Chambers v. Probst

• Citation: 140 S.W. 572,145 Ky. 381
• Parties: CHAMBERS v. PROBST.
• Decision Date: 16 November 1911
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

140 S.W. 572

145 Ky. 381

CHAMBERS v. PROBST.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 16, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch Second Division.

Action by W. E. Chambers against W. G. Probst. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

L Frank Withers, for appellant.

Joseph Selligman and Alfred Selligman, for appellee.

LASSING J.

W. E Chambers was in the employ of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company as a day laborer. He was a watchman at one of the street crossings of said company in the city of Louisville. He lost his position with the company, and conceiving that his discharge was brought about by the unwarranted, unlawful, and malicious intermeddling of one W. G. Probst, he instituted a suit against him to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of his discharge. In his petition he in substance alleged that, by reason of false and malicious statements made by Probst to his employer, relative to the manner in which he had discharged his duties as watchman at the public crossing, he had lost his position. A demurrer was sustained to this petition, and plaintiff's suit dismissed. He appeals, and here raises the question, Is it an actionable wrong to unlawfully interfere with one's right to labor?

In different forms this same question was before this court in Chambers & Marshall v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S.W. 57, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 699, 11 L.R.A. 545, 34 Am.St.Rep. 165; Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S.W. 60, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 737, 11 L.R.A. 550, 34 Am.St.Rep. 171; Brewster v. Miller's Sons Co., 101 Ky. 368, 41 S.W. 301, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 593, 38 L.R.A. 505; Baker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 64 S.W. 913, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1174, 55 L.R.A. 271; and Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle, 118 Ky. 662, 82 S.W. 271, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 544, 111 Am.St.Rep. 331. It is insisted for appellee that the ruling of this court in all of the foregoing cases, except that of Standard Oil Company v. Doyle, justifies and supports the ruling of the trial judge, and that the question involved in that case is readily distinguishable from that here presented. Appellant relies upon the principles announced in these cases, and particularly in Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle, to support a reversal.

Considering these cases separately, we find that Baker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has no application whatever, because that was a suit, not against an intermeddler, but against an employer. Plaintiff there sought to recover damages from his employer because of his discharge. The court held that, as the employment was for no definite period, defendant company had a right to discharge plaintiff, and that, having this right, the reason for its exercise could not be inquired into.

Chambers & Marshall v. Baldwin, decided in 1891, grew out of the following state of facts: Chambers & Marshall purchased of Wise a crop of tobacco, to be delivered in good order during that season. Thereafter Wise sold and delivered the tobacco to Cooper & Baldwin, and notified Chambers & Marshall that he would not deliver to them, and that they might treat the contract with him as at an end. Thereupon Chambers & Marshall brought suit against Baldwin to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by them by reason of the breach by Wise of his contract with them. They alleged in the petition that Wise was induced by Baldwin to break his contract, and that in so inducing him to act Baldwin acted maliciously and with a purpose of injuring plaintiffs. The petition did not charge that false representations were made to Wise to induce him to break the contract. In disposing of that litigation upon appeal here, this court said: "Two questions arise on demurrer to the petition: First, whether one party to a contract can maintain an action against a person who has maliciously advised and procured the other party to break it; second, whether an act lawful in itself can become actionable solely because it was done maliciously." After discussing at length the authorities bearing upon this question, the opinion, in conclusion, states: "But, as Wise was not induced by either force or fraud to break the contract in question, it must be regarded as having been done of his own will and for his own benefit; and his voluntary and distinct act, not that of appellee, being the proximate cause of damage to appellants, they, according to a familiar and reasonable principle of law, cannot seek redress elsewhere than from him." It will be observed that in this opinion the court's decision is made to turn upon the fact that neither fraud nor force were resorted to to induce Wise to break his contract.

The case of Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S.W. 60, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 737, 11 L.R.A. 550, 34 Am.St.Rep. 171, decided shortly after the case of Chambers & Marshall v. Baldwin, grew out of this state of facts: Bourlier Bros. had a contract to have Mary Anderson, a dramatic performer of great reputation, play at their theater on a certain date. They went to much expense in making preparations for her performance. She broke her contract, and Bourlier Bros., conceiving that she had been induced to do so by Macauley, the owner of a rival theater, where she had agreed to play upon the very dates upon which she was to play at their theater, brought suit against Macauley for the damages which they had sustained by reason of the breach of the contract with Mary Anderson. In holding that they were not entitled to recover, the court said that the same questions were raised for determination in the case of Chambers & Marshall v. Baldwin, supra, that the facts in that case controlled this, that the breach of contract was not brought about by either fraud or coercion, but was the voluntary act of the manager of the actress, and that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.

In Brewster v. Miller's Sons Co., 101 Ky. 368, 41 S.W. 301, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 593, 38 L.R.A. 505, the plaintiff sought to recover damages of the defendant because the latter had induced other undertakers to refuse to accept employment from plaintiff. It appears that plaintiff was indebted to defendants for services rendered him in the burial of his father, and that, when his wife died, he was still owing them for his father's funeral, that they declined to again serve him because of the existence of this indebtedness, and he charged in his petition that they induced others to refrain from rendering him this service, to his damage. In disposing of the question on appeal here, this court said "A party may engage in the grocery business, selling necessaries of life, and a hungry, starving man might call at his place of business and seek to buy such articles of food as he needs, and, whilst we would say it was inhuman for the groceryman to refuse to sell him, yet it could not be said that his refusal was unlawful, and that a cause of action could be maintained against him for such refusal. When one desires to bury his dead, it may be an unfeeling act for an undertaker to refuse to furnish necessary material and necessary services to accomplish it, still his refusal to do so does not impose any legal liability upon him. Undertakers are approached by those in great bereavement who desire their services to inter the dead. Under such circumstances they do not feel disposed to demand in advance compensation. Regard for the feelings of those so bereaved forbids that they do so. However, if one has on a previous occasion received the services of the undertaker, and his material, and has refused or failed to pay the bill, it is certainly not unreasonable to refuse to permit him to increase his indebtedness or to render him services. To afford mutual protection against such persons, it is not unlawful for the undertakers of the community to associate themselves together and agree to refuse to render a like service to one who has refused or failed to pay such expenses in the past to some member of the association." Here, again,...