Champion Shoe Machinery Co. v. Sellers

• Decision Date: 10 April 1929
• Docket Number: 291.
• Citation: 147 S.E. 674,197 N.C. 30
• Parties: CHAMPION SHOE MACHINERY CO. v. SELLERS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

147 S.E. 674

197 N.C. 30

CHAMPION SHOE MACHINERY CO. v. SELLERS.

No. 291.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

April 10, 1929

Appeal from Superior Court, Robeson County; N. A. Sinclair, Judge.

Action by the Champion Shoe Machinery Company against G. B. Sellers. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error. On November 6, 1925, the plaintiff entered into a written agreement with B. F. Gleaves, of Maxton, by the terms of which the plaintiff for value delivered to Gleaves one Champion F-89 finisher and one Peerless stitcher No. 16121 and retained title as security for payment of the purchase price. The agreement was duly registered on December 5, 1925. Gleaves put the machines in a building which he had rented from the defendant as a shoe shop and a store, and went out of business January 1, 1927. He left the machines in the defendant's building. The defendant thereafter wrote the plaintiff two letters, in one of which he said he must have a reasonable rent for the space occupied by the machines, and in the other that he was entitled to storage. There was testimony that the defendant told a representative of the plaintiff that he had to have storage.

The plaintiff brought suit for possession of the machines, and these issues were submitted to the jury:

1. Is the plaintiff the owner and entitled to the possession of the machinery described in the complaint?

2. Has the defendant a lien upon the property described in the complaint?

3. In what sum, if any, is the plaintiff indebted to the defendant for storage on the machinery referred to in the pleadings?

The judge instructed the jury, if they believed the record evidence and found the facts to be as testified to by all the witnesses, to answer all the issues in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered a judgment and the defendant excepted and appealed.

Johnson Johnson & Floyd, of Lumberton, for appellant.

J. E Carpenter, of Maxton, for appellee.

ADAMS J.

In his brief the appellant admits that the only question for decision is whether an individual is entitled to a lien for the storage of personal property by virtue of C. S. § 2459, under the facts above stated. The section is in these words: "Every person, firm or corporation who furnishes storage room for furniture, tobacco, goods, wares or merchandise and makes a charge for storing the same, has the right to retain possession of and a lien upon all furniture, tobacco, goods, wares or merchandise until such storage charges are paid."

The appellant's position cannot be maintained, unless the statute is given a strictly literal interpretation and its spirit and purpose are disregarded. It has been said that the letter of the law is its body; the spirit, its soul; and the construction of the former should never be so rigid and technical as to destroy the latter. Kleybolte & Co. v Timber Co., 151 N.C. 635, 638, 66 S.E. 663; Kearney v. Vann, 154 N.C. 311, 70 S.E. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1189. According to the rule, that the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the Legislature, a statute should receive a strict or liberal construction, as the one or the other will accomplish the legislative intent. Black's Int. of Laws, 35; State v. Barco, 150 N.C. 792, 63 S.E. 673; Abernethy v. Board of Com'rs, 169 N.C. 631, 86 S.E. 577; State v. Earnhardt, 170 N.C. 725, 86 S.E. 960. When the meaning of a statute is at all in doubt, reference may be had to the title and the context as legislative declarations of the purpose of the act. State v. Woolard, 119 N.C. 779, 25 S.E. 719. The title of the original act (Pub. Laws 1913, c. 192, amended by Pub. Laws 1915, c. 190) does not refer in express terms to warehouses as places of storage; but all provisions, chapters, subdivisions, and sections contained in the Consolidated Statutes were enacted into a composite body of law on March 10, 1919...