Lall v. State
| Decision Date | 30 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 05-21-00770-CR |
| Citation | 656 S.W.3d 830 |
| Parties | Marlon Juan LALL, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
656 S.W.3d 830
Marlon Juan LALL, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
No. 05-21-00770-CR
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Opinion Filed November 30, 2022
Brian W. Wice, Houston, for Appellant.
Kenda L. Culpepper, Jeffrey William Shell, Rockwall, for Appellee.
Before Justices Myers, Pedersen, III, and Garcia
OPINION
Opinion by Justice Garcia
Appellant was convicted of manufacture or delivery of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. The jury assessed punishment, enhanced, at forty years in prison and judgment was entered accordingly.
Appellant now argues that: (i) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (ii) the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he knowingly possessed methamphetamine; and (iii) the trial court erroneously overruled his improper jury argument objection. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
The events leading to appellant's arrest and conviction occurred on August 12, 2020. Appellant was observed wearing a black fanny pack across his chest, loading things into his vehicle at a house under surveillance for suspected narcotics activity. After appellant left that location, Officer Jordan Pope, accompanied by his canine partner Czar, stopped appellant for having an obscured license plate and following too closely. Appellant consented to a pat-down of his outer clothing and cooperated with Officer Pope but appeared nervous during the encounter.
After Officer Pope checked appellant's identification and registration and confirmed that appellant had no outstanding warrants, he gave appellant a verbal warning for the traffic violations. He then requested consent to search the vehicle, which appellant declined. Officer Pope told appellant he was going to have his canine perform an open-air sniff around the vehicle and if the dog did not alert, appellant would be free to go.
The open-air sniff occurred immediately. Czar alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle, and a search ensued.
The search uncovered a black bag (later confirmed to be the fanny pack the surveillance officer observed) with a sunglass case containing methamphetamine. Other items found in the vehicle included marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a scale, small baggies, and a stolen firearm.
Appellant was charged with the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (a), (d). Appellant filed motions to suppress the evidence. The motions were carried with the trial and argued to the court after the State rested. The trial court denied the motions.
The jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense. During the punishment phase, appellant pleaded "true" to an enhancement and the jury assessed punishment at forty years in prison. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict.
Appellant moved for a new trial and requested findings of fact and conclusions of law on the suppression rulings. The trial court made the findings and conclusions as
requested, and appellant initiated this timely appeal.
II. Analysis
The Motion to Suppress
Appellant's first two issues argue the denial of his motion to suppress was erroneous because there was no reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop or the prolonged detention. We disagree.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Brodnex v. State , 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Martinez v. State , 348 S.W.3d 919, 922–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Derichsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We also defer to the trial court's findings on questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or credibility of the evidence. Brodnex , 485 S.W.3d at 436 ; Wade v. State , 422 S.W.3d 661, 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
We review de novo the trial court's determination of pure questions of law, the application of the law to established facts, and the legal significance of those facts. Lerma v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ; Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 667. We also review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that are not dependent upon credibility determinations. Brodnex , 485 S.W.3d at 436. Whether the facts known to the officer rise to the level of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d 666, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 696, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ).
When, as in this case, the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those findings. State v. Kelly , 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In that context, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, regardless of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion. Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 666 (citing State v. Woodard , 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ). We will sustain the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and if it is correct under any applicable legal theory. Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 190.
The Traffic Stop
We begin with appellant's challenge to the initial detention. The trial court found the evidence supported Officer Pope's reasonable suspicion that appellant committed traffic violations by failing to maintain and assume clear distance and for an obstructed license plate, and that reasonable suspicion justified the stop. Appellant maintains there was no justification for the stop and the trial court's determination was in error.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST . amend. IV ; Hubert v. State , 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). These constitutional protections extend to investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of a traditional arrest. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State , 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing
United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). Warrantless traffic stops by law enforcement personnel to address traffic violations constitute seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and are tantamount to temporary detentions; therefore, such traffic stops must be justified and supported by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ; Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ; see also Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 914. This principle controls "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
An actual traffic violation constitutes an objectively reasonable basis for the stop and sufficiently justifies the initial detention. Walter v. State , 28 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). But the State is not required to show that a traffic offense was actually committed. Tex. Dept. of Public Safety v. Fisher , 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Rather, the State need only show that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in progress. Id. ; Tex. Dept. of Safety v. Marron , No. 14-21-00476-CR, 2022 WL 3452902, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ; see also Jaganathan v. State , 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (question is not whether the defendant is guilty of a traffic offense but whether officer had a reasonable suspicion that he was). Even when an officer is mistaken about the facts that cause him to believe a defendant was in violation of a statute, the mistake "will not vitiate an officer's actions in hindsight so long as his actions were lawful under the facts he reasonably, albeit mistakenly, perceived them to be." Robinson v. State , 377 S.W.3d 712, 720, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
When determining whether a reasonable suspicion supports a traffic stop, we do not consider the officer's subjective intent in stopping a suspect; instead, we look "solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists under the totality of the circumstances." Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ; see also Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 668. An officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a person when, under the totality of the circumstances, he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that the detained person is, was, or will soon be engaged in criminal activity. See Ramirez-Tamyo , 537 S.W.3d at 36. This objective standard requires only some minimal justification for the stop. Brodnex , 484 S.W.3d at 437. Nonetheless, the officer must have more than just an inarticulable hunch or mere good faith suspicion that a crime was in progress. Id.
In assessing reasonable suspicion, we "cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty ... where none exits," and must permit officers to make "commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Kansas v. Glover , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188, 206 L.Ed.2d 412 (2020) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ).
Once an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion for a traffic stop, the stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment, even if the police made the stop for the purpose of an investigation unrelated to the given reason. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806...
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