Cehaich v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, 81-1134

• Decision Date: 16 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-1134,81-1134
• Citation: 710 F.2d 234
• Parties: 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3220, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,218 Emil CEHAICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE and AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS of AMERICA, a labor organization; Douglas Fraser, Irving Bluestone, John Bolin, and Robert Walker, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 234

710 F.2d 234

113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3220, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,218

Emil CEHAICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE and AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS of AMERICA, a labor organization; Douglas Fraser, Irving Bluestone, John Bolin and Robert Walker, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-1134.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 17, 1983.

Decided June 16, 1983.

Barbara Shaw Harvey (argued), Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Bruce A. Miller, Renate Klass, Alan V. Reuther, John A. Fillion, M. Jay Whitman, Claude D. Montgomery (argued), Intern. Union, UAW, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before KEITH, MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges.

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

The sole issue presented for review on this appeal is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant union under applicable federal labor law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

Plaintiff-appellant, Emil Cehaich, has been employed by the General Motors Corporation since 1968. He is employed in the company's Design Staff Unit as a machine repair machinist in Detroit, Michigan. During his employment, Cehaich has also been a member in good standing of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (union).

In November of 1975, Cehaich was appointed to a position as benefits representative for the local General Motors Design Staff Unit. He was appointed to the position by Robert Walker, administrator of the Benefits Plans Section of the General Motors Department. Walker was appointed to his position by Irving Bluestone, an elected union official. As the administrator of the Benefits Plans Section, Walker was "directly responsible for appointing and supervising the activities of the benefits representatives in General Motors plants."

The benefits representative position is described in the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the union. ¹ The benefits representative is responsible for generally conferring with, counseling, and assisting retirees, beneficiaries and surviving spouses regarding benefit problems under the pension, insurance and subagreements. The representative also handles the appeals of various claimants when benefits are initially denied and attends informational meetings about contractual benefits when necessary. This is an unpaid position, but benefits representatives are allowed to perform their duties during the normal work day.

In September 1979, the national union leadership negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with General Motors. A special informational and educational meeting was called in Dallas, Texas for September 21-22, 1979. The purpose of this meeting was to inform influential local union members about the tentative agreement which was about to be offered to the general union membership. Elected and appointed union officers representing General Motors employees from all over the country were invited to attend. As an appointed union officer, Cehaich was one of those invited to the Dallas meeting.

At the meeting, Cehaich became part of a dissident caucus which opposed the tentative agreement. He was among those dissidents who distributed a leaflet criticizing the agreement and the national union leadership. ² Defendants Walker and Bolin, assistant director of the union's General Motors Department, observed Cehaich distributing the leaflets. Walker allegedly told Cehaich he was "through."

When Walker returned to Detroit, he told GM to remove Cehaich's name as benefits representative. Upon learning of his removal, Cehaich was told that he had been removed from his position for "passing out slanderous literature." Walker refused to put this explanation in writing; however, there appears to be no dispute that Cehaich's actions in Dallas led to his discharge from union office. Cehaich has retained his job and does not allege that he has lost any privilege or incident of union membership.

On March 17, 1980, Cehaich filed the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The complaint stated four causes of action. The first cause of action alleged that defendant Walker's actions constituted discipline and was a restraint on the free exercise of speech within the meaning of sections 101(a)(2) and 609 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411(a)(2) ³ and 529. ⁴ The second cause of action alleged that defendant Walker's summary removal of Cehaich violated section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(5). ⁵ The third cause of action maintained that defendant Walker's actions constituted coercion and intimidation in violation of paragraph 7 of the union's collective bargaining agreement. The fourth cause of action alleged that defendant Walker's actions were a violation of Article 31 of the union's constitution. The defendants, relying upon Cehaich's statement of the facts, filed a motion for summary judgment on the first, second, and fourth causes of action.

On September 15, 1980, the district court filed a memorandum opinion and order granting the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, 496 F.Supp. 912. The court held that section 101(a)(2) and section 101(a)(5) were not applicable to the facts of this case. The court held further that it had no jurisdiction to entertain suits involving an interpretation of the UAW constitution. On November 17, 1980, the district court denied Cehaich's motions for an expedited appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and certification of the action under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). Subsequent to the court's ruling on these issues, Cehaich dismissed his remaining cause of action with prejudice. He then perfected this appeal, challenging the district court's interpretation of sections 101(a)(2) and (a)(5) of the LMRDA.

II.

The Supreme Court has recently considered the scope of protected activity within the meaning of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. In Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), the Court discussed the protections of sections 101(a)(2), 101(a)(5) and 609. An examination of the authority set forth in that case will be helpful to a resolution of the issues before this court.

A.

Finnegan v. Leu involved the dismissal of several business agents of a union local. The agents had supported the union president's political adversary during a recent campaign. Upon his election, the union president discharged the agents from their appointed positions. The agents were also members of the union. However, their discharge from their positions did not affect their status as union members.

The agents brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of sections 101(a)(2), 101(a)(5) and 609 of the Act. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment which were granted by the district court. See 469 F.Supp. 832. This court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 652 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.1981). The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to settle a conflict within the circuits on the interpretation of the Act. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 433, 102 S.Ct. at 1869. ⁶

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted that the intent of the LMRDA was to insure that unions were run by democratic processes. It "places emphasis on the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean loss of union membership and in turn loss of livelihood." Id. at 435-436, 102 S.Ct. at 1870-1871. However, the Court noted that the business agents held a "dual status as both employees and members of the Union." Id. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 1871. It was their status as union members that the Act sought to protect.

The court, therefore, concluded that "removal from appointive union employment is not within the scope of those union sanctions explicitly prohibited by Sec. 609." Id. at 439, 102 S.Ct. at 1872. Moreover, the court held that Title I [Sec. 101 et seq.] "does not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to choose a staff whose views are compatible with his own." Id. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 1873 (footnote omitted).

B.

With this discussion in mind, we turn to the facts of the present case. Cehaich concedes that the principles of Finnegan are controlling in his case. However, he seeks to distinguish the two cases on a factual basis. Most importantly, he refers this court to footnote 11 in Chief Justice Burger's opinion. That footnote explicitly "leave[s] open the question of whether a different result might obtain in a case involving nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential employees." Id. at n. 11. Cehaich asks this court to remand the case so that the district court might conduct further factfinding on his role as a benefit representative. We decline this invitation.

Cehaich also held a dual status as an officer and member of the union. These were distinct roles and union action affecting one did not necessarily affect the other. Cehaich's status as a member of the union remained unchanged after his dismissal from his position as a union officer. No fine, suspension, expulsion, or disciplinary action has been taken against him which will affect his rights as a member of the bargaining unit. ⁷

On the other hand, Cehaich has lost his position as an unpaid union officer. He is no longer entitled to exercise the rights and privileges attendant with the appointive office which he once held. Yet, dismissal from his office "does not impinge upon the incidents of union membership, and affects union members only to the extent that they happen to be union [officers]." Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438, 102 S.Ct. at 1871. As the Supreme Court observed, "we discern nothing in Sec. 609 or its legislative history, to support petitioner['s] claim that Congress intended to establish a...