Charter Tp. of Northville v. Northville Public Schools

• Decision Date: 31 July 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 120213, Calendar No. 9.
• Citation: 469 Mich. 285,666 N.W.2d 213
• Parties: CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, Plaintiff, and Heather Schulz, Jeffrey Schulz; Mary Lowe, George Lowe; Eric Hanpeter, Laura Hanpeter; Frank Corona, Marcella Corona; David Malmin, Lee Ann Malmin; John Miller, Debra Miller; Tom Conwell, Evy Conwell; Mary Beth Yakima, Dan Yakima; Richard Lee, Patty Lee; Beth Peterson, Rick Peterson; John Buchanan; Ken Buchanan; Larry Gregory, Nancy Gregory; K. Maureen Wynalek, James Wynalek; Harold W. Bulger and Sandra A. Bulger, Intervening-Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Superintendent of Northville Public Schools, and Northville Board of Education, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

666 N.W.2d 213

469 Mich. 285

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, Plaintiff, and Heather Schulz, Jeffrey Schulz; Mary Lowe, George Lowe; Eric Hanpeter, Laura Hanpeter; Frank Corona, Marcella Corona; David Malmin, Lee Ann Malmin; John Miller, Debra Miller; Tom Conwell, Evy Conwell; Mary Beth Yakima, Dan Yakima; Richard Lee, Patty Lee; Beth Peterson, Rick Peterson; John Buchanan; Ken Buchanan; Larry Gregory, Nancy Gregory; K. Maureen Wynalek, James Wynalek; Harold W. Bulger and Sandra A. Bulger, Intervening-Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Superintendent of Northville Public Schools, and Northville Board of Education, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 120213, Calendar No. 9.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 12, 2003.

Decided July 31, 2003.

Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, LLP by Susan K. Friedlaender, Bingham Farms, for intervening plaintiffs-appellants.

Keller Thoma, P.C. by Robert A. Lusk, Lincoln G. Herweyer, and Kristin R. Binkley, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. by John H. Bauckha, Kalamazoo, for Michigan Townships Association and Michigan Municipal League, amici curiae.

John F. Rohe, Petoskey, for Michigan Environmental Council, Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council, and Michigan Land Use Institute, amici curiae.

Anthony A. Derezinski and Brad A. Banasik, Lansing, for Michigan Association of School Boards, amicus curiae.

OPINION

TAYLOR, J.

We granted leave to appeal to determine whether local school districts, which are required to submit building plans to the state superintendent of public instruction for approval pursuant to M.C.L. § 380.1263(3), must also comply with township zoning and planning ordinances pursuant to the Township Zoning Act, M.C.L. § 125.271 et seq., and the township planning act, M.C.L. § 125.321 et seq. We conclude that because the text of M.C.L. § 380.1263(3) grants the state superintendent sole and exclusive jurisdiction over local school district construction and site plans, it immunizes school districts from local zoning ordinances affecting those functions. However, a majority declines to address whether this is an impermissible delegation of legislative power because the state superintendent is not a party to this suit.

Accordingly, a majority affirms in part and vacates in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

Before beginning construction of a new high school in Northville Township, the Northville Board of Education met with township officials to discuss the effect of local zoning ordinances on its site plan. Although somewhat productive, conflicts remained and the township sought to enjoin construction.¹ The trial court denied a stay, but allowed nearby landowners to intervene as plaintiffs. After discovery, the township and intervening plaintiffs moved for summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion on the basis of the text of M.C.L. § 380.1263(3), which grants sole and exclusive jurisdiction over school site plans to the state superintendent.

The intervenors appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the text of the revised school code, M.C.L. § 380.1263(3), conveys a clear intention to grant "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" over site plans to the state superintendent. The Court also rejected intervenors' claim that the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the state superintendent, concluding that the statute provides sufficient construction and design standards.²

We granted intervenors' application for leave to appeal.³

II

We review de novo decisions on summary-disposition motions. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 466 Mich. 611, 614, 647 N.W.2d 508 (2002). Similarly, we review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. In re MCI, 460 Mich. 396, 413, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999).

III

To determine whether local school districts are subject to township zoning and planning ordinances, we must examine the authority of the school district to develop school construction and site plans, with the approval of the state superintendent, under M.C.L. § 380.1263(3).

M.C.L. § 380.1263(3) states:

The board of a school district shall not design or build a school building to be used for instructional or noninstructional school purposes or design and implement the design for a school site unless the design or construction is in compliance with [M.C.L. §§ 388.851 to 388.855a]. The superintendent of public instruction has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the review and approval of plans and specifications for the construction, reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings used for instructional or noninstructional school purposes and of site plans for those school buildings. [M.C.L. § 380.1263(3) (emphasis supplied).]

Of importance is that this subsection vests design and construction oversight authority over the district's decision in the state superintendent, who has "sole and exclusive jurisdiction...."

The first step in construing a statute is to discern legislative intent. To do this requires review of the statutory text adopted by the Legislature. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). If unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to have intended the meaning expressed, and the courts enforce that meaning without further judicial construction or interpretation. Grievance Administrator v. Underwood, 462 Mich. 188, 193-194, 612 N.W.2d 116 (2000). These rules control the disposition of this matter.

We determine that the statute here is unambiguous. It grants sole and exclusive jurisdiction to the state superintendent to review and approve plans and specifications of school buildings and site plans for those buildings. Thus, what the state superintendent approves is immune from the provisions of local zoning ordinances.

In Dearden v. Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 264, 269 N.W.2d 139 (1978), a case concerning the authority of the Department of Corrections to locate prisons without regard to local zoning, in which the department was given exclusive jurisdiction concerning location, we found the words "exclusive jurisdiction" indicative that the department had, not surprisingly, exclusive jurisdiction. In later cases, apprehensive that this may have suggested a need for "talismanic words," and that a court, not finding any, might conclude that the state agency was not immune from local zoning, we indicated in Burt Twp. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 459 Mich. 659, 669, 593 N.W.2d 534 (1999), that even in the absence of talismanic words the state agency may be immune if the Legislature's intent to immunize was otherwise clear. The thrust of this was that a court should look to the intent of the Legislature and not just do a word search. We recently discussed this again in Pittsfield Charter Twp v. Washtenaw Co, 468 Mich. 702, 664 N.W.2d 193 (2003). We now come full circle. The fact that the Legislature does not have to use talismanic words does not mean that, if it does, they are to be disregarded. That is, Burt Twp, et al., should correctly be understood as recognizing an enlarged target for the Legislature, but it should not be read to say a bull's eye no longer counts. With that in mind, as explained below, we conclude that "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" means, again we hope not surprisingly, sole and exclusive jurisdiction.

We find the dictionary definitions dispositive. "Sole" means "[b]eing the only one; existing or functioning without another or others; only." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981). Similarly, "exclusive" is defined as "not divided or shared with others [or] single or independent; sole." Id. The Legislature's choice of modifiers reflects its intention to unambiguously vest "jurisdiction," i.e., "the general power to exercise authority," in the state superintendent. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.).

This leaves to be determined the definition of "site plan." The dictionary defines "site" as "The place where something was, is, or is to be located," The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1982), or similarly, "[T]he area or exact plot of ground on which anything is, has been, or is to be located...." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). "Plan" is defined as "A detailed scheme, program, or method worked out beforehand for the accomplishment of an object.... A proposed or tentative project or goal...." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1982). Thus, it is apparent that the meaning of "site plan," with no qualifying modifiers, is the plan for everything on the property, i.e., the entire project.

This definition is consistent not only with the common understanding of the phrase but also with the Legislature's use of the term "site plan" in both the Township Zoning Act and the township planning act. The Township Zoning Act states that the proposal for the individual "site plan" of a property owner or user must be "in compliance with local ordinances and state and federal statutes." M.C.L. § 125.286e(1). If it is, the township zoning authorities have the duty to approve it. Similarly, in the township planning act, the site plan must "comply with the [township's basic development] plan adopted under this section." M.C.L. § 125.326(4). If the site plan does comply, it is to be approved by the planning authorities. Thus, in both these acts the site plan, i.e., what is to be undertaken on the site, is presented to the appropriate zoning and planning authorities and, if consistent with the ordinance and plan, it is to be approved.

In a fashion similar to the procedure followed by individuals who wish to have their site plans approved by the zoning and planning authorities discussed above, the school district, under M.C.L. § 380.1263(3), must present its site plan to the state superintendent for approval. Just as the township zoning authorities have duties to accept or reject the individual...