Citizens Alliance for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan Cnty.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 90500–2.,90500–2.
• Citation: 359 P.3d 753,184 Wash.2d 428
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: CITIZENS ALLIANCE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGAL FUND, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Petitioner, v. SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, and San Juan County Critical Areas Ordinance/Shoreline Master Program Implementation Committee, a subcommittee of the San Juan County Council, and its Members Richard Fralick, Patty Miller, and Lovel Pratt, Respondents.

184 Wash.2d 428

359 P.3d 753

CITIZENS ALLIANCE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGAL FUND, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Petitioner

v.SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, and San Juan County Critical Areas Ordinance/Shoreline Master Program Implementation Committee, a subcommittee of the San Juan County Council, and its Members Richard Fralick, Patty Miller, and Lovel Pratt, Respondents.

No. 90500–2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Feb. 26, 2015.

Decided Oct. 1, 2015.

Dennis Dean Reynolds, Dennis D. Reynolds Law Office, Bainbridge Island, WA, Michele Lynn Earl–Hubbard, Allied Law Group LLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Randall Keenan Gaylord, Amy Vira, San Juan County Prosecutor, Friday Harbor, WA, for Respondents.

Katherine George, Harrison–Benis LLP, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Allied Daily Newspapers.

Katherine George, Harrison–Benis LLP, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington COAlition for Open Government.

Nicholas Power, Attorney at Law, Friday Harbor, WA, amicus counsel for Island Guardian.

Steven L. Gross, Attorney at Law, Port Townsend, WA, Daniel Brian Heid, City of Auburn, Auburn, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys.

Julie Sund Nichols, Whitehouse & Nichols LLP, Shelton, WA, amicus counsel for Building Industry Association of Washington.

Brian Trevor Hodges, Pacific Legal Foundation, Ethan Blevins, Attorney at Law, Bellevue, WA, amicus counsel for Pacific Legal Foundation.

Alan D. Copsey, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General Division Attorney General, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for State of Washington.

Opinion

WIGGINS, J.

¶ 1 In this case, the Citizens Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund (CAPR) seeks to invalidate several ordinances passed by the governing council of San Juan County (County), alleging violations of Washington's Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, chapter 42.30 RCW (OPMA). Specifically, CAPR asserts that four ordinances passed as part of a state-mandated update of the County's critical area ordinances (CAO) should be voided because the ordinances had first been discussed by an informal group of county officials and employees (CAO Team) in meetings that did not comply with the OPMA. We reject CAPR's arguments because (1) none of the CAO team meetings constituted “meetings” of the San Juan County Council (Council) under the OPMA, (2) the CAO Team itself was not a “committee” of the Council, and (3) the CAO Team never acted on behalf of the Council.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 At all times relevant to this appeal, the County operated under a home rule charter that vested legislative functions in the Council, consisting of six voting members. San Juan County Home Rule Charter art. 2, §§ 2.10, 2.11, 2.30(1). The charter specified that the Council cannot act without the affirmative vote of four of its members. Id. § 2.40(3). Further, the charter placed all administrative and executive functions under the purview of a county administrator hired by the Council. Id. §§ 3.41, 3.43. During the relevant time period, Pete Rose served as county administrator.

¶ 3 In 2010, the County began the process of updating its CAO as required by the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW. The County had initiated the CAO update process on two prior occasions but had failed to pass the required update both times. By the time the County initiated the third effort to update the CAO, the required update was already four years overdue.

¶ 4 The CAO Team appears to have been an informal group that met occasionally to discuss how to implement the CAO update. The informal nature of the team is reflected by the near-complete absence of official documents referencing the team or its work. For example, the record provides few clues as to how the CAO Team came into existence. It does not appear that it was created through a formal legal instrument such as a legislative resolution or an executive directive. Likewise, no documents in the record indicate how the members of the CAO Team were chosen—in fact, none of the documents in the record suggests that the CAO Team even had an official list of members. The record also does not contain any documents indicating that the CAO Team had any formal purpose, list of responsibilities, or official relationship to other county agencies.

¶ 5 This informal group met approximately 26 times between July 2010 and February 2012. The CAO Team did not keep attendance records, and the record provides little information on who attended many of the individual team meetings. In a response to an interrogatory, the County stated that 10 individuals attended at least one CAO team meeting: Pete Rose, the county administrator; Jon Cain, a deputy prosecutor from the San Juan County Prosecuting Attorney's Office; Paul Adamus, a consultant; Shireene Hale, Janice Biletnikoff, Colin Maycock, and Rene Beliveau, all members of the County's planning staff; and three members of the Council—Richard Fralick, Lovel Pratt, and Patty Miller. CAPR does not allege, and the record does not indicate, that any members of the Council besides Fralick, Pratt, and Miller attended any CAO team meetings.

¶ 6 During the period that the CAO Team was meeting, the Council continued its work related to the CAO update. The record indicates that the Council held 70 different meetings, workshops, hearings, or joint hearings regarding the CAO update between 2010 and 2012. On April 26, 2012, San Juan County Prosecuting Attorney Randall Gaylord submitted a memorandum to the Council suggesting that all gatherings involving at least three members of the Council should comply with the OPMA. Following this memorandum, the CAO Team did not hold any further meetings.

¶ 7 After the CAO Team ceased meeting, the Council met over 25 times and continued to hold public discussions, hearings, and readings of the CAO update. In December 2012, the Council completed the CAO update process by adopting the four ordinances that CAPR now seeks to invalidate. All four of these ordinances were passed by a five to one vote of the Council. None of the adopted ordinances refers to the work or recommendations of the CAO Team.

¶ 8 Shortly before the ordinances were adopted, CAPR filed a complaint against the County, the CAO Team, and the three council members who attended CAO team meetings—Fralick, Miller, and Pratt. After discovery was completed, the County moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and denied CAPR's motion for reconsideration.

¶ 9 CAPR appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of CAPR's complaint, concluding that the OPMA did not apply to the CAO team meetings because CAPR submitted no evidence that a majority of the Council attended CAO team meetings or that the CAO Team acted “on behalf of” the Council, as required by the OPMA. See Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County, 181 Wash.App. 538, 545, 326 P.3d 730, review granted, 181 Wash.2d 1015, 337 P.3d 326 (2014).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 We review grants of summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 206, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000). Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).

¶ 11 Construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Ammons, 136 Wash.2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812 (1998). On matters of statutory interpretation, our “fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent.” Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). “[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. at 9–10, 43 P.3d 4. When determining a statute's plain meaning, we consider “the ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of grammar, and the statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided for in the statute and related statutes.”In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle,

166 Wash.2d 834, 838–39, 215 P.3d 166 (2009). We consider other matters, including legislative history, if “the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning” after completing this plain-meaning analysis. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 We conclude that the OPMA did not apply to the CAO team meetings. The OPMA applies only to meetings of “ ‘[g]overning bod[ies],’ ” a term that applies both to legislative entities such as the Council and “committee[s] thereof” when the committee “acts on behalf of” the legislative entity. RCW 42.30.020(2). Here, none of the CAO team meetings constituted meetings of the Council itself under the OPMA because none of the meetings included a majority of council members. Moreover, the CAO Team was not a “committee thereof” with respect to the Council because CAPR produced no evidence indicating that the Council created the CAO Team. The CAO Team also never “acted on behalf of” the Council and thus could not have constituted a “governing body” under the OPMA even if the Council had created it. We therefore affirm the dismissal of CAPR's complaint.

I. Statutory Construction

¶ 13 RCW 42.30.030 sets forth the OPMA's prohibition against closed public meetings:

All meetings of the governing body of a public agency shall be open and public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the governing body of a public agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

(Emphasis added.) Another section of the OPMA provides the definitions of the above-emphasized terms:

(2) “Governing body” means the multimember board, commission, committee, council, or other policy or rule-making body of a public agency, or any committee thereof when the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hearings, or takes testimony or

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