Caverno v. Fellows

Decision Date26 May 1938
Citation15 N.E.2d 483,300 Mass. 331
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesELIZABETH S. CAVERNO v. ERNEST W. FELLOWS & others.

November 6, 1936.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., FIELD, DONAHUE & QUA, JJ.

Unlawful Interference. School and School Committee. Words "Malice."

An action for alleged unlawful interference, on the part of the plaintiff's immediate superior teacher in a high school of the principal, and of the superintendent of schools, with the plaintiff's right to continue as a teacher under tenure could not be maintained on evidence merely that the defendants made reports of conduct of the plaintiff which resulted in her dismissal by the school committee, there being no evidence that the conduct of any of the defendants was actuated by ill will toward, or a purpose to harm, the plaintiff, rather than by a justifiable purpose to perform their respective duties.

TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated November 23, 1933. The case previously was before this court when, in a decision reported in 286 Mass. 440 , an order sustaining a demurrer to the declaration was affirmed. Thereafter the declaration was amended and the case was tried before Brogna, J.

F. C. Zacharer, for the plaintiff. C. W. Wonson, for the defendants, submitted a brief.

FIELD, J. This case -- previously before this court in 286 Mass. 440 -- is an action of tort brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Fellows, superintendent of schools of the city of Gloucester the defendant Johnson, principal of the high school of said city and the defendant Harris, supervisor of English in said high school, for malicious interference with the plaintiff's contract of employment as a teacher in said high school and maliciously procuring her dismissal as such teacher by the school committee of said city. A motion of the defendants for a directed verdict in their favor was granted, and a verdict was returned accordingly. The plaintiff excepted.

The verdict was directed rightly. There was evidence that the plaintiff taught in the high school each year from the fall of 1925 until November 17, 1932, having had tenure of office and served at the discretion of the school committee after the school year 1927-1928 (see G.L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 71, Section 41; Duffey v. School Committee of Hopkinton, 236 Mass. 5 , 9); that the plaintiff on November 17, 1932, was injured in an automobile accident; that thereafter she had not taught in any school, had been out of employment and had made no effort to obtain employment; that on September 12, 1933, she received a letter from the school committee notifying her that the committee would vote on her proposed dismissal on the ground of insubordination and being temperamentally unfit to teach; that she requested a hearing, and such a hearing was had on September 25, 1933, before the school committee, at which she was present with counsel; and that later she received notice that, at a meeting of the school committee on October 9, 1933, she was dismissed as a teacher. See G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42.

The plaintiff seeks to recover in this action on the ground of malicious interference by the defendants with her right to the position of teacher in the public schools of the city of Gloucester. The general principle governing such actions is that "an intentional invasion of a legally protected interest without legal justification," which is a "legal cause of damage to the plaintiff," creates liability. Ross v. Wright, 286 Mass. 269 , 271, and cases cited. The plaintiff's right to the position of teacher was a "legally protected interest," even though her employment as such was terminable by the school committee in accordance with the statutory provisions for dismissal (G.L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 71, Section 42), and, so far as appears, was terminable by her at will. Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485 , 487. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353 , 360. Ross v. Wright, 286 Mass. 269 , 272-273. Caverno v. Fellows, 286 Mass. 440 , 442. The plaintiff does not contend in this action that her dismissal by the school committee was unlawful, but she contends that it was induced by the defendants through unlawful means. See G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 71, Section 42, Corrigan v. School Committee of New Bedford, 250 Mass. 334 , 339; and compare St. 1934, c. 123, Graves v. School Committee of Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80 .

It appears to be uncontroverted that the defendants held the positions already referred to in the public school system of the city of Gloucester, and that the plaintiff was under the direct supervision of the defendant Harris. There was evidence -- apparently testimony of the plaintiff -- that in the spring of 1931 "she had a talk with the defendant Harris who said she would see to it that the plaintiff would live in some other place and not in Gloucester, which the defendant Harris denied," that "From then on there was trouble between the plaintiff and the defendant Harris relating to news items in the `Flash' which was a page in the Gloucester Times, published each Saturday regarding high school matters and doings," and that in the school year of 1932-1933, starting on September 6, 1932, the plaintiff's assignment of work included "supervising the publication of the `Flash.'" The plaintiff testified that because of her work she did not have an opportunity to prepare entirely the material for the "Flash," and it was not published the first or second week, that "When the `Flash' did not appear the second week, the defendant Harris came to the plaintiff in an angry mood and wanted to know the reason why the `Flash' did not appear," that "The plaintiff tried to explain but the defendant Harris would not listen and rushed out of the room," that "The defendant Harris then reported to the defendant Johnson about the `Flash' being not published and of her talk with the plaintiff," and that "The owner of the newspaper also mentioned to Mr. Johnson the omission of the `Flash.'"

The plaintiff testified further as follows: "The defendant Johnson then called the plaintiff to his office and a discussion was had in regard to the reason for not publishing the `Flash.' This conference took place on September 26, 1932, in the forenoon in the office of the defendant Johnson. The plaintiff tried to explain to the defendant Johnson the reason for not getting out the `Flash' but the principal was angry and said that he would give her ten minutes time to make up her mind whether she would call a meeting of the `Flash Board' for that afternoon and when she did not answer, he ordered her to call a meeting of the `Flash Board' for 1:30 that afternoon." This order was in writing and was as follows: "September 26, 1932 . . . My dear Miss Caverno: Confirming our conference, I order a meeting of the Flash Board at 1.30 to-day with you in charge. Sincerely, Leslie O. Johnson." There was evidence that the defendant Johnson "also made the following statement to the plaintiff: `I shall see whether Miss Harris and I, or you will remain longer in the Gloucester High School,'" that "The plaintiff then became ill and went home about 1 o'clock and told the assistant principal . . . that she was not able to attend the `Flash Board' meeting because of illness," that she "remained at home for a day or two and then returned to teach again," and "taught from then on until November 17, 1932," that "At the `Flash Board' meeting the defendant Harris took over the management of the `Flash' and the schedule of the plaintiff was re-arranged," and that "The defendant Johnson made a report of the matter to the superintendent, the defendant Fellows."

There was evidence that "the plaintiff went to the superintendent's office some time in the latter part of September or the beginning of October 1932, and talked with him about the situation," and there "was contradictory evidence as to what took place or what was said in his office, the plaintiff testifying that she had not refused to abide by the orders of the superintendent or Mr. Johnson or Miss Harris, while the superintendent testified that she said she would refuse to abide by their orders in regard to the `Flash.'" The plaintiff testified as follows: "On May 3, 1933, she received a letter from the defendant Fellows requesting her resignation. . . . On July 8, 1933, the plaintiff answered this letter by a letter written to the defendant Fellows in which she stated that she expected to teach `this coming fall.' . . . The defendant Fellows answered this letter on July 14, 1933, with a letter in which he stated that he is convinced that for the best interests of the Gloucester High School the plaintiff should not return as a teacher and that it was his intention to recommend to the school committee at the next regular meeting that they notify her that they will vote on her dismissal. . . . On September 5, 1933, the beginning of the school year, she went to the high school as was customary and usual in prior years and talked with the defendant Johnson and told him that she was ready to teach school and requested that he give her a program schedule of assignments as was customary. This the defendant Johnson refused to do saying that he was told by the superintendent not to allow the plaintiff to teach."

The bill of exceptions contains the following recital: "The school committee is composed of ten members, with the mayor as chairman. Each member of the school committee was called by the plaintiff as a witness and their testimony generally was that from time to time at meetings of the school committee from September 1932 until the plaintiff's dismissal in October 1933, there were informal discussions with Mr....

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