Cheney v. Richards

• Decision Date: 17 June 1931
• Parties: CHENEY v. RICHARDS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

155 A. 642

CHENEY

v. RICHARDS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 17, 1931.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Aroostook County.

Suit by Edward L. Cheney against Horace G. Richards, in which there was a decree for plaintiff, who subsequently petitioned for an order for defendant to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt for failure to comply with the decree. On report.

Plaintiff's petition dismissed.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, PARRINGTON, and THAXTER, JJ.

A. S. Crawford, Jr., of Houlton, for complainant.

Cook, Hutchinson, Pierce & Connell, of Portland, for respondent.

PATTANGALL, C. J.

On report. The sole issue presented by the record, and which this court is required to decide, is whether or not defendant failed to comply with the terms of a decree in equity ordering him to make a conveyance of certain real estate to plaintiff and because of such noncompliance is guilty of contempt.

The controversy arose from the following state of facts: Plaintiff brought a bill in equity to compel specific performance of an oral contract to convey certain real estate of which defendant held legal title and plaintiff was in possession. The parties disagreed as to the conditions of the contract. After full hearing, the court below sustained the bill and decreed that conveyance be made as prayed for, provided that the plaintiff within a definite time deposited in court for the benefit of the defendant a stated sum of money.

One question involved in the proceedings was whether or not certain notes held by defendant, of which plaintiff was maker, should be included in the accounting. The presiding justice found that these notes were in no way related to the contract in question and did not consider them in computing the amount due.

The decree was filed April 15, 1930, and the paragraph ordering the conveyance read as follows:

"The said Horace G. Richards be and hereby is ordered to convey to the plaintiff, Edward L. Cheney, the Cheney farm, so-called, situated in Mars Hill, in this county, as fully described in Paragraph 1 of the bill herein, with the buildings thereon, by a good and sufficient quit-claim deed, with covenant against the lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming by, through, or under the defendant, within sixty days from the date of this decree: provided that before said deed is delivered and conveyance made, and within said period, said Edward L. Cheney shall have deposited in this court, to be paid to said Horace G. Richards, the sum of fifteen hundred and six dollars and seventy-nine cents, together with interest at six per cent on said sum from April 13th, 1930 to date of such delivery of said deed, less the said plaintiff's taxable costs; as by said decree may more fully appear."

Plaintiff deposited the amount fixed by the decree. Defendant deposited his deed; but before doing so, he had brought suit against plaintiff on the notes referred to and had made a general attachment of plaintiff's real estate. Because of this, he inserted in his deed the following paragraph:

"Excepting and reserving however from this conveyance all that interest in said premises, acquired by said grantor under and by virtue of an attachment of the real estate of said grantee made by said grantor on the third day of May A. D. 1930 upon a writ returnable before the Superior Court at the term thereof to be held at Caribou in said County of Aroostook on the 2nd Tuesday of September A. D. 1930."

Plaintiff refused to accept the deed, claiming that it was not in accordance with the decree, and, defendant refusing to modify it, a petition was filed requesting the court to issue an order for defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt. Order issued and the matter was proceeding to hearing when it was agreed that the case should be reported to this court.

Under the provisions of section 9, c. 91, Rev. St. 1930, the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as a law court, has jurisdiction of cases involving "questions of law arising on reports of cases."

Section 56, c. 91, Rev. St. 1930, provides that: "Upon a hearing in any cause in equity, the justice hearing the same may report the cause to the next term of the Law Court, if he is of the opinion that any question of law is involved, of sufficient importance or doubt to justify the same, and the parties agree thereto. The cause * * * shall be heard and decided by said Law Court in like manner and with like results as herein provided in case of appeals."

The first question confronting us is one of jurisdiction. The authority of this court, sitting as a law court, is limited by the statutes, and it is by virtue of the above-quoted enactments that the questions involved in the matter now before us may be considered, if at all.

Discussing these provisions, our court in Mather v. Cunningham, 107 Me. 242, 78 A. 102, 103, regarded the word "case" or "cause" as used in its unrestricted sense and says that the term "when applied to legal proceedings * * * imports a state of facts which furnish an occasion for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of justice," adding that "the phrase 'reports of cases' was employed by the Legislature as a method of submitting questions, involving both law and fact, in the most comprehensive manner to the decision of the court. * * * It consequently becomes immaterial whether the case was a probate appeal, an equity appeal, an agreed statement of facts, or a civil or criminal case presenting a question of law, if reported without any restrictions as to the questions to be decided."

A slight verbal correction in the above statement might be made in the interest of exact accuracy. "Causes in equity," not "equity appeals," come before us on report. Such causes may come before us on appeal or on report. One method of bringing them forward should not be confused with the other.

"Case" and "cause" are synonymous terms. Unless the problem here presented may properly be designated a "case" or "cause," it lies without the jurisdiction of this court.

"The words 'case' or 'cause,' when used as legal terms, are generally understood as meaning a judicial proceeding for the determination of a controversy between parties wherein rights are enforced or protected or wrongs are prevented or redressed." Ex parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87, 90.

Any question, civil or criminal, contested before a court of justice, is a cause or case. Blyew v. U. S., 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 581, 20 L. Ed. 638.

"Case" is synonymous with "cause" and means any question, civil or criminal, contested before a court of justice. In proceedings for contempts or failure to obey orders or writs of the court, the parties have a right to be heard and to clear themselves of the charge of contempt if they can. Such a proceeding is commenced by a regular process of the court and there is a question to be contested and decided. Erwin v. U. S., 37 F. 470, 2 L. R. A. 229; Baldwin v. Miles, 58 Conn. 496, 20 A. 618.

Assuming that a case is here presented, one more requisite is necessary to bring it within jurisdictional limits. Cases should not be sent to the Law Court, even upon report at the request of the parties, except at such stage of the proceedings that a decision of the question may dispose of the case itself, unless the report contains a stipulation which provides that the decision may, in at least one alternative, supersede further proceedings. "Reports are intended to take up the whole case, for the court to make final decision. It should not come up by installments. * * * It should have proceeded to a decree upon the merits before the sitting justice, and then come here by appeal, or the whole cause— both law and fact—should have been reported." La Forest v. Blake Co., 100 Me....