Caver v. Gomez
| Decision Date | 25 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:11-cv-01025-AWI-SKO (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | DENELL CAVER, Plaintiff, v. E. GOMEZ, et al., Defendants. |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED
(Doc. 76)
OBJECTION DEADLINE: FIFTEEN DAYS RESPONSE DEADLINE: FIFTEEN DAYS
Plaintiff Denell Caver ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 20, 2011. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff's second amended complaint, filed on April 10, 2012, against Defendants Stark, Gomez, and Garcia ("Defendants") for acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in December 2010 at Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP") in Delano, California.
On January 23, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 76, 77.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 11, 2015, and Defendants filed a reply and evidentiaryobjections on March 18, 2015.1 (Docs. 78, 88, 89.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a surreply on March 30, 2015.2 (Doc. 90.)
Defendants' motion for summary judgment has been submitted upon the record without oral argument. Local Rule 230(l). For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that it be denied and this case be set for trial.
Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party's position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).
Defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and in moving for summary judgment, they need only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's case. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986)). If Defendants meet their initial burden, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff "to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial." In re Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). This requires Plaintiff to "show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)).
However, in judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court determines only whether there is a genuine issue for trial and in doing so, it must liberally construe Plaintiff's filings because he is a pro se prisoner. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Defendants identified eleven evidentiary objections. It is neither necessary for the Court to address each one individually nor is it the practice of the Court to do so in the context of summary judgment. See Oyarzo v. Tuolumne Fire Dist., 955 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1052 n.1 (E.D.Cal. 2013) (); Capital Records, LLC v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1200 n.1 (C.D.Cal. 2010); Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118-22 (E.D.Cal. 2006). Accordingly, Defendants' objections are addressed generally and as a group as follows.
The objections to various arguments in Plaintiff's eleven- page brief are disregarded, as the brief is not verified and has no evidentiary value. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004); Coverdell v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1987). (Doc. 89, Objs. 1-5.)
Defendants' objections to official prison records for lack of authentication are overruled. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4); Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532-33 (9th Cir. 2011). The records are subject to authentication under Rule 901(b)(6), and the Court notes the absence of any evidence or argument suggesting the existence of a legitimate challenge to the records on authentication grounds. See Chamberlain v. Les Schwab Tire Center of California, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03105-JAM-DAD, 2012 WL 6020103, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (citing Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (E.D.Cal. 2006)) ( "purely procedural" authentication objection). In addition, Defendants object to at least one document which was likely disclosed by them during discovery and which was submitted first by them in support of their motion for summary. (Doc. 76-2, Motion, Ex. F4; Doc. 89, Obj. 7.) An authentication objection in this circumstance is improper. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2002).
Regarding Defendants' hearsay objections, the Court observes that statements which are not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted - such as those introduced to show the effect on the listener - are not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801; U.S. v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991); Endsley v. Luna, 750 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1091 n.7 (C.D.Cal. 2010). Further, an opposing party's statement offered against that party is not hearsay, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), and, depending on the circumstances, official prison records may fall within the hearsay exceptions for records of a regularly conducted activity and for public records, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), (8); e.g., U.S v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Chong, 98 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118-19 (D.Hawai'i 1999); Edwards v. Clarey, No. 2:11-cv-1725-EFB P, 2014 WL 546368, at *6 n.3 (E.D.Cal. 2014) (); Lancaster v. Amos, No. 1:09-cv-00683-CWD, 2013 WL 6198281, at *10(D.Idaho 2013). In any event, because the Court did not rely on any of the evidence objected to on hearsay grounds, it need not reach those objections.
In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on December 14, 2010, he alerted control booth officer G. Avila that he and his cellmate, inmate Johnson, were not compatible and were not getting along, and that they needed to be separated immediately due to threat of a physical altercation. Twenty minutes later, Correctional Sergeants E. Stark and E. Gomez arrived at Plaintiff's cell; and he informed them that he "was feeling homicidal tendencies," his "safety was in jeopardy," and he and inmate Johnson needed to be "immediately separated." Defendant Stark said she and Defendant Gomez would not be able to address a cell move until after institutional count but they would return. They did not return, however.
On December 15, 2010, Defendant E. Garcia and Officer R. Rielo came to Plaintiff's cell with Medical Technical Assistant M. Camia, who was distributing inmate Johnson's medication. Inmate Johnson told Garcia and Rielo that he was willing to share a cell with anyone in the building to get him out of the cell with Plaintiff due to their continued hostility. Defendant Garcia said it was too late to make a bed move and it would be addressed the next day. Inmate Johnson then struck Plaintiff in the face with his closed fist, knocking Plaintiff to the ground and splitting his eye open.
Plaintiff and inmate Johnson were pepper sprayed, handcuffed, and taken to the program office, where they were put in separate holding cages. Plaintiff was subsequently taken to an outside hospital, where he received eight stitches to the laceration above his right eye.
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"), and during the events at issue, he was incarcerated at KVSP.4 At thattime, Defendants Stark and Gomez were Correctional Sergeants at KVSP, and Defendant Garcia was a Correctional Officer at KVSP.
Under California Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3269, it was the expectation "that all inmates double cell, whether being housed in a Reception Center (RC), General Population (GP), an Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU), a Security Housing Unit (SHU), or specialty housing unit." Inmates were expected to accept their housing assignment if cleared for a double cell, and were "not entitled to a single cell assignment, housing location of choice, or to a cellmate of their choice." Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3269. The KVSP Operational Manual Supplement required that all...
To continue reading
Request your trial