Chase v. State
| Citation | 448 S.W.3d 6 |
| Decision Date | 19 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. PD–1768–13,PD–1768–13 |
| Parties | Ryan Francis Chase, Appellant v. The State of Texas |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
Greg White, Waco, for Appellant.
Stacey Goldstein,State Prosecuting Attorney, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for the State.
The issue before us is whether § 822.013(a) of the Health and Safety Code provides a defense to criminal prosecution. We conclude that it does and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the submission of a defensive instruction,1 the following occurred: On September 2, 2009, appellant and his wife were walking their two dogs—a ten-year-old dog named Maka and a puppy—when two other dogs, Zeus and Rocky, escaped from a neighbor's backyard and attacked the group. Zeus, a pit bull, sank his fangs into Maka's neck and began shaking Maka like a rag doll. Appellant's wife picked up the puppy and ran from the scene. For about five minutes, appellant struggled to remove Zeus's jaws from Maka's neck. A neighbor from a different house (not the owner of the attacking dogs) intervened and helped separate Zeus and Maka. During this incident, Zeus bit both appellant and the intervening neighbor.
After Zeus and Maka were separated, appellant took Maka home. Appellant quickly returned to the scene with a rope, looped the rope around Zeus's neck or collar, and dragged the dog to appellant's house, which was two doors down. During this time, Zeus bit appellant again. When appellant arrived at his house, he secured the dog by tying the rope to the bumper of one of his cars. After securing the dog, appellant slashed the dog's throat with a knife. This injury resulted in the dog's death.
Appellant was charged with cruelty to non-livestock animals under Texas Penal Code § 42.092(b)(6).2 During a pretrial hearing, defense counsel explained that the defense would seek to rely upon § 822.013 of the Health and Safety Code as authorizing appellant's conduct: “[W]e think that provision in the law provides a[n] absolute authorization under the facts of this case for the defendant to do what he did.” Defense counsel claimed that it was this very law that allowed Governor Rick Perry to shoot a coyote that was attacking his dog. Counsel further explained that, under the statute, “a dog or coyote that is attacking or about to attack or has recently attacked livestock, domestic animals, which includes dogs ... may be killed by a person either witnessing it or is involved in it.” Defense counsel claimed that the statute “is a defense” and that whether it applied “is a matter of law” for the trial judge to decide. Granting the State's motion in limine, the trial judge restricted the parties from referring to the Health and Safety Code provision. In connection with its holding, the trial judge cited Volosen v. State.3
In a hearing outside the jury's presence during the middle of trial, defense counsel again raised the applicability of § 822.013 and asked the trial judge to reconsider his earlier ruling. Defense counsel pointed out that the version of the statute at issue in Volosen applied only to certain counties that had adopted it in a referendum but that the current version of the statute applied statewide. Defense counsel also pointed out that the statute's authorization to shoot an attacker dog was not limited to law-enforcement personnel. The trial judge denied defense counsel's request.
During his testimony at trial, appellant stated that, due to a previous incident in which his dog was attacked by another dog that the authorities did nothing about, appellant conducted some research. At that point, the State objected, and the trial judge held a conference outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel reurged his disagreement with the judge's ruling on the applicability of § 822.013 and argued that appellant should be permitted to at least testify about “what in his mind, he felt he had legal authority to do.” The trial judge ruled that appellant could testify “what, in his mind, he believed he was entitled to do” but could not use the word “law.” Appellant was later asked, “You felt, under the circumstances, that your actions were justified?” Appellant responded, “Yes, based on what had happened and my research into the matter.”
Finally, at the jury-charge conference, defense counsel requested the submission of a defensive instruction based on § 822.013 :
Judge, the defense would—based on the earlier issues that we've raised with the Court, would ask that the specific provisions contained in—in Section 822.013 of the Health and Safety Code, which we litigated earlier, be included in the Charge. That—the defense's position is that it's the real issue in this case. It goes to the heart of the defense. And we would respectfully ask that it be included as an appropriate charge.
The trial judge denied the request.4
The jury found appellant guilty. After a punishment hearing before the court, the trial judge assessed a sentence of one year in the county jail but suspended the imposition of that sentence and placed appellant on probation.5
On appeal, appellant complained that the trial judge erred in refusing to submit a defensive instruction based on § 822.013. The court of appeals agreed.6 In response to the State's contention that appellant had failed to preserve error, the appellate court determined that appellant's request was specific enough to enable the trial judge to understand it.7 This was so because appellant had specifically referred to § 822.013 in his objection to the jury charge and because he had made extensive arguments about the applicability of the statute during previous hearings.8 The court also found that, contrary to the State's contention, preservation of appellant's complaint was governed by Article 36.14 rather than Article 36.15.9
On the merits, the court of appeals relied upon decisions by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and this Court in Volosen v. State.10 The court below noted that the Fort Worth court had found that a person authorized to kill a dog under the predecessor to § 822.013 could not be guilty of an offense that proscribed the intentional or knowing killing of an animal owned by another.11 The court acknowledged that we reversed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals but pointed out that our holding was based on the fact that the predecessor statute did not apply statewide.12 “In fact,” the court of appeals said, “the court of criminal appeals referred to the predecessor statute as a defense to a cruelty-to-animals charge.”13
After finding preserved error in the jury charge, the court of appeals conducted a “some harm” analysis pursuant to Almanza14 and found that appellant had been harmed.15 As a result, the court of appeals reversed appellant's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings.16
The State advances three grounds for review. With regard to the first ground,17 the State contends that § 822.013 is only a civil provision and provides no defense to criminal liability. With regard to the second ground,18 the State contends that § 1.03(b) of the Penal Code bars the use of a non-Penal-Code defense to a Penal–Code offense. With regard to the third ground,19 the State contends that appellant failed to preserve error because he did not submit a proposed written instruction in compliance with Article 36.15. In support of its three grounds, the State makes numerous arguments, which we will address as the issues arise in the course of our analysis. We address the State's grounds in reverse order, which we perceive to be the logical progression of these issues.
Thus, we will start with preservation, then address the general applicability of non-Penal-Code defenses to the Penal Code, and finally address whether § 822.013 provides a defense to criminal prosecution.
Because all three of the State's grounds involve questions of statutory construction, we first summarize some general principles of construction. Appellate courts must construe a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its text unless the language of the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning would lead to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended.20 If the language of a statute is ambiguous, or the plain meaning leads to such absurd results, then a court may consult extratextual factors.21 A statute is ambiguous when it is “reasonably susceptible to more than one understanding.”22 Extratextual factors include but are not limited to: (1) the object sought to be attained, (2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, (3) the legislative history, (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects, (5) the consequences of a particular construction, (6) administrative construction of the statute, and (7) the title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.23 With these principles of construction in mind, we turn to the State's grounds for review.24
The record shows that defense counsel pointed out the statutory provision upon which he relied, explained the substance of that provision, contended that the provision was a defense, and asked for a jury instruction based on that provision. These actions would seem to satisfy the basic principle of error preservation that a party is required to “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.”25 Finding that appellant's objection was sufficient because the record showed that the trial judge understood appellant's request to encompass the matters about...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ex parte Perry
...v. State, 253 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).109 Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex.Crim.App.2014).110 Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2014).111 Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 339; Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 295 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). See also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481......
-
Ex parte Marascio
...may be a waivable right, but applicant did not waive his rights. I would hold that applicant preserved error. Chase v. State,448 S.W.3d 6, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)(“We also conclude that appellant was permitted to preserve error either by lodging a sufficiently specific objection in compli......
-
State v. Green
...could not have possibly intended." Baumgart v. State , 512 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Chase v. State , 448 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ). "If the text of a statute is ambiguous, or the plain meaning leads to such absurd results, then we can consult extratextual f......
-
Jenkins v. State
...is ambiguous or the plain meaning would lead to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended. Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2014). If the legislature's intent cannot be determined from the statutory text alone, we may turn to extra-textual sources su......
-
Table of Cases
...776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), §2:41.4 C-15 T ABLE OF C ASES Chappell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), §14:41 Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), §15:101.2 Chauncey v. State, 877 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), §20:95 Chavarria v. State, 876 S.W.2d 388 (T......