Ceroni v. State

• Decision Date: 12 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 45A03-9001-CR-42,45A03-9001-CR-42
• Citation: 559 N.E.2d 372
• Parties: Donald Craig CERONI, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 372

559 N.E.2d 372

Donald Craig CERONI, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 45A03-9001-CR-42.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

Sept. 12, 1990.

Scott L. King, Gary, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., David M. Sommers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

STATON, Judge.

Donald Craig Ceroni appeals his conviction for dealing in cocaine. He presents us with the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Ceroni's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of a hotel room occupied by Ceroni.

We reverse.

On February 19, 1989, five officers of the Hammond Police Department were dispatched to the Super 8 Motel in pursuit of an individual named Robert Gentry. They were apparently told by the desk clerk that Gentry was in room 124 of the hotel. The officers knocked on the door of the room, which was answered by the appellant, Donald Craig Ceroni. Behind Ceroni stood David Stambolija, whom the officers thought matched the description of Gentry with which they had been provided by the dispatcher. The parties argued about the description, Stambolija asserting that he had blue eyes, rather than brown eyes as Gentry was described.

Upon entering the room, the officers observed a quantity of loose marijuana and a marijuana cigarette on a table. Several of the officers contained Ceroni, Stambolija, and their two girlfriends while at least one officer searched the drawers, bathroom, and under the bed. In one of the drawers, an officer recovered a black satchel. Upon opening the satchel, the officer discovered drug paraphernalia and 56.8 grams of cocaine. All of the occupants of the room were arrested.

Ceroni's pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence contained in the satchel on the basis that it was the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure was denied, and his objection to the admission of the evidence at trial on the same grounds was overruled.

When reviewing a claim of a violation of a defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the first line of inquiry is to determine whether the defendant had a personal and legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. Perkins v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1379, 1383. The State contends that since the motel room was not rented in Ceroni's name, but he was allowed to stay in it by a friend, he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in it.

A person's hotel room is a "home" for Fourth Amendment purposes. Mowrer v. State (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 1129, 1132, transfer denied. The fact that Ceroni did not rent the hotel room himself does not mean that he had no personal and legitimate expectation of privacy in the property. Such an expectation of privacy is justified if the owner or renter of the premises consents to the aggrieved party's presence in the dwelling. Jones v. U.S. (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S.Ct. 725, 734, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, overruled on other grounds 448 U.S. 83. Thus, Ceroni has standing to challenge the search. Cf. U.S. v. Grandstaff (9th Cir.1987), 813 F.2d 1353 1357, cert. den. 484 U.S. 837, 108 S.Ct. 119, 98 L.Ed.2d 78.

In order to conduct a valid search and seizure, a search warrant is necessary unless the exigencies of the situation mandate an immediate response. Collins v. State (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 89, 94, transfer denied. Here, the State concedes that the officers had no warrant, but contends that the officers in question were conducting a search of the area to protect the officers and prevent destruction of evidence incident to a valid arrest. In support of its position, the State cites Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, reh. den. 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 36, 24 L.Ed.2d 124. We agree that Chimel is controlling here, but we reach a different result than that advocated by the State.

We note initially that exceptions to the warrant requirement have been strictly construed. Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 759-760, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2590-2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. There is a presumption that warrantless searches are unreasonable, and the burden is placed on the state to show that the search falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Murphy v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1077, 1081, rehearing denied. For a search to be valid under the Fourth Amendment, it must be " 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 762, 89 S.Ct. at 2039, quoting Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Assuming arguendo that the police officers' entry into the hotel room without a warrant was permitted, and that the police officers were justified in arresting the occupants of the hotel room including Ceroni after observing the marijuana on the table, we still cannot agree with the State that the search of the drawers and the satchel was constitutionally permissible.

The rationale of the weapons search/destruction of evidence exception and its limits were set out in Chimel, supra:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items...