Cera v. A.W. Chesterton Co.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. PC-12-0678 |
| Parties | MARCO CERA and DANIELLE CERA, Individually and as Natural Guardians of GABRIELLA CERA and NINA CERA v. A.W. CHESTERTON COMPANY, et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"), pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c), brought by Providence College ("Defendant") against Marco Cera ("Cera") and Danielle Cera, Individually and as Natural Guardians of Gabriella and Nina Cera (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Defendant contends that it is immune from civil suit in the instant matter under certain provisions of the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Act (the "WCA"), G.L. 1956 §§ 28-29 et seq. Plaintiffs object to Defendant's Motion, arguing that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the WCA applies here at all. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14.
Cera, a New Jersey resident, moved to Providence, Rhode Island in 1991 to pursue a four-year course of study and obtain a bachelor's degree in history from Defendant. During his summer vacations in 1993 and 1994 (the "1993 and 1994 summers"), Cera worked for Defendant as a "summer helper" with its Heating,Ventilation, and Air Conditioning crew (the "HVAC crew").1 Defendant traditionally hired approximately twenty-five to thirty-five "summer helpers" during each summer vacation period, placing them among its HVAC, landscaping, and furniture moving crews as supplementary labor.2 As part of the HVAC crew, Cera worked approximately thirty hours per week and performed cleaning, maintenance, and other "gofer" duties for the full-time crew members. Defendant paid Cera regular wages by check twice monthly.3
Plaintiffs allege that Cera was exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing products while working as a "summer helper" for Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Cera inhaled breathable asbestos fibers that had been disturbed and released by Defendant and outside contractors from HVAC products and machinery that he worked with or around. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached duties it owed to Cera to warn him of the dangers of asbestos exposure, to inspect its premises to ascertain the toxicity of asbestos-containing products present, and to remediate any asbestos-related hazards. Plaintiffs contend that as a result of his exposure to breathable asbestos fibers while working for Defendant, Cera developed and eventually died from mesothelioma.4
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on February 9, 2012, seeking, among other claims, to recover compensatory and punitive damages and pre- and post-judgment interest fromDefendant in connection with Cera's alleged exposure to asbestos during the 1993 and 1994 summers. Relative to the instant motion, both parties have appended numerous affidavits, deposition transcripts, and other documents to their briefs in support of their respective claims.
Pursuant to Super R. Civ. P. 56(c),5 our Supreme Court has held that "summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mutual Development Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., LLP, 47 A.3d 319, 323 (R.I. 2012); Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 532 (R.I. 2012). "Conversely, summary judgment is not appropriate 'if there are any genuine issues of material fact or if the moving party cannot prevail as a matter of law.'" In re Estate of Dermanouelian, 51 A.3d 327, 331 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Narragansett Electric Co. v. Saccoccio, 43 A.3d 40, 44 (R.I. 2012)).
"The burden rests with the nonmoving party 'to prove the existence of a disputed issue of material fact by competent evidence; it cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Mutual Development Corp., 47 A.3dat 323 (quoting Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110, 113 (R.I. 2011)); see Olamuyiwa, 45 A.3d at 532. Thus, "by affidavits or otherwise, nonmoving parties have an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin, 46 A.3d 835, 839 (R.I. 2012). When considering a motion for summary judgment, our Supreme Court has counseled that a trial justice must "remain ever mindful . . . 'that summary judgment is an extreme remedy that warrants cautious application.'" Mutual Development Corp., 47 A.3d at 323; Olamuyiwa, 45 A.3d at 533.
"In a tort action by an employee to recover damages for a work-related injury," it is widely acknowledged that an employer asserting a workers' compensation statute as a defense carries the burden of proving that workers' compensation benefits are the appropriate and exclusive remedy for the plaintiff. 6 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 100.01(2) at 100-3. The employer satisfies this burden by demonstrating "that the plaintiff was an employee entitled only to workers' compensation [benefits]" within the meaning of the applicable workers' compensation statute. Id. (Emphasis added.) "The controlling fact in establishing exclusiveness is the [employment] relationship of the parties at the time of occurrence of the injury." Id. at § 100.01(3) at 100-6; see also Gothreaux v. Gulf Oxygen Co., 289 So. 2d 235, 236 (La. App. 1974). (Emphasis added.) Thus, "if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is of no consequence that the employment has since been terminated and that no employment relation exists at the time of the tort suit." 6 Larson § 100.01(3) at 100-7; see also Mitchell v. Hercules, Inc., 410 F.Supp. 560, 571 (S.D. Ga. 1976). Pursuant to § 28-35-11 of the WCA,6 jurisdiction of those cases in which the employer shows that workers' compensation benefits are the appropriate and exclusive remedy for the plaintiff properly lies with the Workers' Compensation Commission. See Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I. 1986); Miles v. Bendix Corp., 492 A.2d 1218, 1219 (R.I. 1985); Silva v. James Ursini Co., 475 A.2d 205, 207-08 (R.I. 1984); DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries Cranston, Inc., 121 R.I. 440, 447, 399 A.2d 1229, 1233 (1979); McAree v. Gerber Products Co., 115 R.I. 243, 249, 342 A.2d 608, 611 (1975).
Defendant contends that §§ 28-29-17 and 28-29-20 of the WCA grant it immunity from civil suit in the instant matter because Cera was Defendant's "employee" during the 1993 and 1994 summers within the meaning of § 28-29-2(4) of the WCA. Specifically, Defendant argues that Cera waived his right to sue Defendant in common-law tort for alleged work-related injuries per § 28-29-17. Moreover, Defendant asserts, § 28-29-20 provides Cera with the sole remedy—workers' compensation benefits—for his alleged work-related injuries. Thus, Defendant maintains, summary judgment is appropriate here because Cera cannot maintain any common-law tort claims against it.
Plaintiffs contend that while Cera worked for Defendant during the 1993 and 1994 summers, Cera was not Defendant's "employee" within the meaning of § 28-29-2(4) because he falls within the enumerated "casual employee" exception. Plaintiffsassert that the "casual employee" exception applies here because Cera's hours, duties, and responsibilities were irregular. Moreover, Plaintiffs maintain, Cera's duties did not further Defendant's business—education—because they entailed simple maintenance, repair, and other "gofer" duties more common to a utility company than a college. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Cera's duties were superfluous tasks that were simply absorbed by Defendant's full-time staff when Cera returned to class. In fact, Plaintiffs assert, Cera was hired only because he had a "special relationship" with Defendant: he was Defendant's student, and Defendant was doing him a favor by hiring him. Thus, Plaintiffs contend, summary judgment is inappropriate here because there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the WCA applies in the first instance.
Defendant responds that Cera was a full-fledged "employee" of Defendant during the 1993 and 1994 summers and the "casual employee" exception does not apply here. Defendant argues that Cera's hours, duties, and responsibilities were, in fact, regular and predictable over a definite number of weeks. Defendant also asserts that Cera's duties furthered Defendant's business because they aided Defendant in promoting and maintaining a safe and effective environment for its students and faculty. Finally, Defendant contends that even if it hired Cera only because he was its student, he nonetheless falls within the WCA's definition of "employee" and is subject to its provisions because the existence of an employer-employee relationship, not the employer's motivation for hiring the employee, is the controlling fact.
An "employee" is defined in § 28-29-2(4) of the WCA as "any person who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of service or apprenticeship with any employer . . . ." Sec. 28-29-2(4). Our Supreme Court has consistently held that "[u]nder the [WCA] the relationship of employer and employee is contractual." Miles, 492 A.2d at 1219; Silva, 475 A.2d at 207-08. Thus, the Court has found that "in order to establish an employer-employee relationship, there must be an express or implied contract for hire." Spikes v. State, 458 A.2d 672, 674 (R.I. 1983). The Id.; see also Durand v. City of Woonsocket, 537 A.2d 129, 130 (R.I. 1988). Above all, the Court has counseled, "the determinative factor in...
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