Charlton v. Kimata

• Decision Date: 15 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90SA118,90SA118
• Citation: 815 P.2d 946
• Parties: George D. CHARLTON, Emaline J. Charlton and Susan L. Johnsen, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ricky R. KIMATA, Catherine Kimata, and Allstate Insurance Company, Inc., an Illinois corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 946

815 P.2d 946

George D. CHARLTON, Emaline J. Charlton and Susan L Johnsen, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ricky R. KIMATA, Catherine Kimata, and Allstate Insurance Company, Inc., an Illinois corporation Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90SA118.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

July 15, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1991.

Herbert A. Delap, Eugene A. Over, Jr., Delap & Barry, P.C., Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Wayne L. Johnson, Englewood, for defendants-appellees Ricky and Catherine Kimata.

Patricia M. Ayd, Robert A. Zupkus, Zupkus & Ayd, P.C., Denver, for defendant-appellee Allstate Ins. Co.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether section 12-47-128.5(4), 5 C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), which creates a limited claim for relief against social hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages to their guests, precludes the plaintiffs' common-law negligence claims and, if it does, whether the statute violates the state constitutional right of access to the courts, Colo. Const. Art. II, § 6, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25, or the constitutional prohibition against special legislation, Colo. Const. Art. V, § 25. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the statute barred the plaintiffs' claims and was constitutional. ¹ We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

On the afternoon of February 8, 1987, Linda Felde, then forty-one years old, attended a housewarming party at the residence of Ricky and Catherine Kimata. Felde and the Kimatas were employees of the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, Inc., as were most of the other guests at the party. While at the party, Felde consumed alcoholic beverages furnished by the Kimatas.

After leaving the party, Felde turned the wrong way onto a one-way street and crashed head-on with the car in which George Charlton and his son-in-law, Wayne Johnsen, were riding. Wayne Johnsen died from the injuries he received in the crash and George Charlton sustained serious injuries.

Felde subsequently pled guilty to the charges of driving under the influence, vehicular homicide, and vehicular assault. George Charlton, joined by his wife, Emaline, and daughter, Susan Johnsen, brought a separate suit against Felde that was later settled. When the plaintiffs learned of Felde's whereabouts prior to the accident during the course of discovery in their suit against Felde, they brought suit against the Kimatas in their capacity as social hosts. They raised claims of negligence, negligence per se, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. They also alleged that the Kimatas and Allstate conspired to fraudulently conceal material facts relating to the case and they asked the court to award exemplary damages.

The Kimatas and Allstate each filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that section 12-47-128.5(4) bars the plaintiffs' claims and the trial court granted their motions. The plaintiffs now appeal the trial court order and challenge the constitutionality of section 12-47-128.5(4).

II.

We first address whether section 12-47-128.5(4) bars the plaintiffs' negligence claims. The plaintiffs contend that they had a common law claim for relief against the Kimatas as social hosts that was not abolished by section 12-47-128.5(4). We disagree.

Before the legislature passed section 12-47-128.5 in 1986, the common law had been interpreted to permit negligence claims against alcohol vendors. See Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250 (Colo.1989); Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098 (Colo.1986); Floyd v. Bartley, 727 P.2d 1109 (Colo.1986). ² But this court had not extended the reach of the common-law negligence claims against alcohol vendors to social hosts.

Since the passage of section 12-47-128.5, the liability of alcohol vendors and social hosts has been strictly a creature of statute in Colorado, see Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d at 1106 n. 3. Subsection (4), which relates to social host liability, provides:

(a) No social host who furnishes any alcoholic beverage is civilly liable to any injured individual or his estate for any injury to such individual or damage to any property suffered, including any action for wrongful death, because of the intoxication of any person due to the consumption of such alcoholic beverages, except when:

(I) It is proven that the social host willfully and knowingly served any malt, vinous, or spirituous liquor to such person who was under the age of twenty-one years; and

(II) The civil action is commenced within one year after such service.

(b) No civil action may be brought pursuant to this subsection (4) by the person to whom such alcoholic beverage was served or by his estate, legal guardian, or dependent.

(c) The total liability in any such action shall not exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars.

§ 12-47-128.5(4). By enacting section 12-47-128.5(4), the legislature provided victims of the tortious acts of intoxicated minor ³ guests with a claim for relief against social hosts. ⁴

In interpreting a statute, a court's primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo.1987). To discern the General Assembly's intent in enacting a statute, we must first look to the language of the statute itself, giving the statutory terms their plain and ordinary meaning, see, e.g., Climax Molybdenum v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Colo.1991); Colorado Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153, 160 (Colo.1988). If possible, we must give effect to every word of the statute. See Johnston v. City Council of City of Greenwood Village, 177 Colo. 223, 228, 493 P.2d 651, 654 (1972).

Here the plain language of the statute indicates that social hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages to their guests are not liable for any injuries suffered due to the tortious actions of their intoxicated guests unless the social host "willfully and knowingly" serves alcohol to a minor. Because it is undisputed that Felde was forty-one years old at the time of the accident, the statute precludes plaintiffs' claims and the Kimatas cannot be held liable for Felde's tortious actions.

III.

We now turn to the plaintiffs' claim that section 12-47-128.5 violates the constitutional right of access to the courts, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. As a preliminary matter, we note that a statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is on the party attacking the statute to establish its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 214 (Colo.1984).

A.

The plaintiffs contend that section 12-47-128.5(4) deprives them of their right to access to the courts in violation of Article II, Section 6, of the Colorado Constitution. As discussed above, there existed no common-law claim for relief against social hosts prior to the enactment of section 12- 47-128.5. In Curtiss v. GSX Corp. of Colorado, 774 P.2d 873 (Colo.1989), and O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344 (1972), we held that Article II, Section 6, is not a prohibition against a legislative change of a pre-existing right but rather requires the courts to be available to effectuate any right that has actually accrued under the law. However, even if the plaintiffs had had an accrued right to sue the Kimatas in negligence for the tortious acts of their social guest, Curtiss and O'Quinn recognize that the legislature may change pre-existing rights. Accordingly, Article II, Section 6, is not violated by rejecting the plaintiffs' common-law negligence claims.

B.

The plaintiffs next argue that section 12-47-128.5 denies the plaintiffs equal protection of laws under Article II, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that: (1) the statute unconstitutionally distinguishes between social hosts and other tortfeasors, and between victims of intoxicated adult guests and victims of intoxicated minor guests; (2) the statute, by requiring proof of "willful and knowing" conduct, impermissibly discriminates between social hosts and other tortfeasors against whom a similar degree of intent is not required; (3) the statute unconstitutionally limits the liability of social hosts to $150,000; and (4) the statute unconstitutionally limits the period of limitations for victims of the tortious acts of intoxicated guests to one year while the statutes of limitations for victims of other torts is two years.

Equal protection of the laws assures like treatment of all those who are similarly situated. Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo.1989). If the classification neither affects a fundamental right, nor creates a suspect classification, nor is based on gender, then the rational basis test is applied. This test requires that the statutory classification bear a rational relationship to a permissible government interest. See Torres v. Portillos, 638 P.2d 274, 276 (Colo.1981).

The rational basis test is the appropriate test to apply to the classifications at issue. As we noted in Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984), there are two distinct prongs to this test. We must determine, first, whether the classification has some rational basis in fact and second, whether it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See also Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d at 860; People v. Velasquez, 666 P.2d 567, 569 (Colo.1983).

In section 12-47-128.5, the legislature addressed the serious problem of alcohol-related injuries and deaths in the state. ⁵ Until recently, persons injured from the negligent acts of an intoxicated person had no claim for relief against either the vendor who sold alcohol to the intoxicated person or the social host who served alcohol to the intoxicated person. Under the traditional common law rule, the...