Chatman County v. Mulling

Decision Date09 February 1982
Docket NumberNo. 37963,37963
Citation248 Ga. 878,286 S.E.2d 735
PartiesCHATHAM COUNTY, Georgia, et al. v. Victor MULLING et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Fred S. Clark, County Atty., Molly S. McKibben, Asst. County Atty., Savannah, for Chatham County, Ga., et al.

John Wright Jones, Savannah, for Victor Mulling et al.

CLARKE, Justice.

This is a mandamus action in which two issues are raised. The first issue is whether the Chatham County Commissioners or the Judge of the Municipal Court of Savannah has the authority to determine the number of deputy sheriffs assigned to the court. The second issue is whether the county commission is required to exercise its discretion in determining the need to appoint a judge pro tempore to assist in the handling of the business of the Municipal Court.

Although it is not expressly raised as a question for determination, there is a broader consideration which this court must face in deciding this case. That consideration is the status of the Municipal Court and its judge as it relates to the general principles of constitutional law and whether those general principles are to be considered in this case.

The judge and sheriff of the Municipal Court of Savannah brought this action to compel the county commissioners to provide the court and sheriff's department with additional personnel and equipment which they allege is necessary for the proper functioning of the court. The trial court, after taking evidence, granted partial relief by ordering the commissioners to hire two additional deputies as recommended by the municipal judge and further ordered the commissioners to exercise their discretion to determine whether or not a judge or judges pro tem should be appointed as requested by the municipal judge. The commissioners appeal.

1. The Municipal Court of Savannah exists under the authority granted by an act of the General Assembly. Ga.L. 1969, p. 2857. Although no constitutional attack has been made on this act, the authority of local government to control judicial officers and court personnel is questioned. The authority relied on in this connection involves constitutional officers of the state who are governed by general law and we find that it is not applicable in the case before us.

The state constitution authorizes the legislature to establish municipal courts in certain counties by law. Code Ann. § 2-3601; see Code Ann. § 2-3001. In Code Ann. § 2-4501 the constitution further provides that the legislature may abolish courts not specifically enumerated in Code Ann. § 2-3001. Those courts enumerated in Code Ann. § 2-3001 are constitutional courts of this state and may not be interfered with by legislation. Williams v. State, 138 Ga. 168, 74 S.E. 1083 (1912). A municipal court is not an enumerated constitutional court. In Feagin v. Freeney, 192 Ga. 868, 17 S.E.2d 61 (1941), this court held that a municipal court judge "is a constitutional judicial officer only in the sense that he is the judge of a court authorized by the constitution to be created." Feagin, at 871, 17 S.E.2d 61. Since a municipal court and its officers are not state constitutional officers, questions relating to the powers and duties at issue here must be resolved solely by interpretation of the act of the General Assembly creating their particular court. For the same reason, this is not a case involving the broad questions of separation of powers or inherent powers. Since we are concerned only with the interpretation of a special act of the legislature, our holding is limited to a court created by such an act. We do not deal in this case with the inherent powers of constitutional courts.

2. The appellants contend that the hiring of deputies of the municipal court is within the control of the Chatham County Commissioners based upon the 1969 Act. The trial court held that the power to determine the need for additional deputy sheriffs was conferred upon the judge of the municipal court. Based upon this holding he then found the commissioners had no discretion to deny appropriations for additional deputies once a showing is made that additional deputies are necessary for running municipal court; he held that the burden shifted to the commissioners to show additional personnel were not necessary.

The relevant portions of the 1969 Act provide as follows:

"Section 23. (a) The Chatham County Commissioners shall provide and maintain a suitable place for holding said Court in the Courthouse or at some other place in the City of Savannah as near to the Courthouse as may, in the discretion of the County Commissioners, be conveniently and reasonably obtained; and they shall also provide the necessary furniture, blanks, books, typewriters, stationery and all other expenses of the said Court. Said County Commissioners are empowered and directed to fix, regulate, prescribe, and pay the salaries of the Clerk, deputy clerks, Sheriff, deputy sheriffs, and Secretary of the Municipal Court of Savannah out of the funds of said County.

* * *

* * *

Section 33. There shall be a Sheriff and a Clerk of the Municipal Court, appointed by the Chatham County Commissioners on recommendation of the Senior Judge, whose term shall coincide with that of said Senior Judge. In the exercise of a sound discretion, the Chatham County Commissioners may remove them from office whenever the interests of the Court so require.

* * *

* * *

Section 34. There shall be a chief deputy sheriff, a chief deputy clerk and as many additional deputy sheriffs and deputy clerks as may be necessary...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Richmond County Hosp. Authority v. Richmond County, s. 42571
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 21, 1985
    ... ... Chatham County v ... Mulling, 248 Ga. 878, 286 S.E.2d 735 (1982); City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving etc., Co., 245 Ga. 794, 267 S.E.2d 234 (1980); Smith v. Bd. of Commrs., 244 ... ...
  • Bland Farms, LLC v. Georgia Dept. of Agr., S06A1633.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 30, 2006
    ...to exercise his or her discretion, but not to direct the manner in which that discretion is exercised. Chatham County v. Mulling, 248 Ga. 878, 881(2), 286 S.E.2d 735 (1982). Thus, OCGA § 2-14-132.1, as a general grant of discretionary authority to the Commissioner, does not support Appellan......
1 books & journal articles
  • Buying Distressed Commercial Real Estate: What Are the Alternatives
    • United States
    • State Bar of Georgia Georgia Bar Journal No. 16-4, December 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...acceptance would be failure to exercise discretion, and discretion unexercised is discretion abused. See, e.g., Chatham County v. Mulling, 248 Ga. 878, 881, 286 S.E.2d 735, (1982). [8] O.C.G.A. § 9-13-161 (2006). [9] See id. § 13-1-11(a) (2010) (permitting collection of attorneys' fees of u......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT