Chotkowski v. State, 13683

• Citation: 213 Conn. 13,566 A.2d 419
• Decision Date: 21 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13683,13683
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Ludmil CHOTKOWSKI v. STATE of Connecticut.

Page 419

566 A.2d 419

213 Conn. 13

Ludmil CHOTKOWSKI v. STATE of Connecticut.

No. 13683.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 4, 1989.

Decided Nov. 21, 1989.

Robert J. Krzys, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Taka Iwashita, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action for breach of an employment contract the trial court rendered summary judgment for the defendant state of Connecticut on the ground that the plaintiff, Ludmil Chotkowski, ¹ as a state employee in the classified service, had no contractual rights, express or implied, against the state as his employer but only those rights made available to state employees by statute. The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, claiming that his suit can be maintained because the claims commissioner has authorized him to bring the action against the state pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160(a). ² He relies upon the provision declaring that, when a suit has been authorized by the commissioner, as in this case, "[t]he rights and liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances."

As an alternate ground for affirming the judgment, the state has presented its defense, raised below but not addressed by the trial court, that the authorization granted by the claims commissioner is ineffective because it is based on a special act of the legislature that violates article first, § 1 ³ of our state constitution, which prohibits anyone from receiving "exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." It is undisputed that, when the plaintiff first presented his notice of claim to the commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-147, ⁴ no award was made because the claim was barred by the one year limitation for presenting claims against the state prescribed by General Statutes § 4-148(a). ⁵ The legislature rejected the commissioner's recommendation, however, and enacted a special act ⁶ allowing the plaintiff to prosecute his claim against the state despite the untimely notice. After this enactment the plaintiff reasserted his claim before the commissioner, who, in reliance on the special act granted the plaintiff permission to sue the state in accordance with § 4-160.

The trial court refrained from deciding the issue of the constitutionality of the special act because its conclusion that the plaintiff could not prevail on the merits made it unnecessary to do so. "Constitutional issues are not considered unless absolutely necessary to the decision of a case ... or unless sufficient public interest warrants such a review." State v. DellaCamera, 166 Conn. 557, 560-61, 353 A.2d 750 (1974). In this case, however, the constitutional issue of the validity of the special act that induced the claims commissioner to authorize the plaintiff to sue the state involves jurisdiction and should properly have been decided before considering the merits of the action. Accordingly, we do not reach the substantive issues involving the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action, because our disposition of the constitutional issue signifies a lack of jurisdiction. For this reason we find error in the form of judgment and remand the case with direction to render a judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. ⁷

In a recent decision of this court, Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 558 A.2d 977 (1989), we held that a special act allowing a claimant to sue the state despite failure to present his claim to the claims commissioner within the time allowed by § 4-148(a) constituted the grant of "exclusive public emoluments or privileges" in violation of article first, § 1. "No enactment creating a preference can withstand constitutional attack if the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual." State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 106, 90 A.2d 862 (1952). "Only if an act serves some public purpose can it be constitutionally sufficient." Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 292, 294 A.2d 67 (1972).

"Under circumstances like those in the present case, where a special act has allowed a person named therein to bring a suit based upon a statutory cause of action that would otherwise be barred for failure to comply with a time limit specified in the statute, we have ordinarily been unable to discern any public purpose sufficient to sustain the enactment." Merly v. State, supra, 211 Conn. at 213, 558 A.2d 977; Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, 176 Conn. 497, 503-507, 408 A.2d 254 (1979). This plaintiff has been no better able than the plaintiff in Merly to identify any public purpose to be served by the special act. He does not even claim, as was done in Merly, that the state caused the delay in presenting his claim to the claims commissioner, "a situation which would afford strong legislative grounds for legislative interference." Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 189, 198 A. 746 (1938). The only consideration he advances is that the legislature may have intended to recognize "an honorary obligation so that substantial justice could be realized." Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 104-105, 355 A.2d 1 (1974); see Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, supra, 176 Conn. at 506-507, 408 A.2d 254.

The "honorary obligation" relied upon by the plaintiff, however, is based wholly upon the asserted merit of his cause of action for breach of contract and does not implicate the delay in filing his claim with the claims commissioner. If the limitation of § 4-148(a), requiring a claim against the state to be presented within one year after its accrual, could be set aside for the benefit of a particular person simply because the legislature viewed his claim as meritorious, it would be difficult to justify enforcing the limitation to bar any claim against the state from being resolved solely on its merits. It is inevitable that such a limitation does defeat some worthy claims that have not been timely presented, as the legislature must have realized when it enacted § 4-148(a). Our state constitutional ban on awarding "exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community" is indifferent to the wisdom of such a limitation as contained in § 4-148(a), but insists that, so long as it remains, it must be applied uniformly to all claimants.

Because we conclude that this case is indistinguishable from our recent decision in Merly, we conclude that the summary judgment adjudicating the merits of the plaintiff's action must be set aside and judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant must be rendered. ⁸

There is error in the form of the judgment, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render a judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.

1 The present action is related to an earlier suit by the plaintiff in which he appealed his dismissal as chief of medicine at the Veterans Home and Hospital in Rocky Hill. The state personnel appeal board rejected his appeal on the ground that he was not a permanent employee in the classified service and thus had no right to appeal his dismissal.

The plaintiff then appealed the decision of the state personnel appeal board. The trial court sustained his appeal and this court affirmed that decision in Chotkowski v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board, 176 Conn. 1, 404 A.2d 868 (1978). After the case had been remanded to the state personnel appeal board, the parties reached a settlement of the plaintiff's claims relating to the termination of his employment. Thereafter, on October 4, 1979, the plaintiff filed with the claims commissioner notice of his present claim, which involves a reduction in his pay for the period October 14, 1975, through April 8, 1976.

2 "[General Statutes] Sec. 4-160. AUTHORIZATION OF ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE. (a) When the claims commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents...