CENTRAL FLA. INV. INC. v. ORANGE CTY. CODE BD.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 5D00-3321.,5D00-3321.
• Citation: 790 So.2d 593
• Parties: CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC., etc., et al., Appellants, v. ORANGE COUNTY CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

790 So.2d 593

CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, INC., etc., et al., Appellants, v. ORANGE COUNTY CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD, et al., Appellees.

No. 5D00-3321.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

August 3, 2001.

Michael E. Marder and David R. Lenox of Greenspoon, Marder, Hirschfeld, Rafkin, Ross & Berger, P.A., Orlando, for Appellants.

Kimberly A. Ashby of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., and Alan Lawson, Orange County Attorneys Office, Orlando, for Appellees.

SHARP, W., J.

Central Florida Investments, Inc., Westgate Lakes, Inc. and Westgate Lake Owners' Association, Inc. ("Central Florida") appeal from an order which dismissed their lawsuit against Orange County and the Orange County Code Enforcement Board ("County") for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, Central Florida argues there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies because the lawsuit involves constitutional issues and challenges to the County's police power and any further administrative action would be futile. We disagree and affirm.

Central Florida and Westgate are the current owners/developers of a condominium and timeshare resort on Big Sand Lake in Orange County. The Association manages timeshare plans at the resort and controls the recreation and common areas, some of which abut Big Sand Lake.

By way of background, Orange County designated the resort as a planned development district and approved the development plan for the property on behalf of Central Florida's predecessor in 1980. According to Central Florida, its predecessor intended for the resort to include water-related facilities.

In 1984, Central Florida's predecessor filed an application to amend the development plan to allow a boat dock and shelter on Big Sand Lake for the rental of nonpowered boats. In July 1984, the amendment was approved with the exception that motorized water craft with combustible engines could not be used.

In January 1993, Central Florida's predecessor applied for an amendment to the development plan to permit the leasing of jet skis to guests at the resort, to operate a ski school with one ski boat, to operate a ski jump and slalom course, to hold boat ownership meetings, to hold water ski tournaments and to make television commercials and movies using power boats on the lake. The Zoning Development Review Committee recommended approval of this amendment with the condition that a maximum of one motorized boat and eight jet skis be permitted to operate at any one time.

In April 1993, the Planning Department outlined its conditions for approval of the amendment. Several hearings were held to consider the amendment but were continued so that a compromise could be reached with neighboring homeowners' association groups. In the meantime, in June 1993, Central Florida acquired title to the resort pursuant to a foreclosure sale.

In early July, Central Florida reached a compromise with its neighbors and changed the request to allow for the rental of six jet skis and one ski boat. At the July 6, 1993 hearing, Central Florida announced the settlement but the County Commission denied its request for the amendment. The Code Enforcement Board then issued a notice that Central Florida was violating the Orange County Code by using motorized water crafts (boats and jet skis) on the lake.

In August 1993, Central Florida filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, challenging the denial of its request for the amendment. Central Florida also filed this lawsuit alleging it was in doubt as to its rights to use motorized water craft on Big Sand Lake. In the first action, the trial court granted the petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the order denying Central Florida's request for the amendment. The trial court in this lawsuit issued a temporary injunction enjoining the County from any attempt to prohibit the rental of boats and jet skis at the resort.

Despite its successes in the legal arena, Central Florida withdrew its application for the amendment and terminated commercial motorized boat rentals in April 2000. The County then moved to dismiss this lawsuit. In May 2000, Central Florida filed a six-count second amended complaint. Count one seeks a declaration of Central Florida's legal rights to operate commercial and non-commercial water craft on Big Sand Lake. Count two requests a declaration regarding Central Florida's riparian rights on the lake. Count three seeks a declaration that the County has violated zoning laws by selectively prohibiting Central Florida from operating motorized boats on the lake while not restricting others from doing so. Count four seeks injunctive relief, enjoining the County from attempting to restrict or prohibit Central Florida's right to operate water craft on the lake. Count five is an inverse condemnation action for damages for the confiscation of Central Florida's littoral and riparian rights. Count six is an action for violation of Central Florida's civil rights under section 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In June 2000, the County filed a supplement to the motion to dismiss, arguing in part that Central Florida failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court found that Central Florida had indeed failed to exhaust administrative remedies by withdrawing the application to amend the development plan to allow motorized boats on the lake. This lawsuit was then dismissed.

As a general rule, parties are required to pursue administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge agency action. City of DeLand v. Lowe, 544 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 551 So.2d 461 (Fla.1989); City of Gainesville v. Republic Investment Corp., 480 So.2d 1344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 682 F.2d 888 (11th Cir.1982). The exhaustion rule serves a number of policies, including promoting consistency in matters which are within agency discretion and expertise, permitting full development of a technical issue and factual record prior to court review, and avoiding unnecessary judicial decisions by giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any errors and possibly moot the need for court action. Deltona Corp.

In De Carlo v. Town of West Miami, 49 So.2d 596 (Fla.1950), the Florida Supreme Court discussed the practicality and necessity of the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted:

The administrative boards usually provided for the consideration and review of zoning problems are made up of local people, having the advantage of full local information as to the reasons behind the various zoning regulations. Their findings, while not conclusive, are indeed helpful in the ultimate determination of the rights of the parties. Moreover, the inequalities of a zoning ordinance, if called to the attention of such local administrative boards, may frequently be adjusted at that level. Such boards should, at least, be given an opportunity to afford relief, or state their reasons for not doing so.

49 So.2d at 596-597.

On appeal, Central Florida argues that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply here because there is no pending administrative proceeding. Central Florida characterizes the situation as one in which the County has already declared that Central Florida has "no riparian rights whatsoever" on Big Sand Lake and plans to enforce that determination.

Contrary to Central Florida's assertion,...