESS] Right.

[DEFENSE] So is it your testimony here today that failure to signal a lane change is a violation of the law in all circumstances?

[WITNESS] No, sir. I was just told that was the reason the car was stopped.

[DEFENSE] So there could be circumstances where it would be legitimate for an officer to stop and arrest somebody for not signaling a lane change. Correct?

[WITNESS] Yes, sir.

[DEFENSE] And there would be circumstances where it would not be lawful for the officer to arrest the person for not signaling a lane change. Correct?

[WITNESS] It would be kind of a situational type.

[DEFENSE] And you don't know the situation?

[WITNESS] Well, when you're changing and like that shoulder is marked, it has a line there, it's marked, and when you're going to change lanes you should give a signal.

[DEFENSE] But you weren't there. You don't know what the circumstances were as to what actually happened. Correct?

[WITNESS] No, sir.

[DEFENSE] And it's your testimony that not every failure to signal a lane change would result in probable cause to arrest somebody. Correct?

[WITNESS] Possibly.

[DEFENSE] Do you know?

[WITNESS] It depends on the situation.

The trial court did not file findings of fact or make an explicit ruling. However, the court clearly denied the motion, stating to Appellant at his plea hearing, "I'm relatively sure that you're going to appeal the Court's ruling on the Motion to Suppress, so for purposes of the record, you do have the Court's consent to appeal that decision." Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

The court of appeals reviewed de novo whether the search was reasonable, giving deference to the trial court's implicit findings of fact that are supported by the record. The court pointed out that the officer who observed the traffic violation did not testify, and Deputy Bailey's testimony did not include any specific details regarding the stop. Castro, 202 S.W.3d at 356. The court presumed that the traffic violation about which Deputy Bailey testified was either a failure to signal when changing lanes or a failure to signal within one hundred feet of turning. Id. at 357. Citing our holding in Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex.Crim.App.2005), the court of appeals determined that the record did not contain sufficient objective facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Castro, 202 S.W.3d at 358. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress and reversed the decision of the trial court. Id. at 359.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The State argues that, by characterizing Deputy Bailey's testimony that the driver failed to signal a lane change as ambiguous, subjective, and conclusory, the court of appeals failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's implicit findings. The State also argues that the court of appeals misconstrued Ford and improperly considered whether the driver failed to signal within one hundred feet of turning when there was no testimony that the driver committed any offense relating to a turn as opposed to a lane change. The State points out that failing to signal a lane change is a violation that is not ambiguous or subject to different interpretations, but the court read ambiguity into the testimony and speculated about an alternative reason for the stop, thereby failing to give proper deference to the trial court's implied finding. Additionally, the State contends that the implied finding that the driver was stopped for changing lanes without signaling is supported by the record. The State points out the differences between the offense in Ford, following too closely, and the offense of failing to signal a lane change, stating that the testimony in Ford was an opinion or a judgment call based on the officer's observations about the vehicle's speed, the amount of traffic, and the road conditions, while whether a driver has signaled a lane change is not a matter of opinion or a judgment call. Additionally, unlike the statute prohibiting following too closely, there is no subjectivity built into the statute regarding changing lanes without signaling.

Appellant states that the only issue presented here is whether Ford applies to this case. He contends that Ford held that testimony that is conclusory in nature is not sufficient and that it requires specific, articulable facts for the State to establish the reasonableness of a stop. The trial court's implicit findings of fact are entitled to deference only if they are supported by the record. And, sufficiently reliable information to constitute reasonable suspicion is supported by the record only when the record contains testimony including specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a person engaged in criminal activity. Appellant states that Ford requires that the record upon which the trial court based its decision in denying a motion to suppress include facts of such specific nature as to allow an appellate court to determine the circumstances upon which an officer could reasonably conclude that a suspect was actually engaging in criminal activity, or had been, or soon would be. He argues that the officer who testified was unable to provide sufficient facts about the alleged violation to support the trial court's implied finding. Appellant states that the fact that the testimony was hearsay is not the problem, rather it is the insufficiency of the testimony presented by an officer who did not observe the violation. Finally, Appellant argues that Ford applies regardless of the nature of the offense on which the stop is based because the trial judge must make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of police action in all stop cases. While more detail may be required to support an implied finding that an officer had grounds to stop for following too closely than to support a finding that an officer had grounds to stop for an unsignaled lane change, both findings must be based on specific, articulable facts found in the record.

ANALYSIS

When the police conduct a warrantless search and seizure, the burden is on the State to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual was violating the law. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim.App.2001). A reasonable-suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances, giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Because the trial court...