Roberts v. Greenway, 29390

Citation233 Ga. 473,211 S.E.2d 764
Decision Date09 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. 29390,29390
PartiesPatrick A. ROBERTS v. Charles E. GREENWAY.
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

Thomas M. West, Jackson, for appellant.

Ken Stula, Sol., William G. Solomon, IV, John Ray Nicholson, Athens, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

JORDAN, Justice.

Patrick Roberts appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Clarke Superior Court.

The appellant was arrested pursuant to four different warrants charging him with the crime of cheating and swindling. In the company of his appointed counsel he appeared before the magistrate's court of Clarke County and waived a commitment hearing with respect to all of the charged offenses. On October 3, 1973, appellant and his attorney appeared in the State Court of Clarke County and signed written pleas of guilty of all four of the offenses charged. Appellant was then sentenced to twelve months confinement on two of the charges and to twelve months probation on each of the other charges.

Appellant claimed in his petition for habeas relief that the pleas of guilty were entered without an understanding of the possible consequences evolving from the entry of said pleas, and therefore the pleas were entered in violation of his constitutional rights.

In an attempt to prove that the pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily the attorney for the respondent directed questions toward appellant's trial counsel concerning the extent to which he had informed appellant as to the possible and probable consequences of entering the pleas. Appellant objected to this line of questioning on the grounds that it invaded the province of the attorney-client privilege. The objection was sustained by the habeas judge, and such evidence was not admitted.

It was established at the hearing that no Boykin v. Alabama record was established at the time the pleas were entered. The State Court Judge testified that it was not his practice to make such a record, the rationale being that he assumed the requisite information was imparted by the defendant's attorney.

The habeas judge after making he above findings of fact ruled that 'The petitioner herein has not met the burden of proof resting upon him to show that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of any of his rights under the Constitutions of the State of Georgia or the United States or was not adequately advised of the possible consequences of the pleas of guilty entered by him in each of the . . . cases.' The habeas judge based his conclusions of law on the grounds that: (1) the judgments and sentences were valid on the face thereof and the petitioner in a habeas corpus action attacking such judgment has the burden of proving any invalidity based on an alleged denial of his constitutional rights; (2) that a defendant in a criminal case was aware of his constitutional rights at the time of the entry of a plea of guilty and made a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof may be proved by extrinsic evidence as well as by a transcript of the proceeding at which the plea of guilty was entered; (3) that an attorney is an officer of the court; and when he is competent and experienced in matters under litigation there is a presumption that he has adequately discharged his responsibility and duties as such; (4) that this presumption is sufficient, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to support a finding that an attorney who is competent and experienced in criminal litigation adequately and properly advised his client as to his rights under the Constitutions of the United States and of Georgia with respect to criminal charges pending against the client and of the possible consequences of a plea of guilty to such charges; and (5) that the petitioner herein has not met the burden of proof resting upon him to show that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of any of his rights under the Constitutions of the State of Georgia or the United States or was not adequately advised of the possible consequences of the pleas of guilty entered by him in each of the above referred to cases.

The appellant contends that the habeas court erred in denying his petition and remanding him to custody.

1. After carefully studying the briefs of the parties and the order of the court in the above styled appeal, it appears that there still exists some confusion as to the standards dictated by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and how these standards have been construed by the appellate courts of this state. We feel that this case presents an opportunity to put at least some of this confusion to rest.

Appellant first contends that Boykin requires an affirmative showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that a defendant's plea of guilty was intelligently and voluntarily entered.

After a prisoner raises the question of the validity of his plea of guilty, the burden is on the state to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. The state may accomplish this end by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing...

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  • United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • November 24, 1976
    ...the privilege, thus enabling the attorney to give his version of their conversation prior to the plea. See also Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975); State v. Lawonn, 113 Ariz. 113, 547 P.2d 467 (1976); Singleton v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 522 P.2d 1221 This line of attorney-......
  • State v. Reaves
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1977
    ...waiver of his Boykin rights; this burden is not met by showing the defendant was represented by competent counsel. Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975). Since Boykin, a Georgia trial judge has the same duty as a federal judge under rule 11. Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764,......
  • Britt v. Smith
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 19, 2001
    ...894, 471 S.E.2d 869 (1996) (citation omitted). 4. Bowers, 266 Ga. at 894, 471 S.E.2d 869 (citation omitted). 5. Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 475, 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975). See Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814, 816, 504 S.E.2d 686 6. Byrd v. Shaffer, 271 Ga. 691, 692, 523 S.E.2d 875 (1999); Bo......
  • Lejeune v. McLaughlin
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 24, 2014
    ...Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 895(1), 471 S.E.2d 869 (1996) ; Glover v. Jones, 245 Ga. 848, 849, 268 S.E.2d 156 (1980) ; Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 475(2), 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975). In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 39......
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