Choudhry v. Free

• Citation: 131 Cal.Rptr. 654,17 Cal.3d 660,552 P.2d 438
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 03 August 1976
• Parties: , 552 P.2d 438 Saidul Z. CHOUDHRY et al., Petitioners, v. Harry M. FREE, Individually and as County Clerk, etc., Respondent; IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 30516.

Page 654

131 Cal.Rptr. 654

17 Cal.3d 660, 552 P.2d 438

Saidul Z. CHOUDHRY et al., Petitioners, v. Harry M. FREE, Individually and as County Clerk, etc., Respondent IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al., Real Parties in Interest.

L.A. 30516.

Supreme Court of California.

Aug. 3, 1976.

As Modified Sept. 2, 1976.

James E. Gonzales II, El Centro, Ronald T. Vera, Albert H. Meyerhoff, Marysville Robert M. Teets, Jr., Berkeley, Richard Pearl and Fred Altschuler, San Francisco, for petitioners.

S. Wyanne Bunyan as amicus curiae on behalf of petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

R. L. Knox, Jr., and Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, El Centro, for real parties in interest.

Kenneth A. Kuney and Berryhill, Kuney & Burckhardt, Tulare, as amici curiae.

MOSK, Justice.

Section 21100 of the Water Code provides that the director of an irrigation district formed under the Irrigation District Law (Wat.Code, § 20500 et seq.) ¹ must be a freeholder of the district which he represents. Petitioner Choudhry, a potential candidate for director of the Imperial Irrigation District (hereinafter the district) at the time of filing this litigation, and two voters in the district, none of whom own real property therein, challenge the constitutionality of the section on the grounds that it violates article I, section 22, of the California constitution ² and the equal protection clause of both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution. (U.S.Const., 14th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, § 7.)

Choudhry, a resident and voter of the district, sought to file a nominating petition for director in August 1975, but respondent Free, the county clerk, refused to accept the petition on the ground that Choudhry was not a freeholder. Thereafter, petitioners sought a writ of mandate from this court, to compel Free to accept the nominating papers for filing. ³ We issued an alternative writ to examine the claim that section 21100 is unconstitutional. ⁴

Neither respondent nor the real parties in interest oppose petitioners' assertion that section 21100 is unconstitutional. Their apparent willingness to jettison the provision virtually eliminates all adversary aspects to this litigation. However, the Association of California Water Agencies, an organization which represents 69 of the state's 104 irrigation districts, has filed an amicus curiae brief in defense of the constitutionality of the section. The Secretary of State, expressing her interest in voting qualifications, appears as amicus curiae in support of petitioners.

The formation of an irrigation district may be initiated by the filing of a petition signed by a majority in number and value of the holders of title to land susceptible of irrigation, or by not less than 500 electors of the proposed district, who hold at least 20 percent of the value of the land. (§ 20700.) Whether or not he owns land therein a resident who qualifies as an elector is entitled to vote on the question of establishment of the district as well as for the selection of a director. (§ 20527.)

The board of directors is charged with conducting the affairs of the district (§ 21385), and among the powers which it may exercise are the following: It may supply and deliver water for irrigation and domestic use (§ 22075 et seq.) and for fire protection (§ 22077), and store, treat and salvage water (§ 22078). It may also produce, purchase or lease electric power and acquire or construct works for generating electricity (§§ 22115--22122). In addition, it is authorized to provide for drainage made necessary by irrigation (§§ 22095-- 22099), construct, maintain, and operate flood control and sewage disposal works (§§ 22160, 22162, 22176), ⁵ and construct, maintain, and operate recreational facilities in connection with dams, reservoirs and other property under its control (§ 22185). It has such general powers as eminent domain and the power to enter into contracts and to sell or lease its property (§§ 22456, 22230, 22500).

The district derives its revenues from assessments upon the land within its boundaries (§ 22950) and from charges for the services it provides, such as water, electric power, sewage disposal, and the operation of recreational facilities (§§ 22252, 22115, 22117, 22179, 22186). It has the authority to substitute such charges for assessments (§ 22280) and may pay its bonds from revenues other than assessments (§§ 25240, 25241), if the issuance of the bonds is authorized by an election (§ 21933). Bond elections may be called at the discretion of the board (§ 21925, subd. (a)).

According to petitioners, the Imperial Irrigation District is the largest in the state, with 501,265 acres of irrigated farm land and more than 1 million acres of total area. It supplies all the water and electrical power needs of Imperial County, and to portions of Riverside and San Diego Counties; the residents of that vast area have no practical alternative to the district as a source of water and power. The district is the second largest employer in Imperial County, with a work force of almost 1,000 fulltime employees and an annual $13 million payroll, the largest in the county. Imperial County, which contains only a portion of the district's residents, has a population of 74,000, 67 percent of whom live in urban areas. According to amicus curiae, there are 100,000 urban residents in the entire district. Only about half of the housing units in the county are occupied by owners.

Petitioners' primary contention is that section 21100 denies them equal protection of the laws because it prohibits Choudhry from seeking the public's suffrage and restricts the right of choice of the two petitioners who are voters. As is customary in deciding claims made on equal protection grounds, our first inquiry is directed to the test to be applied in considering the validity of the classification. If petitioners' claim is measured by the 'compelling interest' test, the state must demonstrate that a classification serves a compelling governmental interest and that there are no reasonable, less intrusive means by which the goals of the state can be achieved. (Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 342--343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274.) On the other hand, under the less demanding 'rational relation' test a classification does not deny equal protection if any set of facts may reasonably be conceived in its justification. (McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.)

Because the right of franchise is fundamental in character, the stricter of these standards has often been applied to test the validity of restrictions upon the right to be a candidate. Although not every classification created by an election law is subject to strict scrutiny, the 'compelling interest' measure must be applied if a classification has a 'real and appreciable impact' upon the equality, fairness and integrity of the electoral process. (Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 144, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92.) A number of cases have held that the strict scrutiny test is therefore applicable to a law which requires a candidate to pay a filing fee as a condition of access to the ballot (Bullock v. Carter, supra, 405 U.S. 134, 144, 92 S.Ct 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92; Knoll v. Davidson (1974) 12 Cal.3d 335, 345, 116 Cal.Rptr. 97, 525 P.2d 1273), to certain durational residence requirements for candidacy (Johnson v. Hamilton (1975)15 Cal.3d 461, 468, 125 Cal.Rptr. 129, 541 P.2d 881; Thompson v. Mellon (1973) 9 Cal.3d 96, 101--102, 107 Cal.Rptr. 20, 507 P.2d 628; Zeilinga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 720--723, 94 Cal.Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578), and to a statute reserving the top place on the ballot to incumbents (Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 670--672, 122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337).

When considered in the light of these decisions, the limitation involved in the present case has an appreciable impact upon the equality and fairness of the electoral process. The freeholder requirement has the effect of denying nonlandowner voters the right to elect candidates who do not own real property. The voters' choice is thus confined to those whose predilections may favor the special concerns of landowners over the general welfare of all residents. Since the directors of the district decide such issues as rate increases for water and power, ⁶ the distribution of water between agricultural and nonagricultural uses, and other matters which could vitally affect the economic welfare of the residents as well as the environment in which they live, the bar of section 21100 imposes a substantial burden upon the right of franchise. Manifestly it also imposes a serious barrier to a candidate's ability to run for office.

Indeed, the restriction involved here is in some respects more pervasive than those considered in the several election cases cited above, because here the potential candidate is entirely excluded from the ballot on the ground that he is not a freeholder, and neither the payment of a fee, the fulfillment of a durational residence requirement, nor a willingness to allow the placement of his name on the ballot below that of the incumbent can qualify him as a candidate.

Nevertheless, amicus asserts, section 21100 does not unfairly affect the electoral process because an irrigation district is an entity which exercises limited powers and its functions have a disproportionate effect upon landowners. In this connection, amicus relies upon an analogous line of cases involving a closely related problem, i.e., whether the right to Vote in a special purpose district election may be limited to landowners. As we have seen, all electors of an irrigation district are entitled to vote. The argument goes as follows: Although it is true that all electors of an irrigation district are entitled to vote in district elections, the Legislature was not required to afford this right to nonlandowners because it is constitutional to require...