Certain Juvenile, In re, 53-70

• Decision Date: 22 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 53-70,53-70
• Citation: 274 A.2d 506,129 Vt. 185
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: In re Delinquency Proceedings Concerning a CERTAIN JUVENILE.

Page 506

274 A.2d 506

129 Vt. 185

In re Delinquency Proceedings Concerning a CERTAIN JUVENILE.

No. 53-70.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Dec. 22, 1970.

James M. Jeffords, Atty. Gen., and George P. Stokes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Paul B. Wolfe, Newport, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

SHANGRAW, Justice.

On February 13, 1970 a petition was brought by the State's Attorney of Orleans County, Vermont representing that the juvenile, who is the subject of these proceedings, is a delinquent child. The claim of delinquency is that on September 26 and 27, 1969, he operated a pickup truck on State Route 105 in Charleston, Vermont, without the consent of the owner of this motor vehicle.

The petition was heard on February 26, 1970 by the District Court, Unit No. 4-Orleans Circuit, sitting as a Juvenile Court. The written findings which were filed explicitly state-'(t)he Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the facts set forth in paragraph 1 through 12 below-.' These paragraphs set forth in detail the circumstances leading up to the taking and operation of the motor vehicle in question by the juvenile, age 15 years. The facts thus found are not in dispute.

The court concluded its findings with its determination and order dated March 5, 1970, that the juvenile '* * * is a delinquent child within the meaning of the Vermont Juvenile Procedure Act, in that on September 27, 1969, he committed an act which if committed by an adult would be a crime under the laws of the State of Vermont, namely, that he operated a motor vehicle on a public highway, namely State Route 105 in Charleston, and the Dane Mill Road, without the consent of the owner of the vehicle.'

A disposition hearing was held March 26, 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of 33 V.S.A. section 657, an Order of Disposition was issued by the court on the same date transferring legal custody of the juvenile to the Commissioner of Corrections with a report due in 90 days. It was further

'ORDERED, that this Order of Disposition will expire, and the child discharged from any and all detention and custody ordered in the proceedings, on the date two years from the date hereof, (or from the date of removal) unless this Order of Disposition has theretofore been renewed by this Court.'

Prior to hearing of the petition alleging that the juvenile subject is a delinquent child, there was filed on his behalf a motion to dismiss the petition setting forth therein several grounds in support of the motion. An answer thereto was filed by the State. The motion was denied.

On April 3, 1970 notice of appeal was filed by him pursuant to the provisions of 12 V.S.A. section 2382, from the order of the court denying the motion to dismiss and from questions of law decided adversely to him.

The definitive issues briefed and presented by appellant for our consideration are limited to two questions previously raised in the prehearing motion to dismiss. It is claimed that the trial court erred in upholding the constitutionality of the Juvenile Procedure Act against the objections:

1. That it permits a finding of delinquency upon evidence less than that required to establish an adult respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: and

2. That it permits imposition of sentence for a period in excess of the maximum allowable upon conviction of an adult for the same offense.

It is appellant's first point that 33 V.S.A. section 654 is inherently defective since it does not clearly call for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This section provides:

After hearing the evidence on the petition, the court shall make an order containing its findings thereon. If the court finds that the allegations made in the petition have not been established, it shall dismiss the petition and order the child discharged from any detention or shelter care theretofore ordered in the proceedings. If the court finds that the allegations made in the petition have been established, it shall find either that the child is delinquent, or neglected, or unmanageable.

In The Matter of Winship, (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, the Court held that juveniles, like adults, were constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage when the juvenile was charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. Acknowledging that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the family court judge in the Winship case apparently relied on the provision of the New York statute which permitted proof by preponderance of the evidence. In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 360, 90 S.Ct. at 1070, 25 L.Ed.2d at 373.

In the case now considered, no question is presented but that the judge below legally imposed the standard of proof now required by the Winship case and he indicated this in his findings. Even though the judge required proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is contended by the appellant that the statute, section 654, supra, permits proof of delinquency by a lower quantum of evidence,-that is the preponderance standard. In this light, appellant claims that the statute is constitutionally deficient and that this deficiency is not overcome by the court's adoption of the higher standard of proof.

A legislative enactment is entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. It will be given a reasonable construction, consistent with constitutional requirements, unless such an interpretation is plainly foreclosed by the language itself. Vermont Woolen Corporation v. Wackerman, 122 Vt. 219, 223, 167 A.2d 553; Reed v. Allen, 121 Vt. 202, 206, 207, 153 A.2d 74.

33 V.S.A. section 654 provides that '(i)f the court finds that the allegations made in the petition have been established, it shall find that the child is delinquent, or neglected, or unmanageable.' The key word in the statute is 'established.' Where criminal conduct is involved it means proof beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with constitutional requirements. And as we have previously held, juvenile proceedings must measure up to the essentials of substantive due process. In re Rich, (1966), 125 Vt. 373, 377, 216 A.2d 266. We are persuaded that the Legislature had this in mind when it revised the Juvenile Court Act of 1967.

The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests upon the person who challenges its validity. State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 156, 2 A.2d 107. To give the statute the meaning claimed by the appellant would be to render it unconstitutional, and this result we must avoid if it is fairly and reasonably possible to do so. Trybulski v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation, 112 Vt. 1, 10, 20 A.2d 117.

Since section 654, supra, in its present form does not offend the fundamental requirements of due process, we can supply by implication the inherent requirement that 'established' means 'beyond a reasonable doubt' where, as here, the juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.

Here, the juvenile court adopted the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing the constitutional rights of the appellant were properly safeguarded.

We not...