Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Com'n

• Decision Date: 06 November 1944
• Docket Number: 39062
• Citation: 183 S.W.2d 77,353 Mo. 540
• Parties: Iva W. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri, and E. J. Keitel, Harry P. Drisler and George A. Rozier, Members, and International Shoe Company, a Corporation, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

183 S.W.2d 77

353 Mo. 540

Iva W. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Missouri, and E. J. Keitel, Harry P. Drisler and George A. Rozier, Members, and International Shoe Company, a Corporation, Appellants

No. 39062

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 6, 1944

Appeal from Butler Circuit Court; Hon. Randolph H. Weber Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Edward D. Summers, Acting Chief Counsel; George A Rozier of counsel.

(1) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this case because the members of the Commission are parties hereto in their official capacities as officers of the State of Missouri. Murphy v. Hurlbut Undertaking & Embalming Co., 346 Mo 405, 142 S.W.2d 449; Trianon Hotel Co. v. Keitel, 169 S.W.2d 891. (2) In order to be eligible for benefits under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law, an individual must be willing and ready and in a position to accept at once any work which may be considered suitable for him and which he has reasonable prospects of obtaining. Sec. 9430, R.S. 1939; Laws 1941, l.c. 608; Sec. 9431 I, R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, l.c. 610; Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Comp. Comm., 28 S.E.2d 535; Keen v. Texas Unemployment Comp. Comm., 148 S.W.2d 211; Brown Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Review, 45 N.E.2d 152; Stella v. Downyflake Restaurant, 11 A.2d 848; Salavaria v. Murphy, 266 A.D. 933, 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 899; In re Steinberg, 263 A.D. 960, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 197; Department of Labor and Industry v. Board of Review, 35 A.2d 739; W.T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review, 29 A.2d 858. (3) The burden of proving the conditions of eligibility set out in Section 9430, R.S. 1939, is upon the individual who claims benefits. Clapper v. Lakin, 343 Mo. 710, 123 S.W.2d 27; Campbell v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis, 235 Mo.App. 56, 126 S.W.2d 915. (4) In an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission the findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive upon the court if there is substantial evidence to support them, and in determining the sufficiency of such evidence, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Atkisson v. Murphy, 179 S.W.2d 27; Trianon Hotel Co. v. Keitel, 350 Mo. 1041, 169 S.W.2d 891. (5) The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law is to pay benefits to individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Sec. 9422, R.S. 1939; Sec. 9430 (c), Laws 1943, l.c. 934.

Robert C. Hyde for respondent.

Dalton, C. Bradley and Van Osdol, CC., concur.

OPINION

DALTON

This is an action to review a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission denying respondent's claim for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law. Chapter 52, Art. 2, Sec. 9421 et seq., R.S. 1939. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the findings of the court. The members of the Commission have appealed.

Respondent's claim for benefits was filed with the Commission on April 9, 1943 and was duly assigned to a claims deputy for determination. Section 9432, R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, pp. 566, 612, Sec. 9. The claims deputy examined the claim and, on the basis of facts found by him, determined that under the provisions of Sec. 9430(c), R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, pp. 566, 607, Sec. 7, respondent was ineligible for benefits because she was not "available for work." Respondent appealed from the decision of the claims deputy and a hearing was had before an appeals referee, who entered his decision affirming the determination of the claims deputy that respondent was ineligible for benefits. Respondent, thereafter, applied to the Commission for leave to appeal from the finding and determination of the appeals referee, but the application was denied and the decision of the appeals referee was adopted as the decision of the Commission. Sec. 9432(e), R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, pp. 566, 612, Sec. 9. Respondent then filed in the Circuit Court of Butler County her petition for review and that court reversed the decision of the Commission. The cause has been submitted here on the abstract and brief of appellants. Respondent has not favored us with a brief.

The facts are not in dispute. Respondent is a married woman and resides with her husband and two minor children in Poplar Bluff. Prior to September 25, 1942, she was employed by the International Shoe Company as a cutter, on a piece work basis, at an average wage of $ 35.00 per week. Shoe factory work is the only kind of employment claimant has ever had outside of her home. She left this employment on the advice of a physician, who was treating her for a nervous condition and nervous spells. She had been working with heavy material, and the work was "rather hard, nervous work." With reference to how the work affected her health, respondent testified: "Well, I don't know, only that we are working nine hours a day for five days and a half a week, and then of course I have two children, and when I would get home I wouldn't get any rest because of them, and it was just, you might say, continuous working all the time. . . . The last month or two that I worked down there sometimes I would have to quit and go home because of my condition. See, my nerves, it causes palpitation of the heart, and when my heart starts running away, I have just got to take out." Respondent was last treated by her physician in February 1943, prior to the June 23, 1943 hearing, but on June 21, 1943, her physician issued a physician's certificate to the effect that she was not physically able to do regular work, but could do light work. Respondent registered for work at the employment office on April 9, 1943, but did not reapply for work with her former employer. Respondent stated her reasons as follows: "I have wanted to go back to International and I have thought a good deal about it, because I do like the work and I got along fine down there with Mr. Ristig, my boss, but I also asked my doctor about it and he says that he's treated me long enough; he knows if I should, I would just be back like I was, so there is no use to begin again and then have to stop." At the hearing on June 23, 1943, a representative of the Shoe Company stated: "The foreman will be glad to have her back any time she is able to work, and so far as we know, she left strictly voluntarily on account of her health. . . . We have other work that is not as strenuous as cutting. . . . We have other work where she could sit down and work at a machine. It would be a lighter job probably than standing on her feet, but they are all on piece work. There would be the same nervous strain, if it affects a person's nerves, as it does in some cases." Respondent thereupon indicated that she could not continue with her former work and that the other work suggested was unacceptable to her. Other evidence is summarized in the Commission's findings of fact, as follows: "All of the claimant's work experience has been in shoe factories as a cutter. She last worked at the employer's factory for eleven months, quitting on September 25, 1942 on the advice of her physician, who had recommended that she seek less strenuous work. She testified that since the birth of her last child eight years ago, she has suffered from nervousness. Prior to quitting the employer, she was under the care of a physician for about three months. She will not return to work at the present time as a cutter because she contends that such strenuous work aggravates her nervous condition. The employer's witness testified that work as a cutter, which is the operation of a clicking machine, is normally a man's work, although a few women have been capable of maintaining production on this type of work.

"The claimant has completed two years of high school, but has had no special training. At the present time she will not accept any type of work in a shoe factory. The only work which she will accept is work as a sales clerk. Two employers have rejected her applications for this type of work because she has had no experience. . . . She is able to do light work, but cannot perform the strenuous work of a cutter, the only work in which she has had experience. . . ."

On the basis of the foregoing facts the Commission held that respondent had "unreasonably limited her availability (when she limited it to only one type of work in which she had had no experience or training"); that she had so restricted the type of work she would be willing to accept she was unavailable for work; and that she was ineligible for benefits.

The judgment of the circuit court, as entered after a hearing on the petition for review, holds "that under the evidence, plaintiff, Iva W. Haynes, has met all of the conditions of eligibility for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law . . . and . . . that the decision of the defendants . . . to the effect that said Iva W. Haynes was unavailable for work during the weeks for which she claimed benefits . . . is contrary to the evidence in this cause and . . . unsupported by substantial competent evidence."

Section 9430, R.S. 1939, as amended, Laws 1941, pp. 566, 607, Sec. 7, provides that, "An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that (a) he has registered for work at and thereafter has continued to report at an employment office in accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe; (b) he has made a claim for benefits in accordance with the provisions of Section 9432(a); (c) he is able to work, and is available for work; and . . ."

In the case under consideration appellants admit that the respondent has met all of the conditions specified in Sec. 9430, R.S....