Chambers-Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State
| Citation | 565 S.W.3d 1 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-15-00744-CV,03-15-00744-CV |
| Parties | The CHAMBERS-LIBERTY COUNTIES NAVIGATION DISTRICT; Terry Haltom, in His Individual Capacity as District Commissioner ; Allen Herrington, in His Individual Capacity as District Commissioner ; Ken Coleman, in His Individual Capacity as District Commissioner ; Ken Mitchell, in His Individual Capacity as District Commissioner ; Dave Wilcox, in His Individual Capacity as District Commissioner, Appellants v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
James F. Parker III, Lambeth Townsend, Nathan Vassar, Lloyd Gosselink Rochelle & Townsend, P.C., Craig T. Enoch, Enoch Kever PLLC, Shelby Leigh O’Brien, Austin, TX, Richard G. Baker, Baker & Zbranek PC, Liberty, TX, for Appellants.
Steven Lord Jr., Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Environmental Protection Division, Craig J. Pritzlaff, Environmental Protection Division, Austin, TX, for Appellee.
Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field
The Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District (the District); District Commissioners Terry Haltom, Allen Herrington, Ken Coleman, Ken Mitchell, and Dave Wilcox (the Commissioners) appeal the trial court's order denying their plea to the jurisdiction and Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The State of Texas, acting on behalf of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (the Department), sued appellants alleging that the District and its Commissioners had unlawfully authorized Sustainable Texas Oyster Resource Management, L.L.C. (STORM) to cultivate and harvest oysters in state waters. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order in part and reverse and dismiss in part.
The District is a political subdivision of the State created in 1944 pursuant to Article XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution () and organized pursuant to Chapters 60, 62, and 63, in part, of the Texas Water Code.1 See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59 (); see generally Tex. Water Code §§ 60.001 –.564 (), 62.001–.318 (governing navigation districts formed under article XVI, section 59 ); 63.001–.379 (governing self-liquidating navigation districts). In 1957 and 1967, the State conveyed to the District by patent more than 23,000 acres of submerged land in Galveston and Trinity Bays (the Submerged Lands). In April 2014, the Commissioners authorized the District to enter into a lease with STORM (the Lease) covering a portion of the Submerged Lands and granting STORM rights "to use, create, manage, possess, cultivate or control oyster beds, to seed, plant, transplant, sow, cultivate, depurate or harvest oysters lawfully and commercially" and "to promote commercial fishing." The Lease granted STORM the right "to protect the Land, each oyster bed ... and the oysters ... against trespass and trespassers," and the lease required STORM, and STORM agreed, to comply with all applicable laws.
The District supported STORM in its effort to obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to construct oyster beds, and STORM sent "No Trespass Notices" to holders of leases, known as "certificates of location," issued by the Department. In August 2015, on behalf of the Department, the State sued the District, its Commissioners in their official capacities, and STORM, alleging that, in leasing the Submerged Lands to STORM, the District and its Commissioners had exceeded their legal authority, and that the District had unlawfully asserted sole and exclusive control and possession over all oysters within the waters and upon the Submerged Lands described in the Lease. The State sought declarations under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act that (1) the District and/or its Commissioners were without legal authority and had acted ultra vires in entering the Lease, and (2) the Lease is void. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 38.001 –.011. The State also sought "restitution" for the value of each oyster or other fish unlawfully killed, caught, taken, possessed, or injured. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code §§ 12.301 (), .303 (providing that attorney general may bring suit to enforce section 12.301 ). The District and the Commissioners filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a. The plea and the motion asserted the same jurisdictional arguments. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the district court denied both the plea to the jurisdiction and the Rule 91a motion.
As a political subdivision of the state, the District is immune from suit unless the legislature has expressly waived immunity. See Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 512 (Tex. 2012) ; College of Mainland v. Glover, 436 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Because sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, it is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004). A plea questioning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law that we review de novo. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007). When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we look to the pleader's intent, construe the pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction, and accept the allegations in the pleadings as true to determine if the pleader has alleged sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) ; City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009) ; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. When the pleadings do not allege sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable jurisdictional defect, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.
Rule 91a provides that a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that it has no basis in law or fact. Tex.R. Civ. P. 91a.1. "A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought." Id. The court may not consider evidence when ruling on a Rule 91a motion; instead, the ruling must be based only on the pleading of the cause of action and any supporting exhibits. Id. R. 91a.6. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) ; see GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied). We base our review on the allegations of the live petition and any attachments, and we accept as true the factual allegations. Wooley, 447 S.W.3d at 76.2
The parties' issues also require us to construe applicable statutes and rules. Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. See Railroad Comm'n v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2011). Our primary concern is the express statutory language. See Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2009). We apply the plain meaning of the text unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex. 2010). "We generally avoid construing individual provisions of a statute in isolation from the statute as a whole," Texas Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 628, and we must consider a provision's role in the broader statutory scheme, see 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex. 2008). We construe administrative rules in the same manner as statutes. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. 2011).
In their first issue, the District and the Commissioners argue that, as a political subdivision, the District is immune from suit unless the legislature has expressly waived immunity and that the applicable statutes contain no such waiver.3 A legislative waiver of immunity must be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.034 ; Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002). "For a suit to proceed against a governmental unit under a statute [that waives sovereign immunity], the court must first look to the terms of the [a]ct to determine the scope of its waiver and then ‘consider the particular facts of the case ... to determine whether it comes within that scope.’ " Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Cooke, 149 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Tex.App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (quoting Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001) ).
The State alleges that the District has unlawfully possessed oysters and seeks recovery under sections 12.301 and 12.303 of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code. Section 12.301 provides that "[a] person who kills, catches, takes, possess, or injures any fish ... is liable to the state for the value of each fish ... unlawfully killed, caught, taken, possessed, or injured." Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code § 12.301. Section 12.303 provides that "[t]he attorney general ... may bring a civil suit ... in the name of the state to recover the value of each fish ... unlawfully...
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Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation Dist. v. State
...the portion of the trial court's order that permitted the State to pursue an ultra vires claim against the District itself. 565 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016). It otherwise affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that the State could pursue a claim a......