Christopher v. State, A91A0962

• Decision Date: 22 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. A91A0962,A91A0962
• Citation: 413 S.E.2d 236,202 Ga.App. 40
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 236

413 S.E.2d 236

202 Ga.App. 40

CHRISTOPHER v. The STATE.

No. A91A0962.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 22, 1991.

Thomas E. Maddox, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.

William A. Foster, III, Dist. Atty. and Jeffrey L. Ballew, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

CARLEY, Presiding Judge.

After a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of driving under the influence and of underage possession of alcohol. He appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered by the trial court on its findings of guilt.

1. Appellant enumerates as error the denial of his motion to suppress.

It is immaterial that there may have been no articulable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle that appellant was operating, because appellant was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. "[T]he Supreme Court [has] specifically indicated ... that roadblocks [can] be considered a valid alternative to random vehicle stops. [Cit.] The Supreme Court has also indicated ... that checkpoint stops are to be viewed differently from isolated vehicle stops 'because the subjective intrusion--the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers--is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop.' [Cits.]" State v. Golden, 171 Ga.App. 27, 29(2), 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984). "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it.... Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight." Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481(4), 110 L.E.2d 412 (1990). Accordingly, the issue for resolution is not whether there was an articulable suspicion or probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle, but whether the instant sobriety check was otherwise implemented and conducted in such a manner as to demonstrate that the stop of appellant's vehicle was " 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2485(4). See also Evans v. State, 190 Ga.App. 856, 380 S.E.2d 332 (1989).

The evidence shows that officers had set up the sobriety checkpoint on a road where general complaints had been made regarding intoxicated drivers. The decision to set up the sobriety checkpoint was made only after the officers had been called at 11:00 p.m. to investigate a complaint regarding a loud party at a residence on the road. The host of the party was warned that those leaving his house in vehicles would have to pass through a sobriety checkpoint which was being set up along the road. In the ensuing two hours, all vehicles traveling along the road past the sobriety checkpoint were stopped. One of those vehicles was being operated by appellant, who had been a guest at the house where the party was being held.

We note at the outset that the sobriety checkpoint cannot be considered "unreasonable" and unconstitutional "on the basis that it was conducted at a time and place conducive to stopping drivers who were leaving [a party] in the area. The purpose of such roadblocks is to locate and arrest those who are abusing the privilege of driving on public roads by driving while they are intoxicated. It further serves to deter such abuse. It is not unreasonable that such roadblocks would be located where such drivers would be expected to be at a time they might be expected to be there." State v. Payne, 759 S.W.2d 252, 253(2) (Mo.App.1988). Moreover, the officers had actually warned the host of the party that the sobriety checkpoint would be set up along the road. Thus, if appellant was unaware that he faced the prospect of being stopped on the road as he left the party, it was only because his own host had failed to warn him. It would not render the sobriety checkpoint "unreasonable" and unconstitutional that, upon being stopped without prior warning, appellant experienced "the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint...." Michigan Dept of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2486(5).

In State v. Golden, supra, 171 Ga.App. at 29(2), 318 S.E.2d 693, and Evans v. State, supra, we addressed several factors in determining whether the roadblocks which were there in issue were "reasonable" and constitutional. However, "[n]either Evans nor Golden establish[es] absolute criteria which must be satisfied before a...