Chambers v. Hermann Hosp. Estate
| Decision Date | 25 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-94-00981-CV,01-94-00981-CV |
| Citation | 961 S.W.2d 177 |
| Parties | Tina CHAMBERS, Individually and as next friend of Tiahree K. Chambers; Wallace Lee Chambers; Annie Mae Chambers; and Edward Johnson, Appellants, v. HERMANN HOSPITAL ESTATE; The Hermann Trust; Hermann Hospital; Hermann Hospital, Inc.; and Gage Van Horn, Appellees. (1st Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Gayle E. Oler, Dallas, Ray Shackelford, Winfred H. Morgan, Houston, for appellants.
Patricia L. Brooks, Michael Phillips, Houston, for appellees.
Before MIRABAL, COHEN and TAFT, JJ.
Plaintiffs filed suit based on an incident occurring at Hermann Hospital on April 23, 1991, in which hospital employee Ronald Chambers was killed, and his fellow employee Edward Johnson was injured, while trying to subdue a violent patient. The main issues in this case involve whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act bar plaintiffs' claims against the hospital defendants, and whether the attending physician owed a duty to non-patient third parties. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
Ronald Chambers was a patient-care technician, and plaintiff Edward Johnson was a food-service worker, at Hermann Hospital. Plaintiffs Tina Chambers and Tiahree K. Chambers are, respectively, the widow and daughter of Ronald Chambers, and plaintiffs Wallace Lee and Annie Mae Chambers are his parents.
On Saturday, April 20, 1991, a patient named Johnny Long, Jr. was brought to the emergency room, and remained at the hospital over the next three days to be treated for seizures and alcohol withdrawal. When he arrived, Long was violently combative, and was kicking, biting, and hitting those attempting to attend to him. Accordingly, they sedated him, then administered anti-seizure drugs and other medications for alcohol withdrawal, then secured him with leather restraints. The next day, Long was transferred to the hospital's neurological critical care unit, where Dr. Gage Van Horn was the attending physician. On the following day, April 22, Van Horn had Long transferred to an unsecured general patient floor, where treatment continued. That evening, Long became "agitated," but refused tranquilizer drugs.
The following morning, Long assaulted a nurse and attempted to leave the hospital. In response to a call for help, Chambers, Johnson, and Richard Larramore, a medical student, attempted to restrain Long, and, in the ensuing struggle, they all crashed through a grill--floor to ceiling in height--that covered an opening to an air shaft. They all fell together 24 feet, to the concrete floor below. Chambers and Larramore were killed, and Johnson and Long were injured. This suit followed.
Chambers' parents and Johnson sued Van Horn for bodily injury and wrongful death respectively, on causes of action for negligence and gross negligence; and they sued Hermann Hospital and related entities 1 (collectively, the Hermann defendants) for those same injuries, on causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional tort. Chambers' widow and child sued the Hermann defendants for wrongful death on causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional tort.
The Hermann defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that on April 23, 1991, they had subscriber status under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, and that therefore the recovery provided for under the Act was the exclusive remedy for compensating plaintiffs' losses. Hermann Hospital, Inc. additionally moved for summary judgment on the ground that it never owned or operated the hospital where the events made the subject of this suit took place.
Van Horn also moved for summary judgment, asserting the evidence conclusively showed that (a) he had no duty to plaintiffs; (b) alternatively, he breached no duty to plaintiffs; and (c) alternatively, any breach of duty to plaintiffs on his part did not proximately cause either Johnson's injuries or Ronald Chambers' death.
Plaintiffs filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment asserting that the Hermann defendants did not have subscriber status under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, and that therefore the recovery provided for under the Act was not the exclusive remedy for compensating plaintiffs' losses.
In an order signed May 4, 1994, the trial court:
(1) granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Hermann defendants on plaintiffs' claims against them, except for the intentional tort claims, on the ground that the defendants had subscriber status under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act at the time of the occurrence in question and were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the exclusive remedy provisions of that act;
(2) also granted summary judgment for Hermann Hospital, Inc. against plaintiffs on the ground that it never owned or operated the hospital where the events made the subject of this suit took place;
(3) denied plaintiffs' cross-motions for partial summary judgment against the Hermann defendants;
(4) granted Van Horn's motion for summary judgment on all of Johnson's and Chambers' parents' claims against him.
The summary judgment was made final by an order of severance signed on August 3, 1994. This appeal followed.
In their first and second points of error, plaintiffs assert the trial court erred (1) in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Hermann defendants on the basis that the recovery provided for under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for compensating plaintiffs; and (2) in denying plaintiffs' cross-motions for partial summary judgment on that same issue.
The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment for a defendant is whether the summary judgment proof establishes, as a matter of law, that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). The movant has the burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue that precludes summary judgment. Id. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovants and any doubts resolved in their favor. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984). A summary judgment for the defendant, disposing of the entire case, is proper only if, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not succeed upon any theories pleaded. Smith, Seckman, Reid, Inc. v. Metro Nat'l Corp., 836 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Dodson v. Kung, 717 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Once the defendant produces sufficient evidence to establish the right to a summary judgment, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient evidence to give rise to a fact issue to avoid a summary judgment. "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tex.1972).
The summary judgment in favor of Hermann Hospital, Inc., is supported by an independent ground--namely, that it never commenced doing business or appointed officers or directors, and never owned or operated the hospital where the events made the subject of this suit took place. Plaintiffs do not attack the trial court's ruling specifically granting summary judgment for Hermann Hospital, Inc., on that ground. Therefore, that portion of the judgment will be affirmed. See Ins. Co. of North America v. Security Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (party appealing from summary judgment must show that each independent ground asserted in the motion for summary judgment is insufficient to support the judgment).
The incident in which Johnson was injured and Chambers was killed took place after January 1, 1991, the effective date of all pertinent portions of a revision to the Texas workers' compensation system effected by former TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. arts. 8308-1.01 through 8308-17.19 (the Act). 2 The Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Art. 8308-3.23. 3 Obtaining coverage.
(a) [A]n employer may elect to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage.... An employer who obtains coverage is subject to the provisions of this Act.
Art. 8308-3.24. 4 Notice to employees.
(a) An employer shall notify each employee in the manner provided by this section as to whether or not the employer has workers' compensation insurance coverage.
(b) The employer shall notify a new employee of the existence or absence of coverage at the time the employee is hired.
(c) An employer who obtains coverage ... shall notify each employee that the coverage has been obtained ... not later than the 15th day after the date on which the coverage ... is effective.
(d) Each employer shall post in the employer's place of business a notice as to whether or not the employer has workers' compensation insurance coverage. The employer shall revise the notice whenever the information it contains is revised.
(e) The notice required by subsection (d) of this section shall be posted at conspicuous locations at the employer's place of business as necessary to provide reasonable notice to the employees.
Art. 8308-3.25. 5 Company notice of coverage[.]
(a) When an employer has secured workers' compensation coverage, the insurance company shall file notice of the coverage with the commission not later than the 10th day after the effective date of the coverage. Coverage is effective on the date a...
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Van Horn v. Chambers
...death. The trial court granted summary judgment for the physician. The court of appeals reversed. Chambers v. Hermann Hosp. Estate, 961 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.]1996) . We reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment that the plaintiffs take In April 1991, Johnn......