City and Co. of Denver v. Bd. of Adjustment
Decision Date | 23 May 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 01CA0762.,01CA0762. |
Citation | 55 P.3d 252 |
Parties | CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a Colorado municipal corporation, and its Department of Zoning Administration; Brian Volkman; and AGR, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER and David P. Spencer, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
J. Wallace Wortham, Jr., Denver City Attorney, Patrick A. Wheeler, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff Appellee City and County of Denver and its Department of Zoning Administration.
Banks & Imatani, P.C., Edward Imatani, Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Brian Volkman and AGR, LLC.
Peterson Dymond Reagor, LLP, David D. Schlachter, Englewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge ROY.
In this proceeding pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) brought by plaintiffs, City and County of Denver, Brian Volkman, and AGR, LLC (developer), defendant, David P. Spencer (neighbor), appeals from a district court judgment reversing an order of the Board of Adjustment of the City and County of Denver (board) revoking developer's zoning permit. We reverse and remand.
This case concerns the construction of a multifamily residential development as a use by right in the Glenn Court/Stoneman's Row subarea of the Platte River Valley (PRV) zoning district. The subarea zoning standards are set forth in § 59-502E of the Denver Revised Municipal Code (the code).
On November 5, 1999, the zoning administrator approved developer's zoning permit for construction of the development. The application for the permit was submitted as a small development under § 59-499(d)(1) of the code, which excused developer from providing notice to all landowners in the subarea. See Denver Rev. Mun.Code 59-499(d)(1)(b.5) (1982). The adjoining landowners therefore were not notified of developer's application, nor of its approval.
Developer began construction on February 11, 2000. On February 16, 2000, neighbor filed an objection with the zoning administrator, requesting that the permit be revoked because it violated the code. The zoning administrator denied the request in a letter the next day, which informed neighbor that he could appeal to the board. On February 24, 2000, neighbor appealed from the denial of his request for revocation and asked that the board revoke the permit and direct developer to cease construction pending the outcome of the review. The board scheduled an evidentiary hearing, but declined to order developer to cease construction. Following the evidentiary hearing, the board unanimously reversed the zoning administrator's decision and revoked the zoning permit. The city sought review pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), and developer intervened. The district court reversed the findings and conclusions of the board. Neighbor appeals from that decision.
We consider whether the board abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction, as well as whether it applied an erroneous legal standard. See Puckett v. City & County of Denver, 12 P.3d 313 (Colo.App. 2000)
. Generally, a reviewing court should defer to the construction of a statute by the administrative officials charged with its enforcement. See Platte River Environmental Conservation Organization, Inc. v. National Hog Farms, Inc., 804 P.2d 290 (Colo.App. 1990). If there is a reasonable basis for an administrative board's interpretation of the law, we may not set aside the decision on that ground. See Wilkinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 1269 (Colo. App.1993).
Administrative proceedings are accorded a presumption of validity and regularity, and all reasonable doubts as to the correctness of administrative rulings must be resolved in favor of the agency. The burden is on the party challenging an administrative agency's action to overcome the presumption that the agency's acts were proper. See Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267 (Colo.1990)
Neighbor argues that the district court erred by concluding that the board exceeded its jurisdiction in hearing his appeal because it was untimely. Neighbor contends that his February 24 appeal was timely from the zoning administrator's February 17 letter. We agree.
The city's home rule charter states:
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by an officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by any decision of an administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time, as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of appeal, specifying the grounds thereof.
Denver Rev. Mun.Code B1.19-3 (1982)(emphasis added). Further, the board is empowered to "hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of this amendment or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto." Denver Rev. Mun.Code B1.19-6 (1982)(emphasis added). Section 59-39(a) of the code adds that "[a]ny person aggrieved ... may appeal to the board of adjustment from any order or decision of the department [of zoning administration]" (emphasis added). The relevant board rule provides that an appeal "must be filed in the office of the Board within fifteen (15) days of the action appealed." Board of Adjustment Restated Rules of Procedure art. III, § 1.
A city ordinance must be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See Denver Rev. Mun.Code 59-16(c)(1982); Catholic Archdiocese v. City & County of Denver, 741 P.2d 333 (Colo.1987); Steamboat Springs Rental & Leasing, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 15 P.3d 785 (Colo.App. 2000).
Construing each of the above ordinances in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning, it is apparent that they permit neighbor to appeal from the zoning administrator's decision not to review the approval of developer's zoning permit. Our opinion is supported by the zoning administrator's own interpretation of the ordinances in the letter advising neighbor of his right to appeal, as well as by the board's construction and conclusion that "[t]he appeal was timely filed February 24, 2000, from a letter of the Zoning Administrator dated February 17, 2000."
We are mindful of developer's argument that permitting a right of appeal from a decision not to review a prior decision minimizes the usefulness of the fifteen-day time limit. However, in light of the ordinances' plain language and intent to create a right of appeal, and the lack of notice to neighbors or other interested parties of the granting of the zoning permit, we cannot hold that neighbor's right of appeal was extinguished fifteen days after the issuance of the permit. To do so would extinguish the right of appeal where the aggrieved party is not notified of the application or zoning administrator's decision until after the expiration of the fifteen-day period, and thus would undermine the enforcement of the ordinances and the intent to grant a right to such an appeal. We therefore conclude that neighbor's appeal was timely filed from the zoning administrator's decision not to review the permit approval.
Neighbor contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the board lacked the authority and power to review the zoning administrator's decision de novo. We agree.
Denver Rev. Mun.Code B1.19-7 (1982). Further, § 59-54 provides:
Denver Rev. Mun.Code 59-54(1) (1982). These powers are limited in Denver Rev. Mun.Code 59-55, which provides in pertinent part:
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