Sokol v. Labor and Indus. Relations Com'n

• Decision Date: 03 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. WD52145,WD52145
• Citation: 946 S.W.2d 20
• Parties: 12 IER Cases 1854 Steve SOKOL, Appellant, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Missouri Department of Employment Security, Respondents, TAI Services, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 20

946 S.W.2d 20

12 IER Cases 1854

Steve SOKOL, Appellant, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF MISSOURI Missouri Department of Employment Security, Respondents TAI Services, Inc., Defendant.

No. WD52145.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

June 3, 1997.

Steve Sokol, Overland Park, Appellant pro se.

Ronnae L. Coleman, Kansas City, for Respondent Missouri Division of Employment Sec.

Victorine Robben Mahon, Jefferson City, for Respondent Labor & Indus. Relations Com'n.

Before ELLIS, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Appellant Steve Sokol appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission that he was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his employer. Because we find that Mr. Sokol did not leave his employment voluntarily, and further that, had he done so, it would have been for good cause, we reverse.

I. Factual Background of Termination of Claimant

Mr. Sokol was employed by respondent TAI Services, Inc. (TAI), a Georgia corporation. TAI's business principally involves eddy current testing of air conditioning equipment. TAI is based in Georgia, and operates in the Southeastern United States. It also, however, has customers in other parts of the country, including the Midwest. On October 10, 1988, TAI Services hired Mr. Sokol to run its Kansas City regional operations.

When hired, Mr. Sokol signed an employment contract which provided that either party could terminate his employment with or without cause upon 30 days written notice. It also provided that for two years after termination of his contract by either party for any reason, he could not "engage generally in direct competition with the Employer in the business of eddy current testing of tubes" and that this limitation would apply "within the existing marketing area of the Employer in the southeastern states of the United States or any future marketing area of the Employer began [sic] during employment under the terms of this Agreement."

Mr. Sokol continued in TAI's employ until he was terminated on July 15, 1994. The parties disagree as to whether Mr. Sokol was involuntarily discharged or whether he voluntarily left employment. Both agree, however, that he left employment because he refused to sign a revised employment contract.

It is undisputed that the revised contract was offered to Mr. Sokol on July 5, 1994. That morning, TAI President Ray Joseph called Mr. Sokol from Georgia. Mr. Joseph said he was flying into Kansas City and wanted to meet Mr. Sokol at the airport. Mr. Sokol later testified that when they met, Mr. Joseph demanded that Mr. Sokol immediately sign a new contract. Mr. Sokol objected that he did not understand the contract, but Mr. Joseph insisted that he would not leave until the document was signed and allegedly made numerous threats to Mr. Sokol. Mr. Joseph also allegedly told Mr. Sokol that the new contract had only minor changes from the old contract.

According to Mr. Sokol, he tired after three hours of wrangling and agreed to sign the new contract with a handwritten modification that it would be in effect for one year and would be renewed yearly thereafter unless written notice of termination was given within 30 days of the termination date.

The following day Mr. Sokol consulted with an attorney. He was told that some of the basic provisions of the contact were very one-sided, and further that some major changes had been made between the first and second contracts. A comparison of the two contracts reveals that most important among the changes were: (1) a requirement that Georgia law would apply; (2) an increase in the guaranteed base salary to an amount above that of the original contract but below that which Mr. Sokol was actually then earning; and (3) a complete revision to the non-competition clause.

Whereas the non-competition clause in the first contract had barred Mr. Sokol from competing with TAI only in the eddy current testing business and only in the Southeastern United States and in future marketing areas ¹ for two years after termination, the new clause barred Mr. Sokol from competing throughout the United States, barred him from soliciting business from or contacting any TAI customer with whom he had worked, and applied to both eddy current testing and any other product, equipment or service sold, provided or under development by TAI, for 18 months after termination.

Believing that he had been lied to in an effort to coerce him into signing the new contract, Mr. Sokol sent a letter to Mr. Joseph on July 6, 1994, rescinding the new contract. ² The letter stated:

This letter is to notify you that the contract which I signed yesterday should be considered null and void.

I feel I was coerced into signing the contract without the benefit of consulting with my lawyer or receiving any counsel ...

... Again, this letter should be considered a formal rescission of the above mentioned contract.

I truly would like to work for TAI Services for many years to come and I hope this doesn't effect our working relationship. If you wish to discuss this matter further, please feel free to call.

On July 15, 1994, Mr. Joseph called Mr. Sokol and told him that he accepted the rescission letter. He then told Mr. Sokol to again sign the new contract. Mr. Sokol claims that when he refused, Mr. Joseph told him that he would take Mr. Sokol's July 6, 1994 letter as a letter of resignation. Mr. Sokol said that he was not resigning and that he wanted to continue to work for TAI. Mr. Joseph finally told him that he would have the weekend to reconsider and if he did not sign by Monday then he would be terminated. On July 18, 1994, Mr. Sokol received a notice from TAI that he was terminated effective July 15, 1994. He received four weeks severance pay.

Mr. Sokol applied for unemployment benefits, claiming that he had been discharged without cause. His employer contested his claim, stating that he had been fired for refusing to sign the second contract, and that this was in effect a voluntary quit because the changed provisions were not unreasonable and thus Mr. Sokol had it within his power to remain employed just by signing the second contract.

II. GOVERNING LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The burden is on the claimant to prove eligibility for benefits. See Kansas City Club v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 840 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo.App.1992). In determining whether this burden has been met, we are guided by the public policy set out in Section 288.020. It states that we should liberally construe the provisions of that Chapter so as to achieve the purpose of promoting economic security for those unemployed through no fault of their own:

1. As a guide to the interpretation and application of this law, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: ... setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.

2. This law shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security both by increasing opportunities for jobs through the maintenance of a system of public employment offices and by providing for the payment of compensation to individuals in respect to their unemployment.

§ 288.020. Under this standard, the provisions of § 288.040 governing eligibility for benefits are liberally construed to provide coverage.

The employer, TAI Services, has not contested Mr. Sokol's qualification for benefits under Section 288.040. Instead, it claims that Mr. Sokol is disqualified from receiving benefits for which he would otherwise be eligible by reason of Section 288.050. Section 288.050 provides reasons for disqualifying otherwise eligible individuals from receiving benefits. It states in relevant part that:

Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, a claimant shall be disqualified ... if the deputy finds:

(1) That he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer; ...

§ 288.050.1. This and the other disqualifying provisions of Section 288.050 are strictly and narrowly construed in favor of finding that an employee is entitled to compensation. Citizens Bank of Shelbyville v. Industrial Comm'n, 428 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Mo.App.1968); Kroger Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Mo.App.1958). ³ Nonetheless, where, as here, the employer claims that the employee voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer, the employee has the burden of proving that this is not the case, either by showing that he left work for good cause attributable to his employer, or by showing that he did not voluntarily leave work but rather was discharged. Id.

The Commission found that Mr. Sokol did not meet his burden. In support, it stated that it believed that the new contract "was substantially and predominantly similar" to Mr. Sokol's original contract and that the changes to which Mr. Sokol objected were "minor changes to the contract [which] did not constitute a substantial change in wages or working conditions." It found that because the changes were minor and reasonable, it was unreasonable of Mr. Sokol to refuse to sign the new contract, and thus he should be considered to have voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer. It thus disqualified him from benefits. Mr. Sokol appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed.

We review the determination of the Commission, not of the circuit court. Charles v. Missouri Div. of Employment Sec., 750 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Mo.App.1988). We will affirm a factual determination by the Commission as to whether an employee voluntarily left his employ or was discharged if it is supported by competent and substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Chilton v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 805 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Mo.App.1991). We will,...