City of Aurora v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Adams

Decision Date10 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95SC10,95SC10
PartiesCITY OF AURORA, Colorado; City of Thornton, Colorado; City of Westminster, Colorado; City of Brighton, Colorado; City of Broomfield, Colorado; and City of Federal Heights, Colorado; Petitioners, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF ADAMS, Colorado; and the following county officers in their official capacities: Helen Hill, Treasurer; Terry Funderburk, Finance Director; and David Wilson, Budget Officer; Respondents.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Griffiths & Tanoue, P.C., Susan K. Griffiths, Denver, City of Aurora, Charles H. Richardson, Julia A. Bannon, Michael J. Hyman, Aurora, for Petitioners.

Robert J. Loew, Adams County Attorney, Ronald A. Carl, Assistant Adams County Attorney, Brighton, for Respondents.

Geoffrey T. Wilson, Denver, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League.

Bruce T. Barker, Weld County Attorney, Greeley, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Counties, Inc.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in City of Aurora v. Board of County Comm'rs, 902 P.2d 375 (Colo.App.1994). The court of appeals held that Adams County can allocate revenue from the specific ownership tax to the Adams County Road and Bridge Fund, irrespective of the allocation's effect on Adams County's duty to share its road and bridge tax revenues with the municipalities in its jurisdiction. Because we find that the General Assembly did not intend to restrict the ability of the Board of County Commissioners to manage the Adams County budget, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

The petitioners, City of Aurora, Colorado; City of Thornton, Colorado; City of Westminster, Colorado; City of Brighton, Colorado; City of Broomfield, Colorado; and City of Federal Heights, Colorado (collectively referred to as the Cities), are all municipalities located partially or totally in Adams County, Colorado. The respondents, the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Adams, Colorado, and its officials (collectively referred to as Adams County), have traditionally allocated some revenue from the specific ownership tax to fund road and bridge construction throughout Adams County. Beginning in 1992, Adams County has allocated a majority of its specific ownership tax revenue to the Adams County Road and Bridge Fund (Road and Bridge Fund).

The Cities initiated this action in the district court seeking review of Adams County's action. The Cities contend that Adams County has effectively eliminated their revenue from the road and bridge tax and the shareback provision by using a majority of the revenue from the specific ownership tax to fund the Road and Bridge Fund. Adams County asserts that the procedure is within its budgeting powers and that it has been allocating under this format since the inception of the specific ownership tax in 1970.

The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Cities, finding that (1) a preliminary injunction was unwarranted, and (2) the specific ownership tax revenue may not lawfully be allocated to the Road and Bridge Fund.

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction but on different grounds, and reversed the trial court's judgment. The court of appeals held that the specific ownership tax revenue may be lawfully allocated to the Road and Bridge Fund, and we granted certiorari. 1 We conclude that the specific ownership tax revenue may be lawfully allocated to the Road and Bridge Fund, and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

II.

This case involves the interrelationship of two taxes: (1) the specific ownership tax, a state personal property tax imposed on motor vehicles; and (2) the county road and bridge tax, a county ad valorem property tax. To put this case in perspective, we will describe each tax.

The specific ownership tax is authorized by article X, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution and is implemented by a statutory scheme presently codified at sections 42-3-101 to -144, 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). 2 Specific ownership taxes are collected in part by the county clerk and recorder and in part by the state with respect to interstate vehicles. The state remits a portion of its collections to each county based on the percentage of state roads located in the county. § 42-3-107(6), 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). Each county in turn is required to apportion its share between itself and the political subdivisions located within the county. § 42-3-107(23), 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). 3

The road and bridge tax is an ad valorem property tax which the county is authorized to levy under section 43-2-203(2), 17 C.R.S. (1993). As its name suggests, the revenue from the tax is used to build and maintain county highways and bridges. Each municipality located within the county is entitled to a share of the road and bridge tax revenue collected by the county. 4

The controversy in this case centers on the definition of the Road and Bridge Fund established by section 43-2-202(1), 17 C.R.S. (1993), which states:

A fund to be known as the county road and bridge fund is created and established in each county of this state. Such fund shall consist of the revenue derived from the tax authorized to be levied under section 43-2-203 for road and bridge construction, maintenance, and administration, all moneys received by the county from the state or federal governments for expenditure on roads and bridges, and any other moneys which may become available to the county for such purpose....

§ 43-2-202(1), 17 C.R.S. (1993) (emphasis added).

The Cities object to Adams County's practice contending that allocation of specific ownership tax revenue to the Road and Bridge Fund violates section 43-2-202(1), 17 C.R.S. (1993), the statute establishing the fund. The Cities allege that the increased allocation of specific ownership taxes to the Road and Bridge Fund reduced the road and bridge tax and correspondingly decreased the shareback revenues allocated to the Cities under the statute.

III.

In interpreting the Road and Bridge Fund statute, we rely on the well-established rules of statutory interpretation. First, we look at the statutory language itself. Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39, 42 (Colo.1992). Where the statutory language is clear and certain, the statute should be construed as written. Id. Where, however, the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear, we may rely on other tools of statutory construction such as legislative history or administrative interpretation in order to discern and effectuate the legislative intent. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991); Howard Elec. and Mechanical, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 771 P.2d 475, 478-79 (Colo.1989).

A.

Section 43-2-202 which governs the Road and Bridge Fund provides that the fund can include revenue from three sources: (1) the road and bridge tax; (2) state and federal programs; and (3) "any other moneys which may become available to the county for such purpose." The statute does not define the terms "any other moneys" or "may become available."

The Cities contend this statute must be read in conjunction with the statute controlling the Adams County General Fund (General Fund). The Cities assert that the specific ownership tax must be deposited into the General Fund and, once deposited, cannot be expended for roads and bridges. Section 30-25-105 creates a General Fund, and provides:

A fund to be known as the county general fund is hereby created and established in each of the counties of the state of Colorado. The county general fund shall consist of all county revenue except that specifically allocated by law for other purposes.

§ 30-25-105, 12A C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). The Cities contend that because the specific ownership tax is not "specifically allocated by law" to a certain fund it must be deposited into the General Fund. Moreover, the Cities assert that section 30-25-106, 12A C.R.S. (1986), expressly prohibits allocations from the General Fund to road and bridge construction. Section 30-25-106 provides:

The board of county commissioners is authorized to appropriate money from the county general fund for all ordinary county expenses ... except expenditures for ... roads and bridges....

§ 30-25-106(1), 12A C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). 5

In response, Adams County contends that the language "any other moneys which may become available to the county for such purpose" gives the Adams County Board of Commissioners broad discretion to use "any" money to fund road and bridge construction projects through the Road and Bridge Fund unless such usage is prohibited by law. Under its broad interpretation, "any" means all other revenue sources, including the specific ownership tax. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (3d ed. 1986) (defining "any" as "non-specific and expansive"). In addition, Adams County asserts that the specific ownership tax revenue is "specifically allocated by law" because the Board of Commissioners allocated the revenue to the Road and Bridge Fund in the 1992 Adams County budget. See Black's Law Dictionary 101 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "allocate" as "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys"). Adams County relies on its broad discretionary budget powers under section 30-11-107(2)(a), 12A C.R.S. (1986), and the presumption of validity which accompanies an exercise of its budgetary powers under section 30-11-107(2)(b), 12A C.R.S. (1986), to assert its position.

B.

Given that the statutory language is not clear with respect to whether the specific ownership tax revenue can be directly allocated to the Road and Bridge Fund, we must turn to other sources to construe section 43-2-202, 17 C.R.S. (1993). We look first to the legislative history and next to the administrative interpretation given to the...

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