Chattahoochee Valley Home Health Care, Inc. v. Healthmaster, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 77388,77389,s. 77388
• Parties: CHATTAHOOCHEE VALLEY HOME HEALTH CARE, INC. v. HEALTHMASTER, INC. et al.; HEALTHMASTER, INC. v. CHATTAHOOCHEE VALLEY HOME HEALTHCARE, INC.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 56

381 S.E.2d 56

191 Ga.App. 42

CHATTAHOOCHEE VALLEY HOME HEALTH CARE, INC. v. HEALTHMASTER, INC. et al.;

HEALTHMASTER, INC. v. CHATTAHOOCHEE VALLEY HOME HEALTHCARE, INC.

Nos. 77388, 77389.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 3, 1989.

Rehearing Denied March 27, 1989.

Certiorari Granted May 4, 1989.

Charles L. Gregory, Glenn P. Hendrix, Atlanta, Hirsch, Beil & Partain, John P. Partain, Columbus, for appellant.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan L. Baranoff, H. Jeff Lanier, H. Perry Michael, Patrick W. McKee, Asst. Attys. Gen., Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, W. Randall Tye, Robert P. Williams II, Atlanta, for appellees.

BANKE, Presiding Judge.

Healthmaster Home Health Care of Georgia, Inc., and its parent corporation, Healthmaster, Inc. (hereafter referred to together as Healthmaster) petitioned the State Health Planning Agency (SHPA) for a declaratory ruling as to whether three "home health agencies" which it (Healthmaster) had acquired were currently authorized under the State Health Planning and Development Act, OCGA § 31-6-1 et seq., to provide home health services in certain specified counties, without the necessity of obtaining a certificate of need pursuant to OCGA § 31-7-155. The SHPA determined that the acquired firms had "grandfather" rights in some, but not all, of the counties in question. Chattahoochee Valley Home Health Care, Inc. (Chattahoochee), a competitor home health care agency providing services in the same counties in which Healthmaster was granted grandfather status, applied to the Superior Court of Muscogee County for judicial review of this ruling pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See OCGA § 50-13-19. The superior court denied a joint motion by Healthmaster and the SHPA to dismiss the action and affirmed the SHPA's declaratory ruling. The case is now before us pursuant to our grant of Chattahoochee's application for a discretionary appeal. Healthmaster and the SHPA have filed cross-appeals, contending that the lower court erred in denying their motion to dismiss. Held:

1. We first address the issue of Chattahoochee's standing to sue. In support of their joint motion to dismiss, Healthmaster and the SHPA contended that Chattahoochee was not an aggrieved person with standing to obtain judicial review of the SHPA's decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and that Chattahoochee was, in any event, estopped from seeking such review because it had itself been doing business pursuant to the same grandfather status it sought to deny Healthmaster.

(a) Under the APA, any person "aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case" may obtain judicial review of that decision. "In the context of the Administrative Practice Act, the word 'aggrieved' has been interpreted to mean that the person seeking to appeal must show that he has an interest in the agency decision that has been specially and adversely affected thereby." Ga. Power Co. v. Campaign for a Prosperous Ga., 255 Ga. 253, 257, 336 S.E.2d 790 (1985).

Construing analogous federal statutory law, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that one who suffers or will suffer economic injury as the result of an administrative decision may be considered aggrieved for purposes of obtaining judicial review of the decision. See Assn. of Data Processing Svc., etc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (holding that a competitor has standing under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 702, to challenge an administrative action which adversely affects its business interests). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). Relying on the Camp decision, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Education, 245 Ga. 533, 266 S.E.2d 157 (1980), held that the lowest bidder on a school construction project had standing to challenge the award of the contract to a competitor based on an alleged violation of State Board of Education regulations governing the bidding of such contracts. Thus, it appears to be well-settled that a business entity may be considered "aggrieved" by an administrative decision which confers an economic benefit upon a competitor.

Relying on Diversified Health Mgmt. Svcs. v. Visiting Nurses Assn., 254 Ga. 500, 502, 330 S.E.2d 885 (1985), Healthmaster and the SHPA contend that even if Chattahoochee's economic interests were adversely affected by the SHPA's decision, Chattahoochee nevertheless lacked standing to appeal that decision because such an appeal would not further the public purposes of the State Health Planning and Development Act. We disagree. The General Assembly instituted the certificate of need system to ensure that "[h]ealth care services and facilities ... [are] provided in a manner that avoids unnecessary duplication of services, that is cost effective, and that is compatible with the health care needs of the various areas and populations of the state." OCGA § 31-6-1. In Diversified Health Mgmt. Svcs. v. Visiting Nurses Assn., supra, a provider of health care services sought to obtain injunctive relief against a competitor by bringing a direct action against the competitor pursuant to OCGA § 31-6-45(d), which specifies that an "interested person shall have standing in any court of competent jurisdiction to maintain an action for injunctive relief to enforce the provisions of this chapter." While the Georgia Supreme Court, citing Executive Comm. of Baptist, etc., of Ga. v. Metro Ambulance Svcs., 250 Ga. 61, 296 S.E.2d 547 (1982), held that this Code section did not confer standing for such an action, it went on to hold that the provider would have been authorized to bring a mandamus action against the SHPA to compel it to seek redress for an alleged violation of the Act by a competitor. We believe it logically follows from this ruling that a provider of health care services would also have standing to intervene in administrative proceedings already pending before the SHPA involving the operations of a competitor and that having done so, it would also have standing to seek...