Chief of Police of Westford v. Town of Westford

• Citation: 313 N.E.2d 443,365 Mass. 526
• Parties: , 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2509, 74 Lab.Cas. P 53,396 CHIEF OF POLICE OF WESTFORD v. TOWN OF WESTFORD et al.
• Decision Date: 25 June 1974
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 443

313 N.E.2d 443

365 Mass. 526, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2509,

74 Lab.Cas. P 53,396

CHIEF OF POLICE OF WESTFORD v. TOWN OF WESTFORD et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued April 3, 1974.

Decided June 25, 1974.

Robert J. Canavan, for Interational Brotherhood of Police Officers and another.

Richard W. Murphy, Braintree, for Town of Westford.

Edward R. Lembo, Framingham, for the Chief of Police of Westford.

Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and WILKINS, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

A bill in equity was brought by the plaintiff chief of police of Westford seeking a declaratory decree that certain provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the town of Westford (town) and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 326 (the union), acting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent as the Westford Police Association, conflict with authority vested exclusively in the chief of police by G.L. c. 41, § 97, and by virtue of such conflict the void. G.L. c. 149, § 1781. The trial judge issued an interlocutory decree declaring certain provisions of the agreement valid and certain others invalid and temporarily enjoining the enforcement of the latter provisions, and reported the case to the Appeals Court pursuant to G.L. c. 214, § 30A. The case was transferred here for direct review under G.L. c. 211A, § 10. We have before us a statement of agreed facts, and the judge's findings, rulings and order for decree.

In August, 1972, the union and the selectmen of the town were negotiating a collective bargaining agreement under G.L. c. 149, § 1781, to govern 'wages, hours and other conditions of employment' of Westford police officers represented by the union. A collective bargaining agreement had been in effect during the calendar year 1971 and by its terms continued in effect until the new agreement was concluded in 1972. During these negotiations the plaintiff assigned one Allen Comeau to a newly created position as investigator in the police department. This assignment was contrary to the still effective collective bargaining agreement which reserved such appointments to officers possessing greater seniority. This provision was not renewed in the 1972 agreement. Also in August, 1972, the plaintiff instituted new shift assignment for the personnel of the police department which were likewise in conflict with seniority provisions of the agreement in effect at the time. The selectmen ordered the plaintiff to rescind these orders which he did but, after consulting counsel, he reissued them. The selectmen then countermanded the orders by direct notice to the other officers. The disputing parties next successively posted their orders on, and removed the other orders from, the department bulletin board, understandably causing some confusion within the department. The plaintiff brought this bill on August 30, 1972, seeking a declaration that his orders were proper and restraining the selectmen from interfering with them. The new collective bargaining agreement was executed on September 19, 1972, and the plaintiff amended his bill to raise the validity of numerous articles of that agreement. His contention is that these articles conflict with the authority granted the chief of police by G.L. c. 41, § 97, and that therefore the agreement must yield under G.L. c. 149, § 178I. ¹

The articles of the agreement which are challenged and which the judge declared invalid deal essentially with the method to be employed in the assignment of hours of work shifts, special duties, and time off for various purposes. In most cases these articles provide that these benefits and burdens are to be distributed on a fair, equitable rotating basis, often giving preference to employees with seniority. He found valid provisions of the agreement applying the same standards to overtime work and extra paid details, establishing a grievance procedure for settling complaints based on violations of the agreement, and permitting the granting of leaves of absence.

The plaintiff argues that the challenged sections conflict with the statutory authority vested in the chief of police by G.L. c. 41, § 97. This contention rests almost exclusively on our decision in Chief of Police of Dracut v. Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 258 N.E.2d 531 (1970), in which we held invalid provisions of a collective bargaining agreement which deprived a chief of police of freedom of exercise the powers of command and assignment which were confided to his office by statute. The Dracut case, however, dealt with the powers of a chief of police created by G.L. c. 41, § 97A, not § 97, which is the governing statute in this case. Unlike the defendant town in the Dracut case, Westford has never accepted the provisions of § 97A. Indeed, at the annual town meeting in 1964, the town expressly refused to accept § 97A. The plaintiff's claim is that § 97, as well as § 97A, should be interpreted to create exclusive power in the police chief to deal with the matters of scheduling and assignment regulated in the collective bargaining agreement. This claim requires a comparative examination of the two statutes. ² Both statutes provide that in towns which accept them a police department is to be established and that police officers and a chief of police are to be appointed by the selectmen who shall also determine their compensation. Both provide that the chief of police shall be in immediate control of all town property used by the department and that the chief shall be in immediate control of the police officers who shall obey his orders. The differences, however, are marked, and in every case they demonstrate a different balance of power and responsibility between the selectmen and the chief.

Section 97A provides that the police department is to be established by the selectmen but 'under the supervision' of the chief. Section 97 provides that the department is to be established 'under the direction of the selectmen.' Under § 97A, the police chief and other officers may be removed by the selectmen but only for cause and after hearing. Under § 97, the chief and other officers may be removed by the selectmen 'at pleasure.' A police chief in a town which accepts § 97A is empowered to make 'suitable regulations governing the police department, and the officers thereof, subject to the approval of the selectmen.' Furthermore, the selectmen have only thirty days to voice their disapproval of such regulations promulgated by the chief or they become effective without their approval. Under § 97, only the selectmen have the power to make such 'suitable regulations.' The chief of police under § 97A has the responsibility to assign police officers to their respective duties. Such a power is absent from § 97. Finally, § 97A provides that § 97 shall not apply in any town which accepts § 97A. This catalogue of differences makes obvious the fact that the primary control of the police department is in the chief of police under § 97A and in the selectmen under § 97.

A further indication of the legislative intention as to the relative powers of chiefs of police and selectmen under the two statutes, with particular reference to the selectmen's right to conclude collective bargaining agreements, is provided by St.1969, c. 341, which inserted into G.L. c. 149, § 178I, a requirement that any provision of a collective bargaining agreement which conflicts with a regulation made by a chief of police pursuant to § 97A shall prevail over such regulation. Chief of Police of Dracut v. Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 499, fn. 3, 258 N.E.2d 531 (1970). The same language is continued in the successor statute, G.L. c. 150E, § 7, effective July 1, 1974. The Legislature must have been certain that a chief of police under § 97 had no right to make such regulations as could arguably supersede a collective bargaining agreement. It is inconceivable that the General Court wished to subordinate the regulations of a 'strong' chief of police under § 97A to such an agreement while subordinating the agreement to the 'regulations' of a 'weak' police chief under § 97.

Our opinion in the Dracut case relied heavily on the explicit grants of power to the chief of police made by § 97A and absent in § 97. Id. at 500--504, 258 N.E.2d 531. It may be that by providing in § 97 that the chief shall be in 'immediate control' of the police officers the Legislature intended that suitable regulation by the selectmen maintain some minimum level of generality. Highly particular regulation might indeed be as 'subversive of the discipline and efficiency which is indispensable to a public law enforcement agency' in a town governed by § 97 as in one governed by § 97A. Id. at 502, 258 N.E.2d at 537. But our use of the quoted language in the Dracut case was certainly not meant to indicate that order and efficiency in police operations was only possible if every police chief in every town were vested with the broad powers granted by § 97A. That matter has already been determined by the Legislature which has given towns the alternatives of having a 'strong' chief of police, a 'weak' chief of police, or no chief of police at all. G.L. c. 41, § 96. The regulation embodied in the collective bargaining agreement at issue here is sufficiently general. The chief of police is general. The chief of police is day operations of the department. In certain areas of assignment he is limited only by such general standards as reasonableness and equity. In others he must abide...