Christiansen v. Elwin G. Smith, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 October 1991
• Citation: 598 A.2d 176
• Parties: James A. CHRISTIANSEN, Jr. v. ELWIN G. SMITH, INC.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 176

598 A.2d 176

James A. CHRISTIANSEN, Jr. v. ELWIN G. SMITH, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 26, 1991.

Decided Oct. 24, 1991.

James Case, Thomas R. Watson, (orally) McTeague, Higbee, Libner, MacAdam, Case & Watson, Topsham, for employee.

James M. Bowie, Elizabeth G. Knox, (orally) Thompson & Bowie, Portland, for employer.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, and COLLINS, JJ.

GLASSMAN, Justice.

Challenging the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Commission, Elwin G. Smith, Inc. appeals from a decision of the Appellate Division affirming the Commission's award of compensation to Smith's employee, James A. Christiansen, Jr., for his work-related injuries sustained in New York. We affirm the decision of the Appellate Division.

The employer, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, is registered to do business in the State of Maine. It hired the employee, a Maine resident, to work on a construction project in Valhalla, New York, in October of 1986. The parties negotiated the employment contract by telephone with the understanding that Christiansen would have to be cleared through the local union hall in New York City before reporting to work in Valhalla. The employee was permanently disabled by an injury suffered at the Valhalla job site on December 29, 1986. He sought and obtained an award of benefits under the New York workers' compensation system. On July 24, 1987, the employee filed a petition for a supplemental award of compensation with the Commission in Maine.

Smith does not dispute that Christiansen was a permanent resident of Maine at the time he was injured. The law is well established that the Maine residency of an employee, by itself, is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Commission over claims for work-related injuries received by the employee out of state. LeBlanc v. United Eng. & Constructors, 584 A.2d 675, 677 (Me.1991); Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d 441, 444 (Me.1986). The Commission properly asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the present claim.

The Maine long-arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, makes the statutory reach of the Commission coextensive with the exercise of personal jurisdiction that is permissible under the due process clause of the federal constitution. Foreside Common Develop. Corp. v. Bleisch, 463 A.2d 767, 769 (Me.1983). ¹ Due process requires that three questions be answered affirmatively:

(1) does the forum state have a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the action; (2) should the defendant by his conduct reasonably have anticipated litigation in the forum state; and (3) would the exercise of jurisdiction comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice?"

Caluri v. Typkema, 570 A.2d 830, 831 (Me.1990) (quoting Foreside Common Develop. Corp. v. Bleisch, 463 A.2d at 769).

We have previously stated that "Maine has a 'legitimate and substantial interest' in ensuring that the burden of its residents' [work-related] injuries falls upon their employer rather than upon their communities." LeBlanc v. United Eng. & Constructors, 584 A.2d at 678 (quoting Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511 A.2d at 444). Here, the employee, like the employees in LeBlanc and Dissell, was a resident of Maine years before his injury; it was his residence at the time of his injury and continues to be so. The employee has received, and continues to receive, his medical treatment in Maine. Accordingly, Maine has a sufficient state interest in the subject matter of the present proceedings.

Due process also demands that a foreign "corporation have sufficient contacts with [the forum] State to 'make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.' " Harriman v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc, 518 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Me.1986) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945)). The requisite minimum contacts are present when "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Harriman v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., 518 A.2d at 1037 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1298 (1958)). Purposeful availment occurs when the activities of the defendant have been purposefully directed at the forum's residents, or if the defendant engages in significant activities in the forum or the defendant creates continuing obligations between itself and residents of the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182-84, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 541-43 (1985) (emphasis added); Harriman v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., 518 A.2d at 1037.

Christiansen resided in Maine when he was first recruited by Smith. Although the continuing relationship consisted of distinct and independent projects for which the employee was specifically...