Citizens Bank of Shelbyville v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 21 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 32802,32802
• Citation: 428 S.W.2d 895
• Parties: The CITIZENS BANK OF SHELBYVILLE, Missouri, a Missouri Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Missouri, James J. Butler et al., as Members of the Industrial Commission, Sharon M. Bentley, and Division of Employment Security, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 895

428 S.W.2d 895

The CITIZENS BANK OF SHELBYVILLE, Missouri, a Missouri Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Missouri, James J. Butler et al. as Members of the Industrial Commission, Sharon M Bentley, and Division of Employment Security, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 32802.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

May 21, 1968.

Arthur H. Bitter, Jefferson City, for appellant Div. of Empl. security.

Frank J. Iuen, Jefferson City, for appellant Ind. Comm.

Clyde Burch, Bethel, for respondent.

CLEMENS, Commissioner.

This appeal concerns an employee's right to unemployment benefits under the Employment Security Law, Chapter 288, V.A.M.S. The claimant, Mrs. Sharon M. Bentley, quit her job with the Citizens Bank of Shelbyville. She applied for unemployment benefits, contending that although she had quit voluntarily it was for 'good cause', attributable to the bank. If not for good cause, she is disqualified for benefits (§ 288.050, subd. 1(1)). The issue is whether the bank cashier's unsociable attitude toward the claimant constituted good cause for the claimant quitting her job.

After holding an evidentiary hearing the Division of Employment Security allowed Mrs. Bentley's claim on the ground she had quit work for good cause because she had been mistreated by the bank's cashier, Mrs. Gloria Hardy. On the bank's petition for review the Industrial Commission held Mrs. Bentley was eligible for benefits. But on the bank's appeal the circuit court ruled as a matter of law that the evidence did not support the award and remanded the case to the Industrial Commission. For reasons to be stated, we affirm the circuit court's denial of the award.

We first consider the statutory law governing Mrs. Bentley's right to unemployment benefits, and then look to the scope of appellate review. In § 288.020 the purpose of the Employment Security Law is stated to be '* * * for compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.' Section 288.050, subd. 1, provides: '* * * a claimant shall be disqualified * * * if * * * he has left his work voluntarily without good cause * * *.' The converse of this, applied to Mrs. Bentley, is that she is qualified for benefits only if she left her employment for good cause. The burden of proof was hers to show the right to benefits. O'Dell v. Division of Employment Security, Mo., 376 S.W.2d 137(7). Whether the favorable evidence establishes good cause is a question of law. Poggemoeller v. Industrial Commission, Mo.App., 371 S.W.2d 488(5). In Buttinger v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., Mo.App., 42 S.W.2d 982(3), a workmen's compensation case, we said, 'The term 'good cause' has no fixed meaning, but must depend upon the circumstances of each case to be determined by the sound discretion of the court.' (See, also, Wilson v. Morris, Mo., 369 S.W.2d 402(7).)

Decisions of the Industrial Commission on questions of law do not bind this court, but as to questions of fact our review is limited to ascertaining upon the whole record whether the Commission could have reasonably made its findings and reached its result considering the evidence most favorable to the award. Cumbustion Engineering, Inc., v. O'Connor, Mo.App., 395 S.W.2d 528(1). We do not limit our view of the evidence to isolated facts; we look to all of claimant's evidence. McTurman v. Bell, Mo.App., 398 S.W.2d 465. In applying the statute to this evidence we bear in mind that although § 288.020, subd. 2, requires a liberal construction of the Employment Security Law, the disqualifying provisions of § 288.050 must be strictly construed. Kroger Co. v. Industrial Commission, Mo.App., 314 S.W.2d 250(3). In the light of these principles we now look to the evidence.

Some facts are undisputed: Mrs. Bentley was one of four clerical employees under the supervision of Mrs. Gloria Hardy, the bank's cashier. Mrs. Bentley had worked there a year, occasionally waiting on customers but mostly sorting, posting and filing checks. Mrs. Hardy considered her a satisfactory employee. A week before Mrs. Bentley's departure, Mrs. Hardy found that someone had made a serious mistake, posting three checks to the wrong account.

According to Mrs. Bentley; Mrs. Hardy told all the employees that erroneous posting was the worst mistake a bank could make, that posting checks called for concentration, and she wanted no more talking while doing that job. Mrs. Hardy added, 'If it happens again, that's it.' Mrs. Bentley acknowledged she had made mistakes before and this one could have been hers. She also admitted Mrs. Hardy did not single her out and the mistake was never mentioned again. Nonetheless, Mrs. Bentley testified: 'Well, it upset me. I never been talked to like that before. * * * It hurt me. I was upset and I was crying, but I did my work, I went ahead with my work and I waited on customers too, and I did all the next week, and I didn't cry.'

Mrs. Bentley testified that during the following week she did her work and treated everybody as usual, but Mrs. Hardy gave her 'the cold treatment every morning': 'Mrs. Hardy didn't speak to me, she didn't say anything to me unless she had to, unless it was something with work, and she would snap me off * * *.' 'She wouldn't even look up when I come in of a morning. She would go ahead with her work, and just speak to me when it had something pertaining to the bank.' Mrs. Bentley considered her working conditions that week were intolerable.

At the end of the week the bank's board chairman, Mr. W. C. Hewitt, came to the bank and talked privately with Mrs. Bentley. According to Mrs. Bentley, he complimented her on her work, wanted her to keep it up, and told her he had been talking with Mrs. Hardy about Mrs. Bentley's behavior and was trying to smooth over their differences. 'He said he thought I apologize to her because she didn't think I was treating her right.' Mrs. Bentley said nothing to Mr. Hewitt about how she had treated Mrs. Hardy that week. After work Mrs. Bentley went to Mrs. Hardy's home and told her Mr. Hewitt had been in and said she should apologize. 'I didn't feel I owed her an apology so I gave her my key.' On both these occasions Mrs. Bentley cried.

On this testimony the Commission accepted the referee's findings of fact, set out here with our own parenthetical remarks and emphasis: Mrs. Hardy, the cashier, failed to speak to Mrs. Bentley when she came to work each morning. Mrs. Bentley's actions were not responsible for the alleged tense situation in the bank. (No finding that Mrs. Hardy was responsible for it.) If the alleged unpleasant situation existed it was the cashier's responsibility to attempt to settle it. (This is a value judgment--a personal conclusion rather than a finding of fact.) The bank's chairman, Mr. Hewitt, told Mrs. Bentley he believed she should apologize to the cashier for not speaking to her the previous week. On these findings of fact the referee and the Commission concluded that the cashier's treatment of Mrs. Bentley gave her good cause for voluntarily leaving her employment.

As said, whether the evidence established good cause is a question of law. The issue is whether the unfriendly relations between Mrs. Bentley and Mrs. Hardy, during the week in question, justified Mrs. Bentley quitting her job for 'good cause', within the meaning of the Employment Security Law.

The stated legislative purpose of the Employment Security Law recognizes the menace of 'economic insecurity due to unemployment' and provides for funds 'to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own' (§ 288.020). The law excludes from benefits employees who leave their employment without good cause (§ 288.050, subd. 1(1)). We must interpret the words 'good cause' by their plain and rational meaning in the light of the purpose of the Employment Security Law.

That legislative purpose is illustrated by three cases. Thus, the statutory word 'unemployment' means 'lack of employment.' A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184(5). In Kilgore v. Industrial Commission, Mo.App., 337 S.W.2d 91(2), 90 A.L.R.2d 825, the court held that benefits were allowable when the 'pressure of circumstances compels termination by the employee.' In Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77, the court determined that the claimant did not meet the statutory...