Ceja v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. S-08-0180.,S-08-0180.
• Parties: Juan CEJA, a/k/a Jonathan Israel Almada, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

208 P.3d 66

2009 WY 71

Juan CEJA, a/k/a Jonathan Israel Almada, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S-08-0180.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 29, 2009.

Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Westling.

Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Smith.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Mr. Ceja was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor by possessing child pornography. He claims the district court erred by refusing to exclude the testimony of the investigating officer who obtained his oral admission to possession of pornographic materials because the State failed to produce the officer's notes of his interview in discovery.

[¶ 2] Finding no violation of the discovery rules, we affirm.

ISSUE

[¶ 3] Mr. Ceja presents a single issue on appeal:

I. Did the trial court's misinterpretation of W.R.Cr.P. 16 constitute an abuse of discretion and a denial of a fair trial?

The State presents a similar issue.

FACTS

[¶ 4] On September 5, 2007, Jose Robledo contacted the Gillette Police Department and reported that his roommate, Juan, was in possession of child pornography. Based upon the information received from Mr. Robledo, officers obtained a warrant to search the residence shared by Juan and Mr. Robledo.

[¶ 5] When the officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warrant, they encountered a man who identified himself as Jonathan Almada. After informing him of his Miranda rights in English, Detective Gary Owens questioned him about Mr. Robledo's claims. He admitted that he had DVDs containing child pornography and stated that he had child pornography on his computer.

[¶ 6] The officers arrested Mr. Almada. Once he was in custody, the authorities learned that Jonathan Almada was an alias and his real name was Juan Ceja Castillo. The State charged him with one count of sexual exploitation of a child in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-303(b)(iv) and (d) (LexisNexis 2007), for possession of child pornography as defined in § 6-4-303(a)(ii)(B).¹ Because Castillo was his mother's middle name, the caption was amended to identify the defendant as Juan Ceja.

[¶ 7] Mr. Ceja filed a demand for discovery on September 11, 2007. Among other items, he requested:

1. As to the Defendant, disclosure of, and the right to inspect and/or copy, any written confession or inculpatory statement, or the substance of any oral confession or inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person to whom the confession or inculpatory statement was made and identity of all persons present when the statement was given.

2. Disclosure of, and the right to inspect and/or copy, the handwritten notes, reports or memoranda of the officer[s] who participated in taking the Defendant's statement, and any subsequent statements and the handwritten notes, reports, and memoranda of any officer[s] who witnessed or were present during the taking of all or any part of the Defendant's statement.

[¶ 8] Mr. Ceja also filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement, including his admission that the pornographic materials and computer belonged to him. He claimed his statements were not voluntary because he did not have an adequate understanding of the English language and he was informed of his rights and interrogated in English. At the suppression hearing, Detective Owens testified that he had notes from his interview with Mr. Ceja. The district court denied the motion to suppress.

[¶ 9] Mr. Ceja then filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from offering his statements to the officers into evidence at trial. He claimed that the evidence should be excluded because the State ignored its discovery obligations by failing to produce the detective's notes to the defense. The district court denied the motion in limine.

[¶ 10] A jury trial commenced on March 17, 2008. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Ceja guilty of sexual exploitation of a child. The district court entered judgment upon the jury's verdict and sentenced him to serve three to ten years in prison. Mr. Ceja appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 11] The issue on appeal pertains to whether the district court properly ruled on a discovery matter. We review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo.1999); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 307 (Wyo.1977). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, "`the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did.'" State v. Naple, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 8, 143 P.3d 358, 361 (Wyo.2006) quoting Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 947 (Wyo.2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 12] Mr. Ceja challenges the district court's ruling that the State did not violate its discovery obligation when it withheld Detective Owens' notes. He claims that the district court was incorrect in ruling that he was not entitled to the notes under W.R.Cr.P. 16 and abused its discretion by refusing to exclude the evidence of his admission that the pornography belonged to him.

[¶ 13] A criminal defendant does not have a general constitutional right to discovery. Instead, his discovery rights are governed by statute, rule and court order. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 577 (Wyo.1990); Capshaw v. State, 714 P.2d 349, 351 (Wyo.1986). Thus, while a defendant may request or demand certain information from the State, he is entitled to the information only insofar as required by statute, rule or case law. W.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(1)(A)(2) governs discovery of the defendant's statements to law enforcement:

(a) Disclosure of Evidence by the State. —

(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.

(A) Statement of Defendant.

(i) Upon written demand of a defendant the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph:

1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the state;

2. The substance of any oral statement which the state intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether before or after arrest; and

3. Recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged.

....

(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. — Except as provided in subparagraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), and (1)(D), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal state documents made by the attorney for the state or other state agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses except as provided in Rule 26.2.

[¶ 14] In this case, there was no written or recorded statement. Instead, the State offered Detective Owens' testimony that Mr. Ceja had verbally admitted the pornographic materials belonged to him. Pursuant to its clear language, Rule 16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2) applies to this situation, and Mr. Ceja was entitled to disclosure of the "substance of" the oral statement the State intended to offer into evidence. As recognized by the district court, Rule 16(a)(2) does not require the State to provide discovery of law enforcement's internal reports, etc., except as provided in Rule 16(a)(1).

[¶ 15] This Court addressed an issue similar to the one presented here in Dennis v. State, 963 P.2d 972 (Wyo.1998). Dennis was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor. At trial, "the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Dennis'[s] statement during a police interview that he did not really care about the ages of the girls he associated with because he was a "`player.'" Id. at 975. Dennis's statement to the police was oral and apparently had not been recorded. The officer had, however, taken notes during the interview, and his notes included the "player" reference. The officer prepared a report, which was provided to the defense in discovery, but his notes were not. The report did not state that Dennis had used the term "player" to describe himself. Dennis moved for a mistrial because the officer testified about the "player" statement at trial and it had not been provided to the defense. Id.

[¶ 16] On appeal, this Court concluded that the State's omission of the word "player" from the discovery provided to the defense was not a violation of Rule 16. We explained:

This particular statement falls under Rule 16(a)(1)(A)(i)(2), and the omission of the word `player' is not a vital or an integral part of the substance of defendant's oral statement to the police. The district court correctly ruled that the State had disclosed the substance of the oral statement. Rule 16(a)(2) does not require disclosure of the officer's notes.

Id. at 975-76.

[¶ 17] This Court's ruling in Dennis is consistent with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the similar Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.² In United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir.1999), the Tenth Circuit ruled that an agent's preliminary hearing testimony about the defendant's oral statement to law enforcement was sufficient to meet the requirement to disclose the "substance of" the defendant's oral statement. Id. at 1010. The court noted:

The underlying purposes of Rule 16 further support our conclusion. Rule 16 is designed to provide the defendant with sufficient information to make an informed decision about a plea, to allow the court to rule on admissibility motions before trial, to minimize prejudicial surprise at trial, and to generally increase the efficiency of...