City of Aurora v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Adams
| Decision Date | 20 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | 94CA0185,Nos. 94CA0180,s. 94CA0180 |
| Citation | 902 P.2d 375 |
| Parties | CITY OF AURORA, Colorado; City of Thornton, Colorado; City of Westminster, Colorado; City of Broomfield, Colorado; City of Federal Heights, Colorado; and City of Brighton, Colorado, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF ADAMS, Colorado; and the following officers in their official capacities, Helen Hill, Treasurer, Terry Funderburk, Finance Director, David Wilson, Budget Officer, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Charles H. Richardson, City Atty., Michael J. Hyman, Julia A. Bannon, Asst. City Attys., Aurora, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee City of Aurora.
Griffiths & Tanoue, P.C., Susan K. Griffiths, Denver, Kevin Maggio, City Atty., Margaret A. Emerich, Asst. City Atty., Thornton, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee City of Thornton.
Martin R. McCullough, City Atty., Ruthanne Gartland, Asst. City Atty., Westminster, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee City of Westminster.
Roy S. Howard, City Atty., James W. Rourke, Asst. City Atty., Broomfield, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee City of Broomfield.
Daniel, McCain, Brown, Wallace & Brubaker, LLC, Margaret R. Brubaker, Leonard H. McCain, Brighton, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee City of Brighton.
Windholz & Associates, David S. Williamson, William P. Hayashi, James A. Windholz, Boulder, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee City of Federal Heights.
Robert J. Loew, County Atty., Ronald A. Carl, Rita M. Harrell, Asst. County Attys., Brighton, for defendants-appellees and cross-appellants.
Bruce T. Barker, Office of Weld County Atty., Greeley, amicus curiae for Colorado Counties, Inc.
Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.
In this action for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, plaintiffs, City of Aurora, City of Thornton, City of Westminster, City of Brighton, City of Broomfield, and City of Federal Heights, appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants, the Adams County Board of Commissioners, and, in their official capacities, Helen Hill, Adams County treasurer, Terry Funderburk, Adams County finance director, and David Wilson, Adams County budget officer, (Adams County) from allocating specific ownership tax revenue to the County Road and Bridge Fund. Adams County cross-appeals from the partial summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs in which the trial court declared that specific ownership tax revenue may not lawfully be allocated to the County Road and Bridge Fund.
Because it is dispositive, we first address the issue raised by Adams County on cross-appeal. As to that issue, we reverse. And, as a consequence, we affirm the denial of the preliminary injunction on grounds different from that relied upon by the trial court.
Plaintiffs filed this action to challenge the practice by Adams County of allocating specific ownership tax revenue to the County Road and Bridge Fund. According to plaintiffs, specific ownership tax revenue, pursuant to statute, must be placed in the general fund of the county receiving the funds. Thus, they argue, it is illegal for Adams County to allocate any of the specific ownership tax revenue to the County Road and Bridge Fund. For several reasons, we do not agree.
Section 30-25-105, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 12A) provides that:
A fund to be known as the county general fund is hereby created and established in each of the counties of the state of Colorado. The county general fund shall consist of all county revenue except that specifically allocated by law for other purposes.
Colo. Const. art. X, § 6, provides for the creation of a specific ownership tax upon motor vehicles, wheeled trailers, semi-trailers, trailer coaches, and mobile and self-propelled construction equipment in lieu of ad valorem taxes, to be "apportioned, distributed, and paid over to the political subdivisions of the state in such manner as may be prescribed by law." See also § 42-3-101, et seq., C.R.S. (1993 Repl.Vol. 17).
Because the funds collected and distributed as specific ownership taxes are not allocated by this constitutional provision to any specific purpose, plaintiffs maintain that they must be placed in the county general fund. On the other hand, Adams County argues that the specific ownership taxes are specifically allocated to the road and bridge fund by law pursuant to the budgetary authority accorded a board of county commissioners by § 30-11-107, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 12A) and § 29-1-108, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.). We agree with Adams County.
A county acts through its board of county commissioners which "possesses only such powers as are by the Constitution and statutes expressly conferred upon it, and, in addition, such implied powers as are reasonably necessary to the proper execution of its express powers." Robbins v. County Commissioners, 50 Colo. 610, 615, 115 P. 526, 528 (1911). "[T]he legislature can and does, at times in Colorado, delegate limited police and legislative powers to local governmental units" including counties. See Asphalt Paving Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 162 Colo. 254, 259, 425 P.2d 289, 292 (1967).
Pursuant to legislative authority, county commissioners are accorded broad discretion on budgetary matters. See Tihonovich v. Williams, 196 Colo. 144, 582 P.2d 1051 (1978). County commissioners have the exclusive power to adopt an annual budget, which is presumptively valid. Beacom v. Board of County Commissioners, 657 P.2d 440 (Colo.1983); § 30-11-107(2)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 12A). In reviewing budgeting actions, courts must give great deference to the county commissioners' determinations, and such actions may be nullified only if they are a clear abuse of discretion. Johns v. Miller, 42 Colo.App. 97, 594 P.2d 590 (1979).
Accordingly, by law, the defendant board possesses broad discretionary authority to develop and adopt a county budget; thus, it may determine to what use the specific ownership tax moneys may be put. We perceive no abuse of discretion by that board in placing moneys derived from the specific ownership tax in the county road and bridge fund. See § 30-11-107; Tihonovich v. Williams, supra.
Plaintiffs contend that this construction of § 30-25-105 gives the board of county commissioners unwarranted discretionary power over the creation and financing of county funds not intended by the General Assembly. We do not agree.
A county ordinance or resolution and a state statute may both remain effective so long as they do not contain express or implied terms in irreconcilable conflict. Wilkinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 1269 (Colo.App.1993). However, a county may not adopt an ordinance or resolution which is in conflict with a state statute. See § 30-15-411, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 12A); see also C & M Sand & Gravel v. Board of County Commissioners, 673 P.2d 1013 (Colo.App.1983). If there are conflicting terms, the local legislation may be preempted by the state statute. Board of County Commissioners v. Martin, 856 P.2d 62 (Colo.App.1993).
Thus, the board of county commissioners has broad discretion over budgetary matters only within the power granted by the General Assembly. If a county budgetary action conflicts with an explicit state statute as to the creation or distribution of county funds, the state statute controls. See City of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners, 644 P.2d 76 (Colo.App.1981) (); cf. Tisdel v. Board of County Commissioners, 621 P.2d 1357 (Colo.1980) ().
Nonetheless, according to plaintiffs, the statutory scheme for the creation and financing of the county road and bridge fund must be read restrictively. In support of this contention, they argue that changes in the language of § 43-2-202(1), C.R.S. (1993 Repl.Vol. 17), enacted in 1970, eliminated any discretionary appropriations by the board of county commissioners. We disagree.
Section 43-2-202(1) provides for the creation of a county road and bridge fund in each county: Such fund shall consist of the revenue derived from the tax authorized to be levied under section 43-2-203 for road and bridge construction, maintenance, and administration, all moneys received by the county from the state or federal governments for expenditure on roads and bridges, and any other moneys which may become available to the county for such purpose.
Prior to 1970, the predecessor statute, C.R.S.1963, 120-1-2, read as follows:
A fund to be known as the county road and bridge fund is hereby created and established in each of the counties of the state of Colorado. The county road and bridge fund shall consist of all moneys received from state and federal sources to be expended by a county for road and bridge construction, maintenance and administration; appropriation by the county commissioners; and all other moneys available for road and bridge purposes.
Contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, the 1970 amendments do not simply eliminate county appropriations as a method of funding for roads and bridges. The amended language provides for a road and bridge tax levy and broadens the "all other moneys" provision to include all moneys "which may become available."
Adoption of the construction of §§ 30-25-105 and 43-2-202(1) urged by plaintiffs would render meaningless the phrase "any other moneys which may become available to the county for such purpose." "May" implies a certain amount of discretion;...
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