Chance v. Chance, 2014–CA–01136–COA.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–CA–01136–COA.,2014–CA–01136–COA.
• Parties: Karen G. CHANCE (Richards), Appellant v. Rickey L. CHANCE, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

191 So.3d 1293

Karen G. CHANCE (Richards), Appellant

v.Rickey L. CHANCE, Appellee.

No. 2014–CA–01136–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

May 10, 2016.

Brandi Denton Gatewood, Ashley Hutchings Hendren, Ocean Springs, attorney for appellant.

Charliene Roemer, Biloxi, attorney for appellee.

Before GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON and JAMES, JJ.

CARLTON

, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Karen Chance (Richards)¹ appeals the Jackson County Chancery Court's judgment holding her in contempt and awarding attorney's fees to Dr. Rickey Chance. On appeal, Karen argues that the chancellor's findings were manifestly wrong because the affirmative defenses of laches, waiver, and equitable estoppel barred Rickey's claims.

FACTS

¶ 2. On March 14, 2003, the chancery court entered a judgment granting Rickey and Karen an irreconcilable-differences divorce. As part of the property-settlement agreement (PSA) incorporated into their divorce judgment, the parties agreed that Rickey would retain possession of two homes the couple owned while Karen would retain possession of a third property located at 1408 Calhoun Street in Ocean Springs, Mississippi.

¶ 3. The PSA required Rickey to obtain a thirty-year mortgage for Karen's home. The PSA further required that Rickey assume the responsibility for paying half of the ad valorem taxes on the home and the entire monthly mortgage payments for ninety-six months until the mortgage's principal balance reached $90,000. The PSA required Karen to pay the other half of the ad valorem taxes and to assume full responsibility for paying the homeowner's insurance premiums. Once the mortgage's principal balance reached $90,000, Karen would assume sole responsibility for satisfying all the home's mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance payments.

¶ 4. On February 17, 2004, the attorney for the home closing sent each of the parties a letter. In the letter, the attorney suggested a course of action that she believed provided the easiest way for the parties to fulfill the terms of their PSA. Because the home loan required monthly escrow payments for taxes and insurance, the attorney suggested that Rickey reduce his monthly alimony payments by the amount of taxes and insurance escrow that Karen was responsible for paying each month. In doing so, the parties would erase the need for Karen to send Rickey a monthly check for the escrow.

¶ 5. Despite the closing attorney's recommendation, the parties failed to adopt her suggested course of action. Instead, Karen, who asserted that she lacked the ability to satisfy her financial obligations under the PSA, failed to pay either the insurance premiums on the home or her half of the ad valorem taxes. As a result, Rickey paid all the ad valorem taxes and insurance premiums on the home from 2003 until 2013.

¶ 6. Both parties agreed that, on several occasions between 2003 and 2013, they verbally discussed Karen's continuing obligation to pay for the home's insurance premiums and her half of the home's taxes. However, during each conversation, Karen maintained that she lacked the ability to meet her financial obligations under the PSA. On September 5, 2013, Rickey sent Karen a letter asking that she reimburse him for past-due insurance and tax payments. In the alternative, Rickey stated that Karen could refinance the home's mortgage loan in her name, credit the amount owed to him against the remainder of the principal balance, and then allow him to pay off the difference between that figure and $90,000. As stated in his letter, Rickey calculated that Karen owed him $56,660.51, which included $4,462.35 for money Rickey paid into the escrow account for 2013. Following Rickey's letter, Karen sent Rickey a check for $4,462.35 to cover her share of the 2013 taxes and insurance.

¶ 7. On October 23, 2013, Rickey filed a motion for contempt against Karen for her failure to pay the insurance premiums and her half of the ad valorem taxes. Karen filed an answer and asserted that Rickey's cause of action was barred by several affirmative defenses, including the seven-year statute of limitations² and the doctrines of unclean hands, waiver, laches, and estoppel.

¶ 8. Following a hearing on the matter, the chancellor entered a judgment on July 24, 2014. The chancellor noted that the parties both acknowledged having multiple verbal communications about the home located at 1408 Calhoun Street. During these verbal communications, the parties discussed the payment of the home's mortgage, taxes, and insurance. The chancellor found that Karen asserted she was unable to satisfy her financial obligations as to the home, and she claimed that Rickey indicated he would pay the taxes and insurance as a gift to her. The chancellor found that Rickey argued, however, that he never intended to waive or forgive any of Karen's financial obligations with regard to the home's taxes and insurance. The chancellor further acknowledged that the parties had no written communication regarding the home until Rickey's letter dated September 5, 2013. The chancellor also found that, since the entry of the divorce judgment, Rickey had paid a total of $35,491 in insurance premiums on the home and a total of $15,678.14 in ad valorem taxes on the home. In addition, the chancellor stated that, other than the $4,462.35 Karen mailed Rickey in May 2014, Karen failed to contribute any funds toward the payment of the home's insurance or her half of the home's taxes.

¶ 9. After concluding that Karen failed to comply with the terms of the divorce judgment, the chancellor next discussed the affirmative defenses Karen asserted. The chancellor first addressed Karen's assertion that Rickey's claim was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. According to Karen, Rickey also failed to comply with certain parts of the divorce judgment. Despite Karen's claims, the chancellor found that Karen failed to meet her burden of proof because the evidence she offered was general in nature and uncorroborated.

¶ 10. The chancellor next addressed Karen's claim that section 15–1–43

's seven-year statute of limitations barred Rickey's requested relief. Because Rickey filed his contempt motion on October 23, 2013, the chancellor found the statute of limitations barred him from seeking recovery for any payments made prior to October 23, 2006.³ Thus, the chancellor found that any insurance premiums and taxes Rickey paid in 2004 and 2005 were not recoverable. However, the chancellor concluded that the statute of limitations posed no bar to Rickey's attempt to recover the $6,463.90 in taxes and $32,121 in insurance that he paid on Karen's behalf after October 23, 2006.

¶ 11. The chancellor next addressed the doctrines of laches, waiver, and estoppel and concluded that none of these defenses barred Rickey's requested relief. The chancellor acknowledged that a party asserting laches must show: (1) a delay in asserting a right or claim; (2) the delay was inexcusable; and (3) the party against whom the claim is asserted suffered undue prejudice. Although the chancellor found that Rickey delayed in asserting his rights, the chancellor also concluded that the delay was excusable. The chancellor found that both parties had testified to verbally communicating about the taxes and insurance owed on the home between 2004 and 2014.

¶ 12. With regard to the parties' verbal communications, the chancellor found:

Both [parties] testified that the content of their discussions always centered around Karen informing Rickey that she was unable to financially afford to pay her share of the taxes and insurance premiums. Rickey accepted Karen's statements regarding her financial situation and paid 100% of the taxes and insurance premiums, but he reminded Karen that it was her obligation to pay one-half of the taxes and all of the insurance premiums. During this same time, Karen was able to enjoy trips to Hawaii, purchase a new vehicle, etc. Based upon the proof, Rickey was paying the taxes and insurance in an effort to help Karen due to Karen's alleged “financial difficulties[.”]

As a result of these findings, the chancellor concluded that the doctrine of laches failed to apply since Rickey's delay in bringing the present action was excusable.

¶ 13. In next addressing the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the chancellor recognized that Karen must prove: (1) belief and reliance on some representation made by Rickey; (2) change of position as a result of the representation; and (3) detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position. The chancellor found that Rickey made no representations upon which Karen detrimentally relied. Although Karen relied on Rickey's statements following each of their conversations that he would pay the taxes and insurance, the chancellor found that Rickey's actions constituted a “nice gesture” and that Karen failed to show she suffered any detriment or prejudice. The chancellor instead found that Karen had benefitted from Rickey's actions since she now owned her home and all the equity that had accumulated due, in large part, to the mortgage payments Rickey had made. In addition, the chancellor found that Rickey's payment of the home's taxes prevented Karen from losing the home at a tax sale. Thus, the chancellor concluded that equitable estoppel failed to apply.

¶ 14. The chancellor next discussed Rickey's requests that Karen be held in contempt and that he be awarded attorney's fees. The chancellor stated that Karen failed to offer any proof to show her inability to satisfy the obligations imposed in the divorce judgment. Therefore, the chancellor found Karen in contempt of court. However, after also finding that the parties' verbal communications about Karen's failure to satisfy her obligations were open to more than one interpretation, the chancellor concluded that Karen's contempt was not willful.

¶ 15. The chancellor next awarded Rickey attorney's fees since Karen's failure to comply with the divorce judgment forced Rickey to file pleadings to enforce the order. The...