Chamblee v. Florida

• Decision Date: 28 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-16452,16-16452
• Citation: 905 F.3d 1192
• Parties: Derrell J. CHAMBLEE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of FLORIDA, Julie L. Jones, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

905 F.3d 1192

Derrell J. CHAMBLEE, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.State of FLORIDA, Julie L. Jones, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 16-16452

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

September 28, 2018

Joseph Henry Rutledge, II, William E. Rutledge, Gregory F. Yaghmai, Rutledge & Yaghmai, Birmingham, AL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Bryan G. Jordan, Pam Bondi, Jennifer Johnson Moore, Attorney General's Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent-Appellee State of Florida.

Donna Antoinette Gerace, Pam Bondi, Jennifer Johnson Moore, Attorney General's Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent-Appellee Julie L. Jones.

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Derrell Chamblee, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely. Chamblee argues that his § 2254 habeas corpus petition was not untimely because his state court judgment never became final within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") due to a remand order issued by the state appellate court in his direct appeal that the trial court never acted upon. He maintains that as long as the remand order is pending in the state trial court, his state court judgment never became final and AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations never started running. We affirm.

I

In 2010, a Florida jury convicted Chamblee of 1 count of racketeering and 25 counts of grand theft. The state trial court entered a judgment sentencing Chamblee to 25 years in prison and ordering him to pay three different sums that are relevant to this appeal: (1) a $225 court cost under Fla. Stat. § 938.05 ; (2) a $20 court cost under Fla. Stat. § 938.06 ; and (3) a $50 fine under Fla. Stat. § 775.083(2). Chamblee appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, arguing, among other things, that the trial court imposed the court costs and fine under the wrong version of the Florida Statutes.

On August 8, 2012, the First District Court of Appeal issued a decision affirming Chamblee's convictions and sentence, but reversing the imposition of the court costs and the fine. See Chamblee v. State, 93 So.3d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). In short, the First District Court of Appeal held that the trial court had applied the wrong versions of the cost and fine statutes, and that it should instead have used the 2003 versions "that were in effect on the beginning date of [Chamblee's] ongoing criminal enterprise." Id. at 1185. With respect to the first court cost, the First District Court of Appeal struck the $225 assessment and directed the trial court to substitute a $200 cost—the maximum amount that could be levied for a felony under the law in 2003. Id. at 1185-86. The court struck the $20 court cost assessment, noting that the State had conceded that it was imposed in error. Id. at 1186. Finally, and most significantly here, the court held that the law in 2003 "allowed the imposition of a $50.00 fine for a felony conviction," but only "so long as the [trial] court found the defendant had the ability to pay the fine and would not be prevented thereby from being rehabilitated or making restitution."¹ Id. In Chamblee's case, the trial court had not determined his ability to pay it and that he would not be prevented from being rehabilitated or making restitution. Therefore, the First District Court of Appeal struck the fine. The court noted that "[o]n remand the trial court may re-impose th[e] fine after making appropriate findings," thereby leaving the imposition of the fine to the trial court's discretion. Id. On August 24, 2012, the First District Court of Appeal issued the mandate in Chamblee's case. For reasons that remain unknown, the trial court never took—and still has not taken—any action in response to the remand order.²

Following his direct appeal, notwithstanding the pending remand order, Chamblee filed a motion for reduction of sentence, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c), on October 23, 2012. In its order denying the motion on the merits, the trial court stated that the direct appellate review process "was concluded on August 24, 2012."

Approximately a year and a half later, on May 20, 2014, Chamblee filed a counseled motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, followed by an amended motion. This motion was dismissed without prejudice because it was facially insufficient. Chamblee, through his counsel, filed a second amended Rule 3.850 motion on October 13, 2014. The state trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion on the merits. Chamblee appealed and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed without written opinion on September 15, 2015.

On October 28, 2015, Chamblee filed the underlying § 2254 federal habeas corpus petition, asserting several due process violations. The State filed a motion to dismiss the § 2254 petition as untimely, arguing that it was not filed within AEDPA's one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).³ In response, Chamblee argued for the first time that his state court judgment never became final because the trial court never acted on the remand order issued in his direct appeal.

The district court ultimately agreed with the State and dismissed Chamblee's § 2254 petition as untimely. The district court first observed that "[t]he parties do not assert, nor does it appear, that [Chamblee] could have sought direct review" of the First District Court of Appeal's August 2012 decision in the Florida Supreme Court—the reason being that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2) does not provide for discretionary review of such decisions. The district court then reasoned that "[b]ecause discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court was not available," Chamblee's conviction became "final"—thereby starting AEDPA's one-year clock—when the "time for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired." That occurred, the district court concluded, "ninety days after entry of the First District Court of Appeal's August 8, 2012 decision"—or November 6, 2012. Thus, the court concluded, that AEDPA's one-year limitation period expired at the latest in December 2013, long before Chamblee filed his § 2254 petition in October 2015, thereby rendering it untimely.⁴ The district court denied Chamblee's request for a certificate of appealability.

Chamblee then moved in this Court for a certificate of appealability, which we granted on the following issue: "Whether the district court erred in determining that Chamblee's § 2254 petition was untimely based on its determination that the petition was not filed within one year of the date on which his conviction became final." Our review is de novo . See Hepburn v. Moore , 215 F.3d 1208, 1209 (11th Cir. 2000).

II

For purposes of AEDPA, the relevant one-year limitations period applicable in this case runs from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under the federal habeas statute, as modified by AEDPA, a state habeas petitioner may challenge only the state-court judgment "pursuant to" which the petitioner is being held "in custody." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Due to this restriction, the only "judgment that matters for purposes of [§] 2244 is ‘the judgment authorizing the prisoner's confinement.’ " Patterson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010) ); see also Ferreira v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (addressing what constitutes a judgment for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) and explaining that "the writ and AEDPA, including its limitations provisions, are specifically focused on the judgment which holds the petitioner in confinement"). Accordingly, for purposes of AEDPA and federal habeas review, the relevant judgment in this case is the 2010 criminal judgment authorizing Chamblee's confinement for a period of 25 years in the Florida Department of Corrections.⁵

Having identified the relevant judgment, we must determine whether the 2010 judgment was "final" for purposes of triggering the one-year limitations period of § 2244(d)(1)(A).⁶ We do not need to grapple with the definition of finality—a legal term that "has been variously defined" depending on context—because federal law, or more precisely AEDPA itself, expressly defines finality of a state court judgment as " ‘the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.’ " Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) ).⁷

However, in order to determine whether the "entirety of the state direct appellate review process [has been] completed," as in Jimenez, this Court must look to the actions taken by the state court and the relevant state law. See id. at 120, 129 S.Ct. 681 (relying upon actions taken by a state court in re-opening direct review of a petitioner's conviction when determining whether entirety of the state appellate review process was completed for purposes of determining whether the petitioner's conviction was final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) ). In this case, the state court treated Chamblee's judgment as final under Florida law, and, in habeas proceedings, we are bound by a state court's interpretation of its own laws and procedures. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602, 163 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005) ("We have repeatedly held that a state court's interpretation of state law ... binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.").

Specifically, the First District Court of Appeal expressly stated in its August 8, 2012 decision that, although it vacated two court costs and the $50 fine (which the...